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The existing political archetype of sexual minorities in the United States present lesbians, 
gays, and bisexuals as more ideologically liberal and Democratic than heterosexuals, as well as 
politically driven by issues specifically related to LGBT life. Ascribing political distinctiveness 
based solely on identification with a group, however, commits the fallacy of “difference-as-
explanation” (Shields 2008:3030), equating a “shared [LGBT] history of sexual oppression and 
[LGBT] political sympathies” (Duong 2012:381).  
Post-modern theories posit that social positions in society, i.e., socially-constructed 
categories of identity, exist as part of a simultaneously-experienced and mutually-reinforced 
“matrix of oppression” (Collins 2000:18). The personal meaning and political effects associated 
with a particular identity can only be understood in relation to the other social identities an 
individual occupies and the related structural inequalities which reinforce identity-based 
asymmetric power distributions. 
Using sample survey methodology, I conduct a web-based survey of 1216 sexual 
minority adults residing in the United States. Informed by a cross-disciplinary approach, I 
measure cognitive and affective aspects of sexual and racial identity – not simple dummy 
indicators – in order to analyze the effects of intersecting socially-constructed identities on 
political attitudes (i.e., toward income inequality, government provision of services, private vs. 
public rights, and policy-specifics such as gun control and immigration) and behaviors (i.e., 
political participation and alienation from the political process). 
My findings progress the study of LGBT politics beyond existing literature by 
quantitatively demonstrating that sexual minority politics are motivated by more than simple 
group identification. The analysis shows that sexual minorities use cognitive and affective 
evaluations of society as well as relational identity comparisons in their internal political 
calculus. The data suggest that liberal (i.e., economically redistributive, pro-civil rights, or anti-
status quo) political claims, as well as participation in and alienation from the American political 
system, occur as sexual minorities evaluate their own sexual and racial identities in relation to 
heteronormative, racist, and androcentric power structures in society. Furthermore, these internal 
and relational comparisons extend across identity categories and exhibit separate and ignificantly 
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 CHAPTER 1: SEXUAL IDENTITY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
  
Despite the long history of sexual and gender minority1 (often represented by the moniker 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender people – or the umbrella acronym LGBT) visibility and 
community in the United States, LGBT people were not recognized as active participants in 
popular political and social debates until the latter portion of the 20th Century (D’Emilio 1983; 
1992; Chauncey 1994; Howard 1999). Over the last four decades, scholars developed a political 
archetype of LGBT people. Politically distinct from heterosexuals, sexual minorities are also 
characterized as ideologically liberal, primarily Democratic, and well-informed on LGBT-
specific public policy (Edelman 1993; Sherrill 1996; Hertzog 1996; Smith and Haider-Markel 
2002; Shaffner and Senic 2006). 
  These studies, however, typify a pattern of identity politics research which only seeks to 
emphasize differences between sexual minorities and heterosexuals. Just as feminist studies were 
critiqued for a deficiency of analyses which examined the “heterogeneous ethnic character of 
[gender relations],” so too can LGBT studies be critiqued for failing to explore intragroup 
heterogeneity among LGBT people (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1983:71; Rich 1983). By 
empirically demonstrating political distinctiveness, LGBT studies assume “adequation between 
                                                 
1 It is important to delineate the difference between sexual and gender minority studies. The term 
sexual minority typically refers to sexual orientations other than heterosexuality, most notably, 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual orientations – although this list is not exhaustive (e.g., pansexual, 
asexual, etc.) – and is often denoted by the acronym ‘LGB;’ whereas the term gender minority 
typically refers to gender queer, variant, non-conforming, transgender, or transsexual people. 
Sexual orientation and gender identity are not interchangeable characteristics (Fassinger and 
Arseneau 2007). Because this distinction has not been widely recognized in quantitative political 
science research, the conflation of sexual minority and gender minority identities has been, and 
continues to be, a troubling trend in political science. While the study of gender minority 
communities should be a priority for political science, the limits of sample survey research – and 
funding – require this study to examine sexual minorities, only. 
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[the LGBT] shared history of sexual oppression and [LGBT] political sympathies” (Duong 
2012:381). That is, in failing to explore intragroup differences, scholars have assumed an 
equivalence between LGBT identity and liberal/Democratic political attitudes. This oversight 
holds serious social and political consequences for sexual minorities.  
Politically, as Egan (2012) suggests, LGBT people may be subject to electoral capture. 
That is, a situation where a particular group of voters are increasingly taken for granted by one 
political party while being ignored by the other (Smith 2007). Socially, LGBT identity has been 
established and perpetuated by society and LGBT elites as white, upper-to-middle class, non-
religious, and male (Ochs, 1996; Cohen 1997; Cohen 2001; Purdie-Vaughns, and Eibach 2008). 
By accepting this assessment and failing to interrogate the category, social science has 
contributed to the misrepresentation and underrepresentation of racial, ethnic, low 
socioeconomic, gender variant, and other marginalized minorities within the LGBT community 
and society at-large (Duggan 2003; Ferguson 2005; Strolovich 2007; Purdie-Vaughns and 
Eibach 2008). Assessing and analyzing political variation among LGBT people is important both 
for producing representative political parties and social movement organizations as well as 
refining our understanding of the predictive power of social identities (Cole 2008:444; Cohen 
1999). 
 The evolution of feminist and queer theories throughout the 20th and 21st Centuries and 
the multidisciplinary adoption of the Intersectional approach have led contemporary scholars to 
critically analyze the category referred to as ‘LGBT’ (Fassinger and Arseneau 2007). While 
qualitative studies have eluded to heterogeneity in the socio-political experiences of sexual and 
gender minorities (Icard 1986; Chan 1989; Loiacano 1989; Thumma 1991; Rogers and Lott 
1997; Garcia 1998; Green 1998), due to methodological and practical considerations, only 
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recently have scholars begun to quantitatively – primarily through survey research – examine 
within-group political variation (Jensen 2014; Maccio, DeRosa, Wilks, and Wright 2014; Swank 
and Fahs 2013a; Egan 2012; Lewis, Rogers, and Sherrill 2011; Marzullo and Herdt 2011; 
D’Augelli, Rendian, Sinclair, and Grossman 2006; Harding 2006; Egan and Sherrill 2005). 
While these studies have begun to elucidate variation in LGBT political experiences, the 
interaction between social, cultural, and historical effects (e.g. religion, ethnicity, class, 
(dis)ability) and identity (e.g. gender, race, or sexuality) are often overlooked. Furthermore, the 
extant attitudinal literature examines those attitudes relating specifically to aspects of LGBT life, 
reinforcing the notion that sexuality is only important in determining attitudes about LGBT-
specific public policy. 
The goal of this study is to analyze and explain political attitudinal and behavioral 
variation within sexual minority communities in the United States. Tangentially, with this study, 
I also seek to clarify, quantitatively, how we understand sexuality in political science. Critical 
feminist and queer theories as well as intersectionality have shown that the behavioral effect of 
identity must be measured as more than just a categorical indicator, e.g., dichotomous ‘1’ or ‘0’ 
(Hancock 2007; Shields 2008; Warner 2008). Complex social-psychological and socio-historical 
processes such as ‘androcentrism,’ heterosexism, and racism, among others, interact and effect 
one’s political orientation (Purdie-Vaughs and Eibach 2008). It follows, then, that LGBT people 
are not politically distinctive (i.e., ideologically liberal or Democratically-oriented) simply 
because of a sexual minority identity (Shields 2008). Instead, I hypothesize, that interactions 
between identity categories effect the political attitudes and behaviors of sexual minorities. 
Specifically, one’s relationship to an identity category, experiences with stigmatization resultant 
from identification with a certain group, the composition of one’s social networks, and one’s 
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socio-cultural condition interact to influence how one participates in and perceives the political 
process as well as one’s attitudinal orientation (Bedolla 2007). 
In a recent interview, the well-regarded statistician and political commentator Nate Silver 
intimates that the collection and analysis of methodologically sound survey data is important in a 
representative democracy because survey data provide an equitable forum for the conveyance of 
ideas between a constituency and their representatives (Gross 2016). The collection and analysis 
of quantitative data from marginalized communities shares this raison d’être. For example, the 
extant sexual minority attitudinal literature typically only differentiates LGBT people from 
heterosexuals, rarely do political analyses fully interrogate intragroup heterogeneity. This gap in 
political science and LGBT studies literature necessitates further scientific inquiry. Also, public 
opinion research is a valuable tool which, when used properly, keeps interest groups, policy 
elites, and government officials accountable to their constituencies. Understanding the variation 
in attitudes and behaviors, and most especially learning how or why variation exists is critical to 
informing policy decisions, political campaigns, interest group and community service 
organization strategies, and, most importantly, assuring that marginalized groups and individuals 
have representation and a voice in our democracy. 
A detailed examination of intragroup variation and its effect on political participation and 
political attitudes is not lightly undertaken. The variety of lived experiences within the LGBT 
community is vast. Quantitative studies are therefore complex and require large samples – a 
difficulty given there exist few sample frames from which to draw respondents. While model 
complexity is not always a vice (Davis 2008; Walby, Armstrong, and Strid 2012), funding 
limitations are problematic. For this reason, the scope of this study is limited to the quantitative 
exploration of sexual minority politics. A second issue faced by quantitative intersectional 
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scholars of LGBT politics is in the representativeness of sample frames which do exist. 
Specifically, affluent LGBT people are over-represented. This problem further reinforces 
existing theoretical and methodological marginalization of poor LGBT people who do not have 
access to the technology necessary to participate in web-based survey research.  
In the following pages, I first trace the roots of modern conceptions of identity and the 
influences which feminist, intersectional, and queer theorists predict to be important 
determinants of political attitudes and behaviors. I also discuss the role of identity in politics by 
examining the historical and current uses of identity categories in political research. Secondly, I 
analyze the contribution of the many theories and disciplines which have produced a body of 
literature broadly defined as intersectional theory. A brief history of intersectionality, and a 
discussion of the many theoretical and methodological debates which permeate contemporary 
intersectional research follows. At the end of this section, I present the theoretical foundation of 
this study.  
In the next chapter, I examine the theoretical model, in detail, including an elucidation of 
key hypotheses. I then discuss the survey methodology focusing on survey objectives, sample 
size, data collection, question construction, and statistical methods. An analysis of the survey and 
statistical results follows in the third and fourth chapters. I conclude with a discussion of the 
myriad intersecting and mutually reinforcing experiences with social advantage and disadvantage 







Political Identity Research 
 
Early identity research in American politics was based on the idea of America as an 
identity ‘melting pot,’ and examined how well, if at all, various ethnicities – conceptualized at 
the time predominantly as European immigrants – assimilated into American society (See Dahl 
1961, for example). The theoretical rationale, and primary concern of this line of research was to 
ensure that the ‘melting pot’ was doing its job to ‘burn away’ impurities, unnecessary and non-
conforming identities, and producing a cohesive, distinctly American identity. As conceptions of 
identity evolved and categorical-based differences multiplied, studies of identity politics 
emerged which specifically examined inter-group variation, i.e., whether attitudinal variation can 
be contributed to differences in identity. Founded on theories such as self-categorization, social 
identity, and identity politics (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell 1987; Tajfel 1978), 
such studies produced many valuable insights, including into sexual minority politics; however, 
they are roundly criticized for relying on unitary conceptions of identity – a fallacy which 
prohibits the exploration of intra-group diversity, renders invisible group members at the margins 
or intersections of certain identities, fails to consider socio-contextual influences on identity and, 
fails to problematize the use of identity categories in social science research. 
In order to understand modern conceptions of identity in political research it is important 
to first review and, where necessary critique, the literature on the subject. In what follows, I 
review the literature concerning identity as a predictor of political attitudes and behaviors. While 
critical, I recognize the important contributions of this literature to modern research. Afterward, I 
more thoroughly examine modern critiques of identity politics and explore contemporary 
conceptions of identity and its role in political processes. After a brief introduction to 
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intersectional theory, I focus the remainder of the discussion specifically on LGBT politics and 
how modern intersectional and queer conceptions of sexual identity are hypothesized to 
influence political attitudes and behaviors. The chapter ends with a brief review before 
introducing the theoretical model used in the current study.  
 
From Ethnic Voting to Identity Politics 
 
 It is important to begin any discussion of identity categories by noting that social 
identities are, in fact, social constructs and cultural representations (Omi and Winant 1994). 
Social constructionism is essentially a challenge to the inevitability of a given social condition – 
whether that is an identity such as race and ethnicity (Omi and Winant 1994) or gender (Risman 
2004), or social problems such as poverty, unemployment, and discrimination (Ingram and 
Schneider 2005; Edelman 1988; Collins 1989). Social construction typically occurs when a 
dominant group in society agree to “the values and meanings associated with events, persons, 
groups, regions, countries, or any other objective or subjective situation” (Schneider and Ingram 
1997:106), although the process may also take the form of internal policing whereby members of 
minority groups determine what constitutes membership in the group (Purdie-Vaughns and 
Eibach 2008). These values and meanings are entirely dependent on the structure of power 
within a given society and as such are highly contextual – changing from society to society and 
across time. Identities are not only socially constructed they are also culturally represented in 
that the structure of a society is built upon constructions of identity (Omi and Winant 1997). 
Homosexuality in the United States, for example, has been constructed as sexually deviant, a 
symptom of mental illness, a chosen lifestyle, and a natural biological development depending 
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upon the historical context and structure of power (Strolovich 2012; Herek 2010; Brookey 2001). 
Furthermore, as will be discussed in greater detail later, the term LGBT – once constructed as an 
‘umbrella’ category for sexual minorities – has been challenged by critical scholarship as an 
unrepresentative conflation of gender and sexuality (Fassinger and Arseneau 2007). As 
represented in modern American culture, homophobia, heteronormativity, biphobia, and 
transphobia are systems of power which structure conventional representations of gender and 
sexuality in society (e.g. in media depictions and public policy). As eluded in this example, 
social construction presents a number of issues for identity measurement – a discussion to which 
I will return – and it is also a recurring concept in this study. It also highlights the importance of 
examining, as well as problematizing, societal power structures in order to better understand 
their effect on politics. In the following sections, which discuss the use of identity measures in 
political science, it is important to remember that the categories and cleavages used to determine 
differences have been imposed on groups in our society by scientists and policy-makers alike. 
They are, however, constructs that rest on contextual, structural, and cognitive assumptions 
which, in actuality, change over time. 
Identity Categories & American Political Research 
The United States is neither socially nor politically homogeneous. One need only examine 
election returns or interest group data to understand that a multitude of political divisions exist in 
the United States; divisions which find expression in multiple and competing forms of political 
action and attitudes (Truman 1951). Early models in political science sought to explain political 
heterogeneity by examining social heterogeneity. These studies postulated that the country was 
divided along a number of cleavages, believed to be representative of the dominant social 
divisions among the United States population. These cleavages, in turn, were thought to be the 
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basis for individual “political choices” (e.g. vote choice or policy preferences) (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954:54). The primary “social experiences” which were assumed at the 
time to “most persistently underlay political choices” were centered around “class, ethnic, and 
ecological differences” (Berelson, et al. 1954:54) although by the 1960s political parties had 
emerged as a social identity cleavage which also appeared to be a reliable predictor of political 
behavior (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). 
 To Berelson, et al. (1954) and others, class represented one of the most basic divisions in 
American society. From the era of the Great Depression forward, Americans were divided by 
“occupational, income, and status cleavages” (Berelson, et al 1954:54). As it was then viewed, 
class division in American politics could be summed up by the following statement: “Richer 
people vote Republican more than poorer people” Berelson, et al (1954:56). Class distinctions, 
though, are certainly more complex than this rudimentary observation. Political socialization and 
historical context are also factors which influence class-based voting; however, it was argued 
that activating a class-centered identity required “a depression or heated political campaign 
directly aimed at economic interests” (Berelson, et al 1954:59). Social class was therefore 
reasoned to be less salient among the general population than other cleavages such as race, 
ethnicity, or geography. Contrarily, socioeconomic class, especially as it intersects with race, 
ethnicity, and gender in the United States, is considered to represent a powerful influence in 
American politics (Landry 2004). Indeed, contemporary western feminist and Black feminist 
theorists explicitly reject conceptions of identity which devalue the role of class in psychological 
and political development.2 As will become clear, early conceptualizations of identity in political 
                                                 
2 The recognition of class-based cleavages also represents a broader international philosophical 
and political debate which greatly influenced what would come to be the western Feminist 
Movement – from which originated many of the ideas adopted in this study. Socialist Feminism 
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science both reinforced societal divisions and, because of the nature of their construction often 
completely overlooked marginalized communities.  
 Other divisions among the electorate were observed along “religious, racial, and ethnic 
cleavages” (Berelson, et al 1954:54). Politicians could work to unite what was perceived at the 
time to be cohesive blocs of voters by making “appeals” to “a common characteristic” shared by 
members of the group and/or members of the group and the politician (Berelson, et al 1954:63). 
Furthermore, because of their “internal cohesiveness,” these groups offered ready-made political 
organizations which could be used to turn out the “bloc vote” for certain candidates (Berelson, et 
al 1954:63). Such conceptions represent perhaps the most egregious error in the study of political 
identities. Assuming homogeneity within social groups and then attributing political distinction 
to that homogeneity serves only to reify artificial differences and perpetuate stereotypes as well 
as to silence marginalized members of the group – important criticisms which will be reviewed 
later (Shields 2008). 
 Other identity constructs appear in early political science literature. Robert Dahl, for 
example, (1961) proposed that ethnic minorities – in this instance white European immigrant 
communities of New Haven, Connecticut – relied on their shared immigrant identity as a 
political heuristic informing their vote choice and behavior. In the debates over economic 
assimilation (i.e., whether ethnic cleavages would disappear once a group attained middle class 
status) Dahl (1961), Gordon (1964), Wolfinger (1965), Parenti (1967), and Gabriel (1972) 
                                                 
(i.e., “linking systems of patriarchy and capitalism”) and Marxist approaches to “racial and 
ethnic inequality which identified racism as a means to maintain class boundaries” would be 
subsumed by the intersectional perspective in the late 20th Century (Veenstra 2013:647). For 
perspectives on Socialist Feminism see Jaggar and Rothenberg (1993) and for perspectives on 
Marxist links between capitalism and racism see Bohmer (2005), finally, for a critique of Marxist 
influences on Feminism see Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1983).  
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offered competing hypotheses for why individuals vote for candidates with which they share an 
ethnic identity. 
Wolfinger’s (1965) “mobilization theory,” for example postulated that only after 
achieving middle-class status could ethnic minority candidates afford to compete for elected 
office and, in turn, inspire cohesive voting behavior among an ethnic population. While Parenti 
(1967) insisted that ethnic identities may never disappear, Gabriel (1972) proposed a “new 
theory of ethnic voting” to be tested using social psychological indicators of group belonging.  
Gabriel (1972) operationalized “ethnic consciousness” using a battery of interview questions 
such as whether respondents would object to being referred to as Italian or Irish; whether or not 
the respondent associated her/himself with the Italian or Irish community; whether or not 
respondents were happy with Italian/Irish traditions or if those traditions should be eliminated; 
and, how “at home” respondents felt among members of the Italian/Irish community (Gabriel 
1972:411-413). The study suggested that identity cohesion among ethnicities resulted in ethnic 
voting (i.e., selection of ethnic candidates on a ballot) and concluded that “the more intense an 
individual’s ethnic consciousness, the greater the chance that he will make an ethnic choice on 
the ballot” (Gabriel 1972:413).  
Early studies such as these gave strong indications that interactions across societal 
divisions held important implications in the study of political behavior. Although these early 
works failed to fully examine the effects of other social identities such as race, gender, and 
religion, Dahl’s (1961) work implies mutability (i.e., evolving new meaning over time) in 
identity categories as well as interaction between categories of difference (e.g., ethnicity and 
class) – key features of intersectional theory. Furthermore, concerning categorical mutability, it 
should be noted that the concept of ethnicity is itself an exemplar of social constructionism. That 
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is, “yesterday’s races are today’s ethnicities” (Parent, et al 2013:642). These early studies 
constructed ethnicity based on white European (Irish or Italian) descent while people of color 
were all construed as ethnically homogeneous. Later constructions of race and ethnicity have 
attempted to be more inclusive of cultural diversity (Omi and Winant 1994). Gabriel’s (1972) 
conclusions also implied intriguing new questions about the role of social identities in politics. 
For example, how socio-economic status (SES) is experienced across racial and ethnic 
categories; whether social structures or political institutions contribute to the experience of SES; 
and, how interactions between ethnicity and SES change over time. 
 Since the 1960s, political scientists have focused much effort and analyses on the strong 
correlations between partisan identity, vote choice, and political ideology (Campbell, et al 1960). 
Partisanship was constructed as “coalitions of sociodemographic groups” in which disparate 
racial, ethnic, class, and religious identities developed allied, if not entirely cohesive, partisan 
identities which held great promise both in terms of empirical study and applied political action 
(Nie, Verba, & Petrocik 1976:213; Axelrod 1972). While partisanship, along with political 
ideology, remain consistent predictors of political attitudes, the definition of party identification 
remains unclear (Fiorina 1981; Miller and Shanks 1996) and the psychological influences on 
partisanship ambiguous. Greene (2002), for example argues that partisan identity cannot solely 
be described as identification with a group. In addition, robust measures of partisanship must 
consider affective and cognitive components – attitudes and beliefs about political parties – in 
order to measure the full effect of partisan identity on political behavior (Greene 2002). 
 Continuing in the tradition of inter-group differentiation, political scientists have 
examined racial and ethnic groups (De la Garza and Weaver 1985; Binder, Polinard, Wrinkle 
1997; Claassen 2004; Jones and Frances 2012), religious groups (Woodberry and Smith 1998; 
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Greeley and Hout 2006), gender binaries (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef ,and Lin 2004; Norrander 
and Wilcox 2008), and sexual minorities (Edelman 1993; Sherrill 1996; Hertzog 1996; Smith 
and Haider-Markel 2002; Shaffner and Senic 2006) and shown distinctive political behaviors 
between one or more social categories of difference. These identity politics-based approaches 
highlight differences between identity categories in an effort to explain political phenomena. 
While a critique will be offered later, it is sufficient to say that identity-based explorations which 
rely on categorical differences as explanations have a number of theoretical flaws. That is not to 
say, however, that such studies are without value. In making categorical distinctions, researchers 
are able to highlight inequalities between groups, such as wage gaps based on gender or 
mortality rates based on race (Bowleg 2013) –  distinctions which are important for public 
policy. However, assuming group homogeneity (i.e., viewing groups as solid ‘blocs’ of voters or 
consistently opinionated as Berelson, et al (1964)) implies cohesion that does not exist. Basing 
policy positions or movement strategies on these false assumptions, then, only serves to reify 
differences without addressing the views of those not fully represented by the most dominant 
members of a socially constructed category3.  
 After reviewing the body of literature regarding the influence of identity on political 
attitudes and behaviors, a number of themes emerge which have been further refined by 
contemporary scholars. First, the interactive nature of identities – when not explicitly tested – 
was implied. Berelson, et al (1954) explored the relationship between socioeconomic status 
                                                 
3 As an example, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, many LGBT interest groups endorsed policy 
positions in favor of legalized same-sex marriage. While a small, but not insignificant, portion of 
the LGBT community opposed such positions nearly all national interest groups as well as the 
Democratic Party supported legalized same-sex marriage without addressing the underlying 
inequalities produced by state-sanctioned marriage. For a discussion highlighting how race, 
class, and sexual orientation interact and influence opposition to same-sex marriage among black 
LGBT people see Farrow (2014). 
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(SES) and religion, for example, while Dahl (1961), Wolfinger (1965), and Parenti (1967) tested 
similar interactions in an effort to predict vote choice. These studies served as precursors to 
interactive and “multiplicative” models of political behavior (Veenstra 2013). 
 Second, as suggested by Gabriel’s (1972) operationalization of ethnic consciousness, 
group attachment is a key concept in measuring social identity. While adding affective and 
cognitive measurement components, contemporary scholars researching identities in political 
contexts use similar methodologies, conceptualizing identities as an amalgamation of factors not 
merely as dichotomous (yes or no) indicators (Bedolla 2007; Duckitt, Callaghan, & Wagner 
2005; Greene 2002; Phinney 1989).  
 Third, as Black feminist and intersectional scholars have shown political outcomes are a 
function of individual experience (Beal 1970; Anthias & Yuval-Davis 1983; James and Busia 
1993; Bacca Zinn & Dill 1996; McCall 2005; Hancock 2007b; Simien 2007). It was 
hypothesized that political cleavages among voters formed because of “differentiation” (i.e. 
“policy issues persisting over a period of time that affect [groups] differently” (Berelson, et al 
1954:74). Whether the experiences of African-Americans with the structural effects of racism or 
the experiences of the working class striving for the American dream, “vote is as much 
conditioned by who one is as by what one believes” (Berelson, et al 1954:67). 
 As identity groups continued to refuse ‘assimilation’ throughout the 20th and early 21st 
Centuries political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists took note and used them as unique 
predictors of political attitudes and social behaviors. Ethnicity, race, gender, class, religion, and 
sexuality are all shown to correlate with distinct voting preferences, political attitudes, and 
political behaviors. The central questions have since centered on how best to conceptualize and 
measure identity and, perhaps more importantly, how best to analyze within-group variation. 
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Scholars of identity have traditionally fallen into one of two groups: categoricalists who adhere 
to rigid definitions of identity primarily out of methodological concern; and anticategoricalists 
(to borrow a term from McCall 2005:1773) who seek to fully “deconstruct analytical categories” 
altogether.  
In the following sections I will: review the extant identity literature and offer a definition 
of identity which guides this study. While I briefly critique categorical and anticategorical 
approaches to identity measurement, I also highlight a modern “both/and” solution to social 
scientific methodology (Shields 2008). I will then apply the concepts and definitions of modern 
identity scholarship to an analysis of intra-group heterogeneity among sexual minorities.  
 
Identity: Toward a Definition 
 
 Various popular and scientific uses of the term ‘identity’ are well documented (Gleason 
1983; Gitlin 1995; Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). As previously expounded, 
identities have been used to shape and categorize politics as well as define popular culture, and 
explain various social scientific phenomena throughout history (Gleason 1983). Identities have 
been defined as “social categories in which an individual claims membership as well as the 
personal meaning associated with those categories” (Shields 2008:301). This definition of 
identity, which is relatively similar throughout the social sciences, has been subject to criticism 
by contemporary scholars based on two key deficiencies. First, this definition assumes that 
identities are unitary (stable categories). One develops an identity either through birth, 
socialization, or choice, and that identity remains unaltered throughout one’s life (Deaux, Reid, 
Mizrahi, and Cotting 1999). Identity – this definition implies – is a static representation of one’s 
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membership in a certain class. Similarly, this definition leaves open the idea of essentialism – 
that all the individuals in a given identity category represent the prototypical member of that 
category – a critique expressed by Black feminist and queer theorists. Second, like the first, this 
definition assumes that identities do not interact. Instead, identities represent discrete categories. 
That is, one can identify with multiple social or political groups; however, those various 
identities represent separate experiences which do not overlap with one another.  
Theoretical debates about identity stability – especially among sexual minorities – hold 
serious methodological concerns for quantitative research. As previously discussed, identities are 
subject to temporal and contextual constraints. In fact, Diamond (2003a), observes alterations in 
sexual identity after only a five-year study of bisexual and lesbian women. Changes in identity 
were linked to changes in how the women “interpreted or acted on their attractions.” 
Furthermore, some feminist and queer theorists view identities as so mutable that they are 
impossible to measure quantitatively. The following discussion highlights modern theorizing and 
research about the stability of identity categories. It is meant to problematize reliance on identity 
categories for the purpose of inter-group comparisons as well as highlight the within-group 
variation of identity categories that most scholars view as constant.4  
 
 
                                                 
4 While I recognize these modern critiques of identity, for the purposes of this study, I adopt the 
view that identities are “coherent enough to be recognized, yet fluid enough to be interrogated” 
(Honeychurch 1996:345). That is, identities have both “dynamic” and “stable” properties which 
allow identities “to influence behavior at the level of [a] specific event” (Sellers, et al. 1998:23). 
This is important to this study because it implies that survey responses represent the identity of 
the respondent – and convey the behavioral influences of that identity – at the time of the survey, 
although that identity may change over time. Furthermore, I adopt the view that survey responses 
collected through valid sample survey methodology are generalizable to national populations. 
These are assumptions which I will reiterate in Chapter 2. 
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The Stability of Identity Categories 
 The increasing recognition and reliance on unitary social identities as predictors of 
attitudinal and behavioral characteristics has not occurred without criticism. Among political 
scientists, sociologists, and psychologists, the conceptualization of identity as fluid, non-static, 
and responsive to contextual and situational influences represents a growing body of theory. 
Political science has recognized the limitations of “identity politics,” for example, where unique 
categories (e.g. race, gender, class) “serve to bind people into a political group based on a 
uniform set of experiences” (Hancock 2007a:65). The reality of the incongruous bonding of 
individuals on the basis of prototypical identity traits, however, only “silences sub-group 
members in an effort to present a united front” politically (Hancock 2007a:65). Examples 
frequently cited include the underrepresentation and misrepresentation of minority women by the 
feminist and black male-dominated civil rights movements; of lesbian women by the feminist 
movement; or, of Bisexuals, Gender Queer, and Transgender people and people of color of all 
gender and sexual identities by the gay rights movement. Traditional political conceptualizations 
of identity which limit group association to a single descriptor, therefore, result in the 
disenfranchisement of millions of people who only partially share the dominant social identity 
(Purdie-Vaughs and Eibach 2008). Identity, then, is more than fitting into a single demographic 
category. 
  Among sociologists two observations about unitary identity categories are important. 
First, sociologists such as Emirbayer (1997) suggest a dynamic view of identity processes. That 
is, identity is not static; it is mutable. This “relational” view of sociology, “conceive[s] of the 
social world as consisting primarily in…processes…in dynamic, unfolding relations” (Emirbayer 
1997:281). In this formulation, identity can be adjusted based on contextual or situational factors, 
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a multidisciplinary idea which I will return to shortly (Diamond 2003a; Bedolla 2007; Warner 
2008; Valentine 2007; Diamond & Butterworth 2008).  
The relational view is important particularly among social movement theorists. The 
reliance on a single socially or culturally constructed identity as catalyst for social movement 
formation is problematic. Shared group identity, or what is sometimes referred to as group 
consciousness (broad social constructs such as gender, race, or sexual orientation) is a central 
tenant of political mobilization, and requires settling a number of problematic “relational 
comparisons” vis-à-vis other groups (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott 2009:19; Cole 
2008). That is, groups must decide what constitutes group membership – who is ‘in.’ Notably, 
Sidney Tarrow (1998:119) recognized that social movements constructed around a single rigid 
conceptualization of identity would produce “insular, sectarian, and divisive movements 
incapable of expanding membership, broadening appeals, and negotiating with prospective 
allies” (See also Gitlin 1995; Gamson 1995; Stein and Plummer 1994).  
Secondly, as with political science, the exclusivity of identity politics is particularly 
troublesome for those seeking to explain social movement formation and perpetuation (Cole 
2008). If the requirement for group mobilization is collective identity, and identity is restricted to 
a single explicitly-defined category, e.g., “Gay” can only be defined as white, male, wealthy, 
non-religious, homosexuals, then the movement is not only limited by its membership base, but 
it is also limited in its ability to appeal to broader populations for political support and resources. 
 Psychologists, and especially feminist and womanist scholars recognized that restrictions 
and narrowly-defined concepts of identity are counterintuitive. Just as collective or group 
identities are constantly in flux, cultures, experiences, and structural influences – which differ 
among groups – are important in defining identity. As Shields (2008:304) notes, “the facts of our 
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lives reveal that there is no single identity category that satisfactorily describes how we respond 
to our social environment or are responded to by others.” The reduction to “difference-as-
explanation” observed by early political scientists such as Berelson, et al. (1954) is judged a 
“seductive oversimplification” (Shields 2008:303). Furthermore, Shields (2008:303-4) notes, that 
popular culture and media observe categorical differences among populations, e.g. the ‘gender 
gap’ or ‘race gap’ in presidential elections, which scientific studies then reify, thus elevating 
categorical differences to the level of scientific explanation. These scientific ‘explanations’ are 
then used to fuel gender, race, and/or sexuality-based stereotypes in areas such as physical and 
mental health care, social welfare, and public policy (Shields 2008; Richards 2002; Hare-Mustin 
& Marecek 1988). Understanding identity as a “mutually-shaping” composite of experience, 
culture, history, context, and socio-structural influences is important in not only combating 
stereotypes, but also in producing better health outcomes and more representative political 
systems (Walby, Armstrong, and Strid 2012:235; Cravens unpublished manuscript; Sevelius 
2013; Singh 2013; Warner & Shields 2013).  
 Along with these contributions, Black feminist (also referred to as multiracial or 
multicultural feminist) scholarship has provided two theoretical insights which are important in 
defining identity. The first involves the somewhat disputed idea of the ‘mutually constitutive’ 
nature of identity; and, the second is that identities are defined by their socio-structural power 
relationships within a society.  
While the terminology is disputed5 (Walby, et al. 2012), concerning the idea that 
identities mutually shape one another, Shields (2008:301) notes that “one category of identity, 
                                                 
5 In fact, the debate is more than just semantic and has serious implications for the measurement 
and analysis of identity. A radical branch of intersectional theorists posit that “mutually 
constituted” identity refers to the transformation that occurs when two or more identities 
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such as gender, takes its meaning as a category in relation to another category” with which one is 
identified. Similarly, in the “trans-actional” view of the social world, relational sociologists posit 
“the very terms or units involved in a transaction [e.g. societal interaction] derive their meaning, 
significance, and identity from the (changing) functional roles they play within that transaction” 
(Emirbayer 1997:287). While some scholars (Zack 2007; Hancock 2007a; Baca Zinn and Dill 
1996; Spelman 1988) take a more radical view concerning the mutually constitutive nature of 
identity, what I argue is that mutually-shaped identity refers to the idea that identity categories 
interact with and affect one another (Walby, et al. 2012:235). What it means to be female in the 
United States, for example, is directly related to one’s race, class, sexuality, and/or religion. That 
is, the advantages and disadvantages associated with certain identities, Caucasian, for example, 
are differentially distributed based on gender or class or sexuality. So, what it means to be white 
in the United States is related to (changes based on) whether one identifies or is identified as 
male or female, affluent or poor, or a sexual minority. Furthermore, the interactions between 
                                                 
intersect. Black (race) and woman (gender), for example, are two identity concepts which are 
empirically measurable and often intersect in politics, economics, health, etc. Intersectionality 
scholars such as Hancock (2007a) argue that where two or more identity categories intersect 
(e.g., a Black Woman is disadvantaged in health care by (1) a lack of health insurance from her 
place of employment or insufficient pay to afford health insurance and (2) by women’s health 
organizations which focus primarily on white women’s reproductive health needs) the prior 
components of an identity are no longer measurable, and a new identity category exists (in this 
example the term “BlackWoman” is conceptually different than ‘black’ or ‘woman’ identity 
categories. Methodologically, this implies that “black women cannot be understood as the mere 
addition of ‘women’ and ‘black,’” but rather are a “distinctive category” (Walby, et al. 
2012:239). Some intersectional theorists (Hancock 2007a) have even argued that true 
intersectional analyses are only those which conceptualize identity in this way (Spelman 1988; 
Baca Zinn and Dill 1996; Brah and Phoenix 2004; Zack 2007). In terms of semantics, it is argued 
that the concept should be altered, and instead referred to as “mutual shaping” – which “enables 
the retention of naming each relevant inequality while simultaneously recognizing that it is 
affected by engagement with others” (Walby, et al. 2012:235). For the purposes of this study, the 
most important aspect of the concept is the recognition that identities interact and are affected by 
their ‘engagement’ with other categories of identity. 
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each additional identity category are just as important. The nature of those interactive 
relationships is, in turn, defined by the socio-structural power dynamics that accompany each 
identity. In this way, identities derive meaning from and “reinforce” one another through the 
socio-structural distributions of power within a given culture or society (Shields 2008:301; 
Ashmore Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). To understand one’s experience, and therefore 
political attitudes and behaviors, it is necessary to know more than just one’s racial or class or 
sexual identity. 
Identity & the Structure of Power 
Essential to any conceptualization of identity is the understanding that “identities are 
couched within status and power relations” (Warner 2008:455). In short, socially constructed 
identities such as race, class, gender, and sexuality are the “primary organizing principles of 
society which locates and positions groups within that society’s opportunity structures” (Baca 
Zinn and Dill 1996:322). Identities are used as “mental heuristics” which “filter information in a 
biased manner, thereby resulting in a tendency for individuals to confirm new information that is 
consistent with preexisting beliefs and reject information that is not” (Pierce, Siddiki, Jones, 
Schumacher, Pattison, and Peterson 2014:3). On the basis of these biased judgements, systems of 
power are constructed “in which one group exerts control over another” (Weber 2004:127; 
Landrine, Klonoff, Alcaraz, Scott, and Wilkins 1995; Bacharach and Baratz 1962; Lasswell and 
Kaplan 1950). At its most basic, this conceptualization of power relations among identities can 
be summed up by social dominance theory which posits that “dominant groups have a 
disproportionate share of economic resources and social and culture capital, while subordinate 
groups suffer stigma, prejudice, and discrimination” (Purdie-Vaughs and Eibach 2008:379). 
22 
 
Accordingly, even a conservative analysis of social dominance in the United States 
reveals a patriarchal social organization resulting in male dominance of women, while racial 
stratification has meant white dominance over other racial groups. Furthermore, the 
heteronormative orientation of U.S. society has meant heterosexual dominance over ‘deviant’ 
sexualities. The socio-structural manifestations of these power relationships have been referred 
to as “androcentrism,” “ethnocentrism,” and “heterocentrism” and are reflected throughout 
society by everything from the character of political institutions and public policy to media 
portrayals of subordinate groups (Purdie-Vaughs and Eibach 2008). 
The impact of these power relationships on identity is not discrete. First, these systems of 
oppression operate simultaneously, and, as was previously discussed, these fundamental systems 
of oppression within U.S. society intersect i.e., “work with and through each other” (Baca Zinn 
and Dill 1996; Crenshaw2014). This means that “people experience race, class, gender, and 
sexuality differently depending on their social location in the structures of race, class, gender and 
sexuality” (Baca Zinn and Dill 1996). Perhaps the relationship between identity and socio-
structural systems of power is best described as follows: 
“Class, race, gender and sexuality are components of both social structure and social 
interaction. Women and men are differently embedded in locations created by these 
cross-cutting hierarchies. As a result, women and men throughout the social order 
experience different forms of privilege and subordination, depending on their race, class, 
gender, and sexuality. Intersecting forms of domination produce both oppression and 
opportunity. At the same time that structures of race, class, gender, and sexuality create 
disadvantages for women of color, they provide unacknowledged benefits for those who 
are at the top of these hierarchies (Baca Zinn and Dill 1996).” 
 
Collins (2000:18) characterizes the organization of these intersecting structures of oppression 
and opportunity most notably as a “matrix of domination.” The intersection of hierarchies of 
power hold a multiplicity of meaning depending on one’s place in the hierarchy (Crenshaw 
1991). That does not mean, however, that identity in non-quantifiable. An understanding of 
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Collin’s (2000) matrix actually provides a theoretical foundation from which to build empirical 
analyses (Bedolla 2007). Simply stated, any conceptualization of identity must take into account 
the observations that multiple social identities can be experienced at once, identities only have 
meaning in relation to other identities, and that identities cannot be understood outside of their 
socio-structural context.  
For the purposes of scientific understanding, and particularly this study, simply 
identifying as ‘gay’ manifests no explanatory value on its own as categorizations are 
meaningless without context. Placing sexuality in the context of other identities and with them 
the associated socio-structural power relations, however, provides explanatory value as the 
intersections of privilege and disadvantage associated with each identity component begin to 
emerge. Political attitudes and behaviors, then, are not just influenced by sexual identity – they 
are also shaped by one’s experience with gender, race, class, and religion, among other social 
identities. Our previous definition of identity (“social categories in which an individual claims 
membership as well as the personal meaning associated with those categories” Shields 2008:301) 
can now be altered. Identity, then, refers to any number of mutually-shaped and simultaneously 
experienced social categories in which an individual claims membership, the personal meaning 
associated with those categories, and the relationship between those categories and the structures 




 As eluded to in the previous section, recent theorization regarding the mutually-shaped, 
simultaneously-experienced, intersecting nature of identity along with the study of the “material 
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consequences of categories of difference” has come to constitute a body of knowledge referred to 
as Intersectionality (Davis 2008). In political science, intersectionality is often referenced as a 
critique of the treatment of race and gender by contemporary researchers. At the same time, 
however, the intersectional approach is criticized for its complexity (Simien 2007; Hancock 
2007a; McCall 2005) – though complexity is also viewed as beneficial by some (Davis 2008; 
Walby, et. al 2012). As used in this study, intersectionality is an attempt to “conceptualize and 
theorize about…the cross-cutting political effects of both marginalization and privilege within 
and among groups in U.S. society” (Bedolla 2007:232, emphasis added). To this end, the 
intersectional approach is used to analyze “within-group diversity” with the goal of “shed[ding] 
light on the way we think of groups as actors in politics.” (Hancock 2007b:251).  
 Early formulations of intersectionality explored the idea of multiple categories of 
difference within feminism (i.e., poor Black women and lesbians) and the implications for the 
role of women in politics and society (Stewart and McDermott 2004). Based on these 
approaches, additive models were developed which analyzed categories of differences as discrete 
indicators of oppression. That is, by analyzing and adding together each individual oppressed 
identity (e.g., Black + Female + Lesbian) researchers could discern the totality of one’s 
experience with oppression (Beale 1970). These conceptualizations resulted in many quantitative 
analyses of discrimination (Alquist 1975; Jeffereies and Ransford 1980; Ransford and Miller 
1983; Reid 1984; McLeod and Owens 2004). While many of these concepts preserver in 
contemporary research, poststructuralist feminist scholars have pressed the discipline to 
deconstruct and “abandon categorical thinking altogether” (Davis 2008:73). This divide in 
feminist thought has been somewhat bridged by the development, and continual refining, of 
intersectionality which recognizes both the importance of inclusion and the danger of over-
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categorization (Davis 2008). In what follows, I will provide a brief history of the development of 
the intersectional approach, discuss the debate between intersectional schools of thought and 
provide examples of their application in contemporary interdisciplinary research. Finally, I 
discuss sexual identity and the study of LGBT political attitudes and behaviors in light of 
intersectionality and queer theory. The section ends with the theoretical rationale for this study. 
Intersectionality: A Brief History 
 The term “intersectionality” was first coined6 by the Black feminist legal scholar  
Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) “to describe the exclusion of black women from white feminist 
discourse (which equated women with white) and anti-racist discourse (which equated black with 
men)” (Bowleg 2013:755) in the context of critical legal studies (Grzanka 2014). This is fitting 
as the epistemological roots of intersectionality are intertwined with Black feminist theory, 
especially the writings of many lesbian women of color (The Combahee River Collective 1997; 
Moraga and Anzaldua 1983). As Shields (2008:303) notes, “the theoretical foundation for 
intersectionality grew from the study of the production and reproduction of inequalities, 
dominance and oppression.” The present (i.e., postmodern) formulation of intersectionality 
required two developments. First, Black feminist scholars challenged the lack of inclusivity in 
White feminist theory. As discussed previously, it was the primary contention of Black feminists 
in the United States that any grand theory of feminism (e.g., essentialism) which failed to 
consider the experience of poor women, women of color, or lesbians (and, in international 
                                                 
6 Crenshaw’s (1989) conception referred specifically to the experience of Black women, 
however, the term has now grown to represent an entire sub-field of multidisciplinary academic 
inquiry. While this is the first use of the term ‘intersectionality,’ it is important to note that many 
of the key themes and assumptions of what would come to be intersectionality were 
simultaneously developing throughout the 20th Century. Those relevant to political science were 
briefly discussed in the introduction to this chapter, but see Walby, et al. (2012:225) for further 
references to intersectional themes in multidisciplinary literature.  
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debates, women in developing countries, immigrants, or refugees) would be unsuccessful. To 
this end, scholars such as Beale (1970), Green (1995), and Gay and Tate (1998) formulated 
arguments for the inclusion of women of color, poor women, and lesbian women in feminist 
thought and social action which adopted an accumulative approach to discrimination. A second 
development came when scholars proposed an ‘intersectional’ approach to address the 
limitations of accumulative models (Shields 2008:303). 
The accumulative/additive approach (Veenstra 2013:646) – or the accumulated 
disadvantage model (Shields 2008:303; Nakano Glenn 1999) – suggests that women of color 
exist in a state of “double jeopardy” (Beale 1970) because of the oppression that comes from 
both their gender and race. Women face sexism and people of color face racism. The additive 
effects of these two power structures in U.S. society work to doubly disadvantage women of 
color. Add to this poverty, minority sexuality, or (dis)ability and the negative effects mount 
(Bowleg, Huang, Brooks, Black, and Burkholder 2003). As Veenstra (2013:647) notes, 
“accommodating the possibility of double and triple jeopardies accruing to multiple 
disadvantaged identities represented an important advance over a literature that had 
predominately focused on sexism to the exclusion of racism and classism.” Early proponents of 
the “race, class, gender strand” of feminist inquiry were primarily concerned with just such 
questions of “intragroup differences” (Davis 2008:71). The additive model thus highlights the 
differences within the category ‘women’ and allows for more thorough exploration of the 
“struggles for empowerment” minorities within minority categories confront (Davis 2008:71). 
The utility of additive models is in their ability to “predict who experiences the most 
discrimination” (Veenstra 2013:647; Landrine, Klonoff, Alcaraz, Scott & Wilkins 1995). By 
quantitatively analyzing experiences of discrimination, those who face ‘the most’ can be targeted 
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by public policy or interest group resources (Quinn 1993; Williams 1999; Krieger 1999; 
Veenstra 2013). 
The idea that identities and inequalities are mutually shaped and that systems of power 
intersect to “construct systems of oppression/advantage” (Veenstra 2013:647) is the key 
theoretical distinction between the additive approach and the intersectional approach to social 
science research. The intersectional approach was developed around Collin’s (2000) concept of a 
“matrix of domination,” and views systems of inequality as so interconnected as to be 
“analytically inseparable” (Veenstra 2013:647; Anderson 2008). While the inseparability of 
intersectional experiences is contested – especially for purposes of quantitative research (e.g., 
McCall’s (2005) “intercategorical complexity”), that identities and systems of advantage and 
disadvantage interact and shape one another is not (Walby, et. al 2012). Since these 
developments, intersectionality has been further critiqued and revised. Structures, rather than 
individual characteristics, have become the focus of analysis in critical theories (Duong 2012), 
while the effectiveness of the approach across all contexts has been questioned (Luft 2009).    
Intersectional theory has continued to evolve and adapt as theoretical discrepancies 
develop, are debated, and resolved (Zack 2007; David 2008; Luft 2009; Walby et. al 2012). 
Across disciplines, however, scholars have used intersectionality to highlight experiences with 
discrimination (Landrine, et. al 1995), inform counseling (Szymanski, and Moffitt 2012), 
medical (Jackson and Williams 2006), educational (Gutierrez y Muhs, Niemann, Gonzalez, and 
Harris 2012), and political (Cohen 1999) practices, and explore intra-group variation across a 





Complexity & McCall’s Paradigms 
Perhaps one of the most cogent discussions of complexity in intersectional theory and 
methodology comes from McCall (2005). In this assessment, there exist three –though this is not 
exclusive – approaches to intersectional inquiry, each of which is “defined in terms of how they 
understand and use analytical categories to explore the complexity of intersectionality in social 
life” (McCall 2005:1773). The “anticategorical” approach is “based on a methodology that seeks 
to deconstruct categories,” while the “intercategorical” approach “requires that scholars 
provisionally adopt existing analytical categories to document relationships of inequality among 
social groups and changing configurations of inequality along multiple and conflicting 
dimensions” (McCall 2005:1773). Finally, the “intracategorical” approach – which lies on the 
spectrum between the two previously mentioned – “maintains a critical [or problematizing] 
stance toward categories,” while at the same time focusing “on particular social groups at 
neglected points of intersection.” (McCall 2005:1774). I will examine each in turn. 
First, the intercategorical approach necessitates the use of categories in intersectional 
analysis in order to examine the differences which exist between identities. While this risks 
committing the fallacy of “difference-as-explanation,” the role of categories in such an analysis 
is to highlight and explain differences between social groups (Shields 2008:303). Similarly, the 
intracategorical approach assumes the existence of semi-stable categories in order to examine 
within-group variation. 
Such analyses are characterized methodologically by the additive perspective which rests 
on two assumptions: dichotomy of categories and the ability to rank-order identities (Collins 
1993; Davis 2008). These assumptions are problematic for intersectionality and have been 
criticized theoretically for their oversight of intracategorical complexity (King 1988; Collins 
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1993; Takagi 1996; Kwan 1997; Collins 2000; Warner 2008). One’s experience with gender is 
informed by one’s race. Likewise, the experience of sexuality is informed by one’s experience 
with race and gender. Simply indexing subordinate identities (e.g., Gender + Race + Class + 
Sexuality) does not adequately represent the experience of those who lie between or at the 
intersection of those categories. In this view, analyses which focus on a specific category of 
identity (e.g., gender, race, sexual identity) “obscure the depth of understanding provided by that 
category’s intersection with another category[ies] (e.g., race, SES, sexual identity)” (Bowleg 
2013:758-9). 
Similarly, some multiplicative models adopt the use of identity categories for the purpose 
of statistical analysis (Veenstra 2013). Whereas additive models posit a simple sum of identity 
categories provide the true ‘total’ amount of discrimination faced by an individual or group, 
multiplicative models posit a compounding of discriminatory effects as identities multiply. As 
Parent, DeBalere and Moradi (2013:640) note, “beyond independent effects, minority statuses 
and related experiences may interact to shape people’s experiences with the typical implied 
nature of interaction being that one minority status or experience may exacerbate the effect of 
another” (See also Green 1995; Landrine, et al. 1995). The end result of multiplicative models is 
a greater amount of “disadvantage than that predicted by double, triple, or quadruple jeopardy” 
(Veenstra 2013:648). Methodologically, this approach is characterized by the use of interaction 
terms in statistical regression models (Frederich 1982; Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006; 
Hancock 2007a; Cole 2009). Multiplicative models, although not as wedded to dichotomous 
identity categories, are nevertheless criticized for their reliance on the assumption of within-
group homogeneity and the static nature of identity (Emirbayer 1997; Hancock 2007a; Bedolla 
2007; Choo and Ferree 2010). Despite these critiques, multiplicative models appear to be the 
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most productive – and utilized – quantitative methodology in intersectional research. (For a more 
thorough review of the advantages and disadvantages of multiplicative models see Landrine, et 
al. (1995)). 
The anticategorical approach challenges the use of identity categories in social scientific 
inquiries altogether. Since the 1980s and 1990s, postmodern and poststructuralist feminist and 
queer theorists sought to destabilize identity categories which were viewed as perpetuating 
stereotypical representations of race, gender, class, and sexuality in popular culture and political 
and scientific discourse (Davis 208; Cohen 2001; Stein and Plummer 1994). In this view, 
categorical-based analyses misrepresent the true nature of identity because categories are based 
on the “dominant constructions of race, gender [and sexuality]” in society (Cohen 2001:203). In 
short, anticategorialists argue that categories are too exclusive, structured around white, male, 
heteronormative prototypes, and fuel stereotypical representations of those who do not meet 
societally-imposed standards. Analyses based on such categories are therefore neither valid nor 
generalizable. 
Methodologically, the anticategorical approach is at best antagonistic toward quantitative 
methods. Intersectional analyses in this tradition are encouraged to adopt methods informed by 
qualitative designs, focusing on “individual narratives” (Robertson and Sgoutas 2012:428). Such 
designs are better capable of capturing the subtleties of identity interaction while at the same 
time avoiding the trap of dichotomous categorization which so often accompanies identity 
research. In the most extreme cases, the compatibility of intersectional theory and quantitative 
methodology is questioned altogether (Bowleg 2008:317). While qualitative methods have 
proven insightful in the study of identity intersections, abandoning quantitative methods is 
argumentum ad absurdum. As McCall (2005) and others note, approaches which bridge the gap 
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between the two extremes of anticategorical and additive analyses seem to offer the most 
promising road forward for intersectionality researchers.  
McCall’s (2005) intercategorical analysis seems best suited for this task. While critical of 
the use of categories, such an approach also recognizes their utility for delineating specific social 
foci. In this respect, analyses can target a particular social group in order to better understand the 
“relationships of inequality among social groups and changing configurations of inequality along 
multiple and conflicting dimensions” which exist within the category (McCall 2005:1773). 
Research using the multiplicative approach, while not perfect, has been an “indispensable tool” 
which is “particularly useful for revealing patterns of disparity in arenas such as employment and 
income, physical and mental health, and social life” (Cole 2009:177). It should also be noted, 
though, that many historiographical accounts and theoretical explorations of intersectionality 
distinguish additive and multiplicative approaches from ‘true’ intersectional theory (a position I 
refute) (Parent et al. 2013; Zack 2007; Brah and Phoenix 2004). The basis of this delineation, 
however, is purely driven by assumptions regarding data collection (Hancock 2007a; Shields 
2008; Cole 2008). That is, the aforementioned assumptions of staticity and mutual exclusivity of 
identity have been applied to data collection methods especially in survey research. As McCall’s 
(2005) intercategorical and intracategorical approaches make clear, the use of identity categories 
in intersectional research, while debated, is not without merit. Using dichotomous or otherwise 
mutually exclusive indicators for such complex and interrelated concepts as race, gender, and 
sexuality, however, are anathema to intersectional theory. While considered the gold standard by 
survey methodologists (Salant and Dillman 1994; Johnson 2014), mutually exclusive categorical 
measures of identity fail to represent those at the intersection of the categories and misrepresent 
many who do not fit the prototypical socially-constructed image (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 
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2008). For these reasons, moving forward with intersectional research, especially in the area of 
survey research design, questions must be carefully considered to ensure proper measurement of 
the various aspects of identity. Indeed, as with Hancock (2007a:66), I argue “for new 
conceptualizations of categories and their role in politics, rather than seeking an abolition of 
categories themselves.” As will be explained in the methodology section, I offer to supplement 
categorical variables with social-psychological measures of group association and personal 
affect. 
As with McCall (2005), Shields (2008) argues for a “both/and” approach to 
intersectionality in behavioral research. Such an approach “entails both comparing individual 
identities to each other as well as considering intersections and their emergent properties” 
(Shields 2008:307). Similarly, Risman (2004:443) notes,  
“we cannot study gender in isolation from other inequalities, nor can we only study 
inequalities' intersection and ignore the historical and contextual specificity that 
distinguishes the mechanisms that produce inequality by different categorical divisions, 
whether gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, or class.”  
 
This view is based on a systemic or structural conceptualization of identity which holds 
that in order to address structural oppression (e.g. sexism or heterosexism) the causal 
relationships within each structure must be explored and explained separately. This requires a 
view which discretely examines heterosexism (sexuality-based discrimination) and sexism 
(gender-based discrimination). While each are understood as interlocking forms of oppression, 
“it is important for analytic clarity, and…the scholarly contribution to social change, to identify 
causal mechanisms for heterosexism and gender oppression distinctly (Risman 2004:443; 
Calhoun 2000). Indeed, the legacy of intersectionality to this point has been its impact on our 
understanding and problematizing of power structures as well as in its assumption of within-
group heterogeneity (Stewart and McDermott 2004).  
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In the preceding sections I provided a modified definition of identity, a brief history of 
the development of intersectionality, and discussed the theoretical and methodological 
distinctions between the additive, multiplicative, and intersectional research designs. Finally, I 
proposed adopting a synthesized approach (e.g., “both/and”; “intercategorical”) to intersectional 
research with a focus on multiplicative analyses and proposed restructuring survey research 
design to better meet the theoretical assumptions of intersectionality about the nature of identity 
(i.e., mutually constitutive and non-static). As Syed (2010:61) notes, intersectionality was 
“originally developed within legal studies and the humanities as a way of making sense of 
interlocking societal oppression experienced by subordinated groups” not as a way of making 
predictions about human behavior. As such, the study of human behavior necessarily requires 
modifications to the existing literature. This kind of “incompleteness” has been pointed to as a 
means by which intersectionality remains a highly salient research paradigm across many 
disciplines and fields of specialization (Davis 2008). 
Intersectionality “serves as a reminder to researchers that any consideration of a single 
identity, such as gender, must incorporate an analysis of the ways that other identities interact 
with, and therefore qualitatively change, the experience of gender” (Warner and Shields 
2013:804). With this in mind, I now turn to a discussion of LGBT identity and intragroup 
heterogeneity, as well as the complicated nature of identity interaction within a marginalized and 







LGBT Identity: Development & Interaction across Multiple Axes of Dis/Advantage 
 
“LGBT” is a misleading acronym. First, as noted in intersectional criticisms of gender, 
the acronym implies group cohesion across the sexual and gender identity categories Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender. While this may be important in facilitating a discussion of 
sexual diversity, for the purposes of scientific inquiry the assumption of cohesion across sexual 
minorities can lead to incorrect conclusions about group attitudes and behavior. As translated 
through the “difference-as-explanation” assumption, for example, LGBT group “distinctiveness” 
is used to explain attitudinal variation between homo- and heterosexuals. For example, LGBT 
people are observed to be more liberal and Democratic in policy and candidate preferences than 
heterosexuals (Edelman 1993; Sherrill 1996; Hertzog 1996; Smith and Haider-Markel 2002; 
Shaffner and Senic 2006). While it may make analyses easier, the cohesion assumed by the 
LGBT moniker is not supported by sexual minority research7 (Worthen 2013; Egan 2012; 
Eliason 2010; Lombardi 2009; Fassinger and Arseneau 2007; Weiss 2004; Mohr and Rochlen 
1999). 
Similarly, the term LGBT belies cohesion across racial and ethnic identities. The 
dominant view of ‘LGBT’ is white, affluent, and gay male, despite the varied experiences and 
identities which exist within the LGBT community (Chan 1989; Thumma 1991; Garcia 1998; 
Green 1998; Duggan 2003; Ferguson 2005). Racial discrimination is not uncommon within the 
                                                 
7 Studies which have examined intragroup differences among LGBT people originate primarily 
from the field of psychology and examine discriminatory attitudes between group members 
(Mulick and Wright 2002), although some studies have also examined political distinctions 
between lesbians/gays and bisexuals (Baumgardner 2007). Other studies include: Weinberg, 
Williams, and Pryor (2012); Brewster and Moradi (2010); Weltzer-Lang (2008); Gordon (2006); 
Burleson (2005); Ault (1996); Ochs (1996); Hutchins (1996); Rust (1995). 
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LGBT community and racial minority LGBT people often face significantly different social and 
cultural pressures which demand sexual ‘normalcy’ than do white LGBT people (Icard 1986; 
Loicano 1989; Garcia 1998). As Rogers and Lott (1997:297) note, “oppressed groups struggle 
against the boundaries dividing them from privileged groups but also against boundaries 
constituted by mixes of privilege and disprivilege within their ranks” (quoted in Cole 2008). 
The LGBT acronym actually groups together both sexual and gender identities. While the 
implications for transgender political participation as well as physical and psychological health 
have until recently been relatively understudied, what research that has emerged suggests 
transgender people fall into a category of “otherness” that exists within the LGBT identity 
(Parent et al. 2013:641; Roen 2002; Fassinger and Arseneau 2007; Koken, Bimbi, and Parsons 
2009; Worthen 2013; Singh 2013). Transgender itself is a cross-cutting categorization which 
encompasses significant variation (D. Valentine 2007). That transgender people can identify as 
heterosexual, gay, lesbian, or bisexual – as well as represent racial and ethnic, and religious 
differences – is another layer of intricacy which is overlooked by the LGBT acronym, what 
Parent, et al. (2013:641) calls a “conceptually inconsistent separation in our domains of gender 
and LGBT identities.”  
 Examinations of intragroup variation, especially those which focus on points of identity, 
sociocultural, and structural intersections, are essential to our understanding of LGBT politics. In 
the section that follows, I will explore LGBT identity through the intersectional framework and 
examine the identity intersections which theory posits to be sources of variation in behaviors and 
attitudes. I will also begin to introduce the formal model of this study by examining the 




Modeling Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Identity 
 As with all social constructions of identity which are not representative of dominant 
social characteristics, early conceptions of LGBT identity were constructed as ‘deviant’ and 
innately self-loathing (See Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & Chavous 1998). Freudian 
conceptualizations of sexuality, for example, treated homosexuality as an obstacle along an 
otherwise natural path of sexual development (Freeman 2007). In an attempt to elucidate and 
refine identity formation processes, later scholars suggested “homosexual identity” was the 
natural (i.e., not inherently flawed) culmination of a liner process involving periods of identity 
confusion, comparison, tolerance, acceptance, and pride (Cass 1979). “Identity synthesis” – the 
point at which gays and lesbians are able to “integrate homosexual identity with all other aspects 
of self” – finalized the process (Cass 1979:234,235; Herek 2010).   
 Similarly, de Monteflores (1978) viewed lesbian and gay identity formation as an 
extension of what is modernly referred to as the “coming-out” process whereby individuals 
reveal their sexual orientation in varying degrees to the people in their lives. According to de 
Monteflores (1978:65), the process begins with personal acceptance of a gay or lesbian identity 
and ends with the public expression of that identity or “self-disclosure” (publicly coming-out) in 
an effort to achieve “self-validation” or a sense of worth from society. In this process, identity is 
linked to public expression. That is, one cannot truly be gay or lesbian-identified without 
reconciling the private and public aspects of identity. Regardless of the source of sexual 
orientation de Monteflores (1978) postulated that gay and lesbian identity is acquired by choice 




 Linear models of identity formation, however, are criticized for a number of reasons. 
Most notably, such models were the result of studies which examined primarily white, affluent, 
gay men who were socialized and ‘came out’ during the early to mid-20th Century. As such, 
these models cannot account for the experiences of the majority of LGBT people. Furthermore, 
self-fulfillment and, as social movement scholars noted, political activity were contingent upon 
vocal and overt self-identification with the marginalized LGBT community – a situation which 
many racial minority or low-income LGBT people often find untenable (Fassinger and Arseneau 
2007).  
Similarly, Garcia (1998:19) and others questioned both the sequential nature of the 
models, as well as the insufficient consideration for different cultural values which help shape 
identity development and influence political outcomes. As previously discussed, one’s lesbian or 
gay identity cannot be understood apart from one’s culture, which includes ethnicity, religious 
heritage, and socioeconomic factors. “No social group is homogeneous” and there exists “within-
group diversity” in each “category of difference” (Simien 2007:267; Hancock 2007a:251). That 
is, while sexual minority identities may share similar characteristics and/or experiences (e.g. 
coming to terms with one’s sexuality, experiences with discrimination, familial rejection, same-
sex partnering, etc.) it is inappropriate to assume that these similar experiences are shared across 
racial, ethnic, gender, and even temporal experiences (Fassinger and Arseneau 2007). In fact, 
modern queer theorists posit that there is no descriptive (i.e. demographic) or structural (shared 
heterosexist experiences) characteristics upon which any commonalities among “sexual 
deviants” (e.g. sexual minorities) can be based, and therefore, they are required to create one 
through a process Duong (2012:379) calls “world-making.” More radical notions aside, identity 
formation from an intersectional perspective, especially the formation of an LGBT identity must 
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be understood as a “multicultural” process “whereby people can develop and maintain a solid, 
productive identity that is influenced by two or more cultures without having one replaced by the 
other” (Garcia 1998:104, See also: Ramirez, 1983). These intersecting identities form the bases 
for interactions which influence political attitudes and behaviors. 
 Consistent with the additive approach, scholars studying sexual minorities modified the 
concept of lesbian, gay, and bisexual identity in the 1990s and 2000s. In studying suburban gay 
men, for example, Brekhus (2005:94) noted the formation of an “integrator” identity where a gay 
identity is “just one of many affiliations which he [a self-identified gay man] combines into one 
complete multifaceted self.” Using a multicultural approach, Bailey (1999) recognized the 
intersection of identities among lesbian, gay, and bisexual people and adopted an additive view 
which led to the “identity multiplexing” hypothesis. Similar to the double and triple jeopardy 
paradigms, identity multiplexing views various social and political identities as “layer[ed] and 
rank[ed] by individuals” according to individual cultural and historical experiences and 
circumstance (Bailey 1999:31)8. While both Bailey (1999) and Brekhus (2005) attempted to 
examine intersecting identities within the LGBT community, such attempts, again, only modeled 
white, middle-class, gays and lesbians (Brekaus (2005) only examined gay men) and failed to 
fully explore cultural and historical differences while overlooking gender variance. Not until 
feminist, queer, and transgender scholars exposed the discrepancy between experiences of white 
gay men and racial and ethnic minority gays and lesbians did formulations of LGBT identity 
development change. 
                                                 
8 Although ranking has been controversial in intersectional thought, Bowleg (2013), noted the 
phenomenon among Black lesbian and bisexual women. It was postulated that such effects are 
“the consequence of power relationships that shape the construction and salience of social 
identities” (Bowleg 2013:764). 
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 Modern social psychological literature has provided a wealth of new ideas, theories, and 
concepts about the development and maintenance of LGBT identities. Within the past seven 
years, two special issues of the journal Sex Roles (Vol. 68, 2013; Vol. 59, 2008) have been 
devoted to explorations of LGBT identity research. As concepts of ethnicity and race evolved in 
social scientific research, so too must conceptions of gender and sexuality. LGBT, as a social 
scientific category – especially in quantitative research – still marginalizes bisexual, queer, and 
transgender individuals (Hutchins 1996; Warner 1999). While identities and our notions about 
identity formation change over time (Diamond and Butterworth 2008; Fassinger and Arseneau 
2007) the idea that identities influence our perception of the world and have behavioral and 
attitudinal effects is not disputed. What is important, however, is to develop, adequately 
conceptualize, and measure identity categories so as not to exclude those already at the margins 
of research. 
At the Intersection of LGBT Identity  
The intersectional approach provides a framework for analyzing LGBT political attitudes 
and behaviors because it emphasizes the “interaction of categories of difference” (Hancock 
2007b:64). LGBT people “reside in multiple systems of stratification” which “constantly 
challenge” them to “simultaneously respond to numerous privileges and constraints that are 
bestowed on the various social roles they occupy” (Swank and Fahs 2013a:661). The 
intersectional approach is valuable because it helps us understand better what shapes LGBT 
attitudes and behaviors. Previous studies offer socialization and group interest as explanations 
for lesbian, gay, and bisexual political distinction. However, these studies fail to recognize the 
“competing hierarchies, obligations, and experiences,” such as racial, gender, religious, and class 
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considerations, which “inform and modify one another in ways that create many variations 
within a single stratum of people” (Swank and Fahs 2013a:661). 
 Lesbian, gay, bisexual people who, along with their sexual minority identity, identify as 
racial/ethnic minorities, gender non-conforming, or as religious, for example, experience cross-
cutting or intersecting value systems and social pressures which further complicate identity 
formation and, subsequently, its influence on political attitudes and behavior. This occurs for two 
reasons. First, social and cultural norms that regulate behavior exist within most social groups. 
These norms primarily arise from culturally-constructed gender or sex roles, although, they can 
be the product of structural forms of discrimination, as in the case of African-American women 
whom the dominant white society often stereotypes as promiscuous. Such stereotypes force false 
images of ‘normalcy’ on marginalized communities and induce internal policing so that racial 
minority lesbians, for example, face moral and cultural coercion in order to avoid intra- and 
inter-group stigmatization. Secondly, every socially constructed identity possesses its own innate 
advantages and disadvantages (Weldon 2006).  
Cultural Variation in Perceptions of Sexuality 
Studies of racial minority LGBT people suggest that dominant cultural perceptions of 
sexuality and gender norms exert pressure on sexual minorities to conform or at least modify 
their sexuality in the face of competing community values. Schnoor (2006:47) notes such 
struggles among Latino and Asian-identified LGBT people. Specifically, Green (1998:43-8), 
notes (1) the role of the family in “protecting against the racism of the dominant culture” and the 
“strong family ties that encompass nuclear and extended family members in complex networks;” 
(2) the value placed on motherhood among African-American women; (3) the strong presence of 
“Western Christian religiosity;” and (4) a “legacy of sexual racism” (i.e. a negative stereotypical 
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view of African-Americans as promiscuous) which has led in many cases to “an exaggerated 
need to demonstrate ‘normalcy’” in terms of sexual behavior as sources of tension between 
African-American and sexual identities (See also: Chan 1989; Morales 1989; Thumma 1991; 
Garcia 1998; Moore 2011). Indeed, culturally-constructed and enforced conceptions of 
masculinity and femininity have a significant impact on sexuality even among racial minority 
heterosexuals (Bowleg, Teti, Massie, Patel, Malebranche, and Tschann 2011). Furthermore, 
Bowleg (2013:759) notes a majority of an African-American gay and bisexual male sample 
ranked their “black or black male identity as primary.” To explain such behavior, Bowleg 
(2013:759) notes, “the combination of the ascribed identity status of race in the U.S., the 
visibility of “race” relative to normative Whiteness, and the role of racial prejudice and 
discrimination against Blacks in the U.S. are social processes that may have prompted an early 
awareness of Blackness.” Bowleg (2013:759) also posits that the “non-visible” nature of sexual 
identity vis-à-vis race allows for racial identity to take preeminence, noting of one study 
participant, “being able to pass as heterosexual, and thus avoid LGB discrimination presumably 
made his Black identity more salient than his bisexual identity.” 
 The real effect of these competing value systems becomes apparent in studies of minority 
transgender populations. Koken, Bimbi, and Parsons (2009), for example, observe experiences of 
rejection among transwomen of color fueled by family religious traditions. This rejection often 
has the tangible consequence of poverty and homelessness. Furthermore, Gray (2009:37,8) and 
Singh (2013) also note that LGBT youth experience pressure on their identity based on 
geographic isolation while Kazyak (2012) observes a similar phenomenon among geographically 
isolated lesbians. While these LGBT people may not select a rural identity per-say, this is the 
effect of their geographic location and Gray (2009) notes that these LGBT people rely on the 
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identity and subsequent “familiarity” of their immediate family, or what is referred to as “a 
strategy of sameness” to offset their LGBT identity in order to better integrate into rural society. 
Across cultures, then, pressures to conform – whether to gender or sexual norms, established 
religious beliefs, or other community values – exert influences on LGBT identity. I hypothesize 
that these pressures in turn influence political attitudes and behaviors.  
 As part of an intersectional approach it is also important to explicitly consider the role of 
whiteness as a component of LGBT identity. As mentioned previously, it is not atypical for 
racial minority LGBT people to experience discrimination at the hands of white members of 
sexual minority communities. Hurtado and Stewart (1997:303) identify a number of ways that 
whiteness is used to “maintain structural privilege and to promote racism.” Among them are 
distancing, denial, superiority, belongingness, and solidarity, although research suggests 
whiteness holds less meaning for the latter two except in situations where whites feel 
disprivileged e.g., in the context of outsourcing or undocumented immigration (Fine, Weis, 
Addelston, and Marusza 1997).  
Systems of Power & Influences on Sexual Minority Politics 
What accounts for political attitudinal and participatory variation among sexual 
minorities? The answer, I hypothesize, can be found by examining intragroup heterogeneity.  
As previously stated, socially constructed identities are multifaceted. In order to better 
understand the influence on politics, as well as the interaction between identities, I measure, as 
Greene (2002), identity categories using social-psychological indicators of group belonging 
(Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, and Cook 1989; Mael and Tetrick 1992; Duckitt, Callaghan, 
and Wagner 2005). The composition of social identities is more complex and nuanced than 
current quantitative research recognizes (Bedolla 2007). Identities, like attitudes, consist of 
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cognitive, affective, and behavioral components (see Greene 2002; Eagly and Chaiken 1993). 
“Linked fate” (Dawson 1994; Simien 2005), experience with stigmatization (Goffman 1963; 
Major and O’Brien 2005), group associations (Mael and Tetrick 1992; Sellers, et al. 1998), and 
social networks (Knoke 1990; Quintelier, Stolle, and Harel 2012), along with situational and 
contextual effects represent aspects of social identity which influence political attitudes and 
actions. Yet, contemporary survey research discounts or fails to adequately measure the 
interaction between these important and influential concepts (Hancock 2007; Shields 2008; Cole 
2008), instead assuming self-selection into an identity category occurs in social isolation and 
invariably results in intragroup political homogeneity 
Social identity and self-categorization theories hold that individuals endeavor to 
“maximize differences” between the group with which they identify (“ingroup”) and members of 
“psychologically relevant opposition groups” (Greene 2002; Brown 2000; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, and Wetherell 1987; Tajfel 1978). While definitions of identity are imprecise, most 
political and social-psychological studies have conceptualized social identities in this way, i.e., 
as oppositional and mutually exclusive (Jackson and Smith 1999; Sellers, et al. 1998). 
Furthermore, the ambiguous conceptualizations and focus on distinctiveness have led many 
scholars (as with LGBT political studies) to “misattribute” social and political phenomena to 
social identity (intergroup) differentiation (Shields 2008; Richards 2002: Helms, Jernigan, and 
Mascher 2005). Post-modern scholarship, however, suggests that identities exist as part of a 
“matrix of domination” (Collins 2000), i.e., intersecting structures of opportunity and 
disadvantage which privilege and/or disprivilege particular identities in certain social contexts 
(Warner 2008). As previously stated, any conceptualization of identity must take into account the 
intersectional notion that multiple social identities can be experienced at once, identities only 
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have meaning in relation to other identities, and that identities cannot be understood outside of 
their socio-structural context (Brown and Williams 1984; Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Cotting 
1999).  
While intersectional conceptions of identity have permeated interdisciplinary research for 
more than three decades, one overlooked element of this line of research is what Crenshaw 
(1991) refers to as “political intersectionality,” or the idea that “those who occupy multiple 
subordinate identities may find themselves caught between the sometimes conflicting agendas of 
two political constituencies to which they belong, or are overlooked by these movements 
entirely” (Cole 2008:444). Often, political intersectionality includes “the challenge of working 
politically with the diversity within an identity group” (Cole 2008). Similar to identity politics, 
social identity and self-categorization theories assume group heterogeneity once individuals self-
select into a group. In terms of political activity, shared experiences are wrongly translated into 
shared political attitudes and behaviors (Cross 1991; Rogers and Lott 1997). A more realistic 
approach, however, recognizes that “subpopulations within a constituency that have relatively 
more privilege” often “set political agendas” which leads to the “secondary marginalization” of 
multiple-minority groups whose “interests are not addressed by the organizations or movements 
purporting to serve them” (Cole 2008:444; Strolovich 2006; Cohen 2001; Cohen 1999). 
Although some studies suggest that single social group identification is adequate to induce social 
movement participation (Simon, Sturmer, Loewy, Weber, Freytag, Habig, Kampmeier, and 
Spahlinger 1998), theories of stigmatization have hypothesized that individuals who identify 
with multiple minority groups are less likely to challenge dominant political structures through 
participation in protest activity (Swank and Fahs 2013a) or even hold ideologically dissident 
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attitudes – i.e., liberal attitudes that would challenge dominant social constructions of power 
relations (Cravens unpublished manuscript). 
 Figure 1.1 graphically depicts the model used in this study. The individual LGBT-
identified person is the level of analysis. Strength of group association, stigma, social networks, 
and context represent four processes which influence individual political orientation. 
Intersectional theory notes the importance of assessing how other identities with which the 
individual might identify influences each of the specified processes (Bedolla 2007). That is, 
researchers should consider how gender, racial, or religious identities influence the strength with 
which an individual identifies as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. Similarly, stigmatization 
does not occur in isolation. Stigmatization (Goffman 1963) interacts across social identities (e.g., 
a gay man of color experiencing both racism and homophobia) to influence political attitudes and 
action.  
 
Figure 1.1: Theoretical Model of Identity Interaction (Adapted from Bedolla 2007) 
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The goal of this study is to analyze and explain political attitudinal and behavioral 
variation within sexual minority communities in the United States. In the following chapter I 
describe the research design and methodology used to implement a nationally representative 
sample survey of sexual minority adults living in the United States. I explain how the four key 
processes at the center of Figure 1.1 are operationalized to measure sexual minority and racial 
identity, describe the operationalization of attitudinal and behavioral measures – used as 
dependent variables, as well as the methodology and the various hypotheses used to test the 




































As discussed in chapter 1, the approach undertaken in this study relies on McCall’s 
(2005:1773) conception of intercategorical inquiry to explore the “relationships of inequality 
among social groups and changing configurations of inequality along multiple and conflicting 
dimensions” of identity among a sample of 1216 sexual minority survey respondents in the 
United States. The intercategorical approach – like all forms of intersectional analysis – 
“considers” categories of difference such as race, gender, class, and sexual orientation “as 
organizing structures of society, recognizing that these key components influence political 
access, equality, and the potential for any form of justice” (Hancock 2007a:63).  
While some approaches to intersectional research pursue evaluations of institutional and 
“historically particular configurations of inequalities,” such as “the cultural influence of the 
media” – what Choo and Ferree (2010:135) refer to as “systemic intersectionality” – other 
intersectional approaches engage in individual-level research and often attempt to “include the 
excluded” (Duong 2012). These “process-centered models” (Choo and Ferree 2010:133) 
conceive of identity intersections as “locations like ‘street corners’ where race and gender meet 
and have multiplicative effects.” In this metaphor, ‘streets’ refer to “social processes such as 
racism or sexism” and are considered to ‘cross’ one another without actively altering or 
transforming the underlying processes (Choo and Ferree 2010:133). This interpretation of the 
transformative nature of intersections is, however, disputed. Some scholars suggest that identity 
categories are fundamentally altered by the process of intersection in such a manner that 




The debate over quantitative intersectional analysis appears to be based on traditional 
data collection methods – most notably the use of survey research designs which rely on standard 
categorical variables for the collection and interpretation of identity-related information and 
effects (Hancock 2007b; Simien 2007; Bedolla 2007; Emirbayer 1997). It is argued that research 
which relies on measures that reflect static (often conceptualized as dichotomous) identity 
categories – namely with additive and multiplicative models of political phenomenon – produces 
“competition” between “marginalized groups for fringe levels of resources rather than systemic 
reform” which is beneficial across society (Hancock 2007a:70). The resultant “oppression 
Olympics” is often a criticism of such methods of analysis (Walby, et al. 2012:237). 
Furthermore, identity analyses which rely on mutually-exclusive response categories in survey 
research “deny certain groups who fall between the intersections of multiple groups the political 
space for claims” to a voice in policy debates (Hancock 2007a:70; Crenshaw 1991; Cole 2008; 
Purdie-Vaughs and Eibach 2008). Finally, critics suggest that traditional additive and 
multiplicative models “lead to [a] misdiagnosis” of social problems and even have the potential 
to contribute to harmful “policy solutions” (Hancock 2007a:70). 
Highlighting these criticisms scholars Patricia Hill Collins (2000) and Leah Warner 
(2008) suggest that identities exist as part of a “matrix of domination” (Collins 2000), i.e., 
intersecting structures of opportunity and disadvantage which privilege and/or disprivilege 
particular identities in certain social contexts (Warner 2008). Simply stated, any 
conceptualization of identity must take into account the intersectional notion that multiple social 
identities can be experienced at once, identities only have meaning in relation to other identities, 
and that identities cannot be understood outside of their socio-structural context.  
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For the purposes of survey research, it is necessary to “provisionally adopt” (McCall 
2005:1773) analytical categories; however, the hazards outlined by anticategoricalists may still 
be avoided. This is accomplished by also adopting Collins’ (2000) and Warner’s (2008) re-
conceptualization of identity and using more robust measures in quantitative research. This is not 
a radical new approach to political science. In fact, some of the indicators used in this study were 
developed to measure attitudes toward the private rights of business owners to maintain racially 
segregated facilities Woodmansee and Cook (1967; 1976) while many of the identity measures 
have been tested in relation to partisan identification (Green 2002). What is unique to this study 
is the application of cognitive and affective measures of identity – including identity centrality, 
public and private regard, and stigmatization – to concepts such as sexuality and race within the 
same survey instrument. These robust identity measures can then be compared and interacted to 
determine their individual and multiplicative effects on attitudinal and behavioral measures. In 
short, by adopting the intercategorical approach and relying on social-psychological theory to 
inform my methodology, I quantitatively complicate how we understand sexuality, its 
relationship to socially-constructed identities such as race, and its effect on sexual minority 
politics. 
In the following sections, I discuss the nature of intragroup heterogeneity and the 
theoretical model used in this study; identify key hypotheses; explain the survey research design, 
including survey question construction and sample survey methodology; and, finally, introduce 






Sexual Minority Heterogeneity 
 
What accounts for political attitudinal and participatory variation among sexual 
minorities? The answer, I propose, can be found by examining intragroup heterogeneity. That is, 
“the cross-cutting political effects of both marginalization and privilege within…groups in U.S. 
society” (Bedolla 2007:232). Critical feminist and queer theories as well as intersectionality have 
shown that the behavioral effect of identity must be measured as more than just a categorical 
indicator, i.e., dichotomous ‘1’ or ‘0’ (Hancock 2007; Shields 2008; Warner 2008).  
While this study follows McCall’s (2005:1773) intercategorical approach to 
intersectional inquiry, I also borrow from the intracategorical approach in that one goal of this 
study is to “reveal the complexity of lived experience within social groups at neglected points of 
intersection.” Sexual minorities “reside in multiple systems of stratification” which “constantly 
challenge” them to “simultaneously respond to numerous privileges and constraints that are 
bestowed on the various social roles they occupy” (Swank and Fahs 2013a:661). That is, sexual 
minorities – like other socially-constructed groups – are neither demographically nor politically 
monolithic. Instead, “competing hierarchies, obligations, and experiences inform and modify one 
another in ways that create many variations within a single stratum of people” (Swank and Fahs 
2013a:661). 
Complex social-psychological and socio-historical processes such as ‘androcentrism,’ 
heterosexism, and racism, among others, interact and effect one’s political orientation (Purdie-
Vaughs and Eibach 2008). It follows, then, that LGBT people are not politically distinctive (i.e., 
ideologically liberal or Democratically-oriented) simply because they identify as a sexual 
minority (Shields 2008). Instead, I hypothesize, that interactions between identity categories 
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effect the political attitudes and behaviors of sexual minorities. Specifically, one’s relationship to 
an identity category, experiences with stigmatization resultant from identification with a certain 
group, the composition of one’s social networks, and one’s socio-cultural condition interact to 
influence how one participates in the political process as well as one’s attitudes toward specific 




Figure 1.1, on page 45, graphically depicts the model used in this study. As introduced in 
Chapter 1, the individual LGBT-identified person is the level of analysis. Strength of group 
association, stigma, social networks, and context represent four processes which influence 
individual political orientation. Intersectional theory notes the importance of assessing how other 
identities with which the individual might identify influences each of the specified processes, 
graphically depicted here by the boxes containing various social and political identities (Bedolla 
2007). That is, researchers should consider how the relationship between societal power 
structures and socially-constructed gender, racial, or religious identities influence the strength 
with which an individual identifies as a sexual minority. Researchers should also consider the 
culturally significant values associated with categories of identity and how these internal value 
structures – as well as exogenous power structures – influence the relationship between sexuality 
and other socially-constructed identities. Similarly, stigmatization does not occur in isolation. 
Stigmatization interacts across social identities (e.g., a gay man of color experiencing both 
racism and homophobia) to influence political orientations. While multiple identities are 
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specified in Figure 1.1 that are not under investigation in this study, the possibilities for future 
research are illustrated by the complex web of interacting social identities9.  
Intersectional Decisions 
 The goal of this study is to analyze and explain political attitudinal and behavioral variation 
within sexual minority communities in the United States. In the end, I will be able to make 
generalizations about the political attitudes and behaviors of sexual minorities in relation to their 
racial & ethnic identity, specifically. It is important in quantitative intersectional research to limit 
the categories of difference under evaluation in order to avoid generating as Young (2004:721) 
warns “an infinite regress that dissolves groups into individuals” (quoted in Warner 2008:455-7). 
It is also “the researcher’s charge” to “make choices” about which identity groups to study and 
also to “explicitly” justify those “decisions processes” in light of their research questions (Warner 
2008:455-7). 
 As I discuss later, examining the politics of only the most visible members of the LGBT 
community risks perpetuating the “intersectional invisibility” of racial and ethnic minorities, the 
economically disadvantaged, gender minorities, the differently abled, religious queers, and others 
who struggle for recognition and whom social science repeatedly ignores (Purdie-Vaughns and 
Eibach 2008). It was the original intent of this study to include a detailed examination of gender 
identity; however, due to economic and methodological constraints, this study focuses on sexuality 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that a central criticism of the intersectional approach among political 
scientists has been the complex nature of intersectional models (Simien 2007; Hancock 2007; 
McCall 2005). The statistical power of models which intricately examine sub-populations can be 
limited without proper oversampling of, in this case, minority populations. This criticism has not 
gone unanswered – either theoretically or methodologically – and other scholars suggest that 
properly executed research designs and statistical modeling along with a proper understanding of 
the terms under investigation yield beneficial results even with complex models (Davis 2008; 




at the intersection of race. The research question which follows, is how does sexuality interact with 
race to influence the political attitudes and behaviors of lesbian, gay, and bisexual people in the 
United States? In the following section I discuss the theoretical model – graphically depicted in 
Figure 1.1 – in detail and explain the key hypotheses of this study. 
Conceptualizing Identity 
There are many aspects of social identification; and, the composition of social identities 
is more complex and nuanced than current quantitative political research recognizes (Bedolla 
2007). In order to better understand the influence on politics, as well as the interaction between 
identities, I propose as Green (2002) to measure identity categories using social-psychological 
indicators of group belonging (Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, and Cook 1989; Mael and 
Tetrick 1992; Duckitt, Callaghan, and Wagner 2005). Identities, like attitudes, consist of 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral components (see Green 2002; Deaux, et al. 1999; Brewer 
1993; Eagly and Chaiken 1993). “Linked fate” (Dawson 1994; Simien 2005), experience with 
stigmatization and internalization (Goffman 1963; Kelman 1961; Gaventa 1980; Major and 
O’Brien 2005), group associations (Mael and Tetrick 1992), and social networks (Knoke 1990; 
Quintelier, Stolle, and Harel 2012), along with situational and contextual measures represent 
aspects of social identity which influence political attitudes and actions. Yet, contemporary 
political survey research discounts or fails to adequately measure the interaction between these 
important and influential concepts (Hancock 2007; Shields 2008; Cole 2008), instead assuming 
self-selection into an identity category occurs in social isolation and invariably results in 
intragroup political homogeneity. 
Social Identity and Self-Categorization Theories hold that individuals endeavor to 
“maximize differences” between the group with which they identify (“ingroup”) and members of 
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“psychologically relevant opposition groups” (Green 2002; Brewer 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, and Wetherell 1987; Tajfel 1978). In essence, social identities reflect the point at which 
“I becomes we” (Brewer 1991:476, emphasis in original). Furthermore, these theories posit that 
self-conceptions expand and contract “across different levels of social identity” and are 
dependent upon “the frame of reference for differentiation and social comparison,” i.e., the other 
social groups to which we compare and differentiate ourselves (Brewer 1991:476; Turner, et al. 
1987; Tajfel 1978). These comparisons are viewed to entail “a shift towards the perception of 
self as an interchangeable exemplar of some social category” (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, 
and Wetherell 1987:50; quoted in Brewer 1991:476). While critical theories have demonstrated 
that prototypical images of socially constructed categories often do not match the lived 
experiences of those who exist at the intersection of these social constructions (Purdie-Vaughns 
and Eibach 2008), and that existing definitions of identity are imprecise (Mael and Tetrick 1992), 
most political and social-psychological studies have conceptualized social identities in this way, 
i.e., as oppositional and in many cases mutually exclusive (Jackson and Smith 1999).  
Such ambiguous conceptualizations and a focus on distinctiveness have also led many 
scholars (as with LGBT political studies) to “misattribute” social and political phenomena to 
social identity differences – what Shields (2008:304) refers to as the fallacy of “difference-as-
explanation.” (See also Richards 2002). Helms, Jernigan, and Mascher (2005:32), for example, 
refer to how “easily” quantifiable characteristics such as race are – especially when measured in 
“combination” with “imprecise definition[s] of racial categories” – and suggest that such 
measurements often result in the researcher contributing “more meaning to racial categories than 
is merited” (quoted in Shields 2008:304). Sellers, et al. (1998:25) and Cross (1991) similarly 
contend that “ascribing” identity characteristics – such as behavioral or attitudinal outcomes – 
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based solely on racial categorization “do[es] not fully incorporate the individual differences in 
the meaning and relevance of race in the lives of persons,” and suggest that researchers may 
“obtain inaccurate estimates of the relationship between identity and outcome” measures. 
Furthermore, Brewer (1993) and Deaux, et al. (1999:97) suggest that identity “categorization” 
alone omits relevant “affective and behavioral” components of “social identification.” These 
criticisms require that measurements of identity encompass categorization, intergroup relational 
comparisons, and self-evaluation. 
Identities are a function of ingroup and outgroup comparisons as well as social 
interactions; and, the strength of attachment to an identity appears to be related to how well the 
identity “satisfies” certain “functions” such as raising one’s self esteem, allowing for social 
interaction, or fostering intragroup cooperation (Deaux, et al. 1999:106). Because identity 
construction requires relational comparisons, group membership alone is insufficient to measure 
the effect of social identities. Measuring identity, then, requires the adoption of more robust 
indicators of group belonging (Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, and Cook 1989; Mael and 
Tetrick 1992; Duckitt, Callaghan, and Wagner 2005). A review of the social science literature 
reveals that measures of “Linked fate” (Dawson 1994; Simien 2005), experience with 
stigmatization and internalization (Goffman 1963; Kelman 1961; Gaventa 1980; Major and 
O’Brien 2005), group associations (Mael and Tetrick 1992), and social networks (Knoke 1990; 
Quintelier, Stolle, and Harel 2012), along with situational and contextual measures fit the criteria 
specified for robust identity measurement. I will discuss the effects of stigmatization and social 





Group Association & ‘Linked Fate’ 
 Social and political psychologists have struggled to completely define and measure group 
identification. Indeed, Bedolla (2007) readily admits it may be impossible to know exactly what 
a person’s identity is. Identification, broadly conceptualized, refers to “the tendency of 
individuals to perceive themselves and their groups or organizations as intertwined, sharing 
common qualities and faults, successes and failures, and common destinies” (Mael and Tetrick 
1992:813), and is one of the most widely used indicators in social science. One measure of 
identification, “identification with a psychological group,” is perhaps the most commonly 
adopted indicator for identification as it involves “the perception of shared prototypical 
characteristics, virtues, and flaws” (Mael and Tetrick 1992:813). As the critique offered 
previously suggests, however, the concept is often measured with categorical (sometimes 
dichotomous), mutually-exclusive indicators because researchers typically focus on “the 
cognitive perception of oneness with the group” (Mael and Tetrick 1992:813). In fact, identity 
and its behavioral and attitudinal effects are much more complex than mere self-selection into a 
group. 
 Identity, like attitude, is composed of cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. 
Cognitive components refer to “an individual’s beliefs about” the identity; “the affective 
component consists of feelings, moods, and emotions experienced in relation to” the identity; 
while “the behavioral component reflects a person’s actions toward” the identity (Greene 
2002:178; Eagly and Chaiken 1995). As part of the affective component of identity, scholars, 
especially in the intersectional vein, have introduced the concept of linked fate – or “a feeling of 
closeness to others who identify with the group label and the acceptance of the belief that 
individual life chances are inextricably tied to the group as a whole” (Simien 2005:529; Dawson 
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1994; Gay and Tate 1998). Often used in studies of racial and sexual identity (Simien 2005; 
Cohen 1999; Simon, Sturmer, Lowey, Weber, Freytag, Habig, Kampmeier, and Spahlinger 
1998), linked fate is an important concept in identity measurement because it allows researchers 
to measure “the relative degree of attachment an individual has to particular group 
identifications” (Bedolla 2007). The concept also “shows how meaningful certain attachments 
are relative to others the individual may have, helping scholars understand the interrelation 
among identities” (Bedolla 2007). The measurement of identity in this study, which is 
operationalized in detail below, is different from previous sexual minority political research 
because single categorical indicators are abandoned in favor of additive indices which provide 
more detail and nuance to the effects of identity and its interaction across categories of 
difference. 
Identity Measurement: So What? 
I have provided a theoretical justification for measuring identity as a composite of 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral indicators and demonstrated how these indicators offer more 
robust insight into identity effects. It should also be noted, however, that the effects of identity 
measurement do not solely exist in theory. In what follows, I also offer a practical justification of 
my identity measurement methodology and suggest that political research which relies on 
categorical measurement of identity without providing adequate justification risks serious 
political consequences for LGBT people and people at the intersection of multiple social 
minority identities.  
As noted in Chapter 1, an overlooked element of this intersectional research is what 
Crenshaw (1991) refers to as “political intersectionality,” or the idea that “those who occupy 
multiple subordinate identities may find themselves caught between the sometimes conflicting 
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agendas of two political constituencies to which they belong, or are overlooked by these 
movements entirely” (Cole 2008:444). Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach (2008:381) have termed this 
phenomenon “intersectional invisibility” and describe it as “the general failure to fully recognize 
people with intersecting identities as members of their constituent groups;” and, “the distortion 
of the intersectional persons’ characteristics in order to fit them into frameworks defined by 
prototypes of constituent identity groups.” They suggest as Crenshaw (1991) that the effect of 
such a system of marginalization is “political invisibility,” or the “neglect by allegedly inclusive 
advocacy groups of the issues that predominately affect people with intersecting subordinate 
identities” (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008:385). Strolovitch (2007) observes such a pattern in 
an examination of interest group activity, finding “advocacy groups often wind up devoting 
proportionally less attention and resources to constituents with multiple subordinate identities 
than they do to their more prototypical constituents who have only a single subordinate identity” 
(also quoted in Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008:385).   
Aside from issues of descriptive and substantive representation, failing to adequately 
report the effects of intersectional identity categories may also seriously effect minority political 
participation and empowerment. Swank and Fahs (2013a), for example suggest that among 
LGBT political activists, those who experience discrimination across multiple axes of oppression 
– in this case lesbian women of color – are “much less inclined to engage in” political activity. 
Similar results are observed for political attitudes as multiple minority gays and lesbians appear 
less likely to hold dissonant attitudes – even toward policies which have the potential to reinforce 







 The term stigma refers to “the culturally shared knowledge that society regards the 
members of a particular group or category negatively and accords them inferior status in their 
social interactions with the nonstigmatized” (Herek 2010:693). Stigmatization is “an undesired 
differentness,” according to Herek (2010), which is socially constructed and, as such, mutable as 
societal “mores” change. Stigmatization exists across all aspects of American society (Goffman 
1963), and is often expressed in the form of negative treatment or discrimination (Major and 
O’Brien 2005). Stigmatization often fuels “negative evaluations and stereotypes” which are 
“widely shared and well known among members of a culture” (Major and O’Brien 2005:395; 
Crocker, Major, and Steele 1998; Jones, Farina, Hastorf, Markus, Miller and Scott 1984). 
Furthermore, stigmatization is directly related to the structures of power within a society. Herek 
(2010) asserts that “stigma-based differentials in power and status are legitimated and 
perpetuated by society’s institutions and ideological systems in the form of structural stigma 
which is ‘formed by sociopolitical forces and represents the policies of private and government 
institutions that restrict the opportunities of stigmatized groups” (Link and Phelan 2001, quoted 
in Herek 2010:693). In effect, a group or groups of ‘others’ – those who do not share the 
dominant characteristic(s) of society – are subjugated, valued less by society, made invisible and 
erased from societal discourse, asymmetrically benefit from societal advancements, and 
necessarily experience life within a society differently than the dominant group. Such disparities 
in lived experience have profound effects including negative mental and physical health 
outcomes and negative economic effects (Williams, Yu, and Jackson 1997). For political 
scientists, it is expected “the more stigmatized groups accept their lower status, the less likely 
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they are to challenge the structural [and political] barriers they face” (Bedolla 2007). Empirical 
examination reveals, however, that among LGBT people, specifically, stigmatization acts as a 
motivating factor for political participation (Swank and Fahs 2013a). I turn now to an 
examination of stigmatization, focusing on two types, specifically: sexual stigma and 
intersectional stigma.  
Sexual Stigma 
 Sexual stigma refers to “the stigma attached to any nonheterosexual10 behavior, identity, 
relationship, or community” (Herek 2010:693). Like other forms of stigma, sexual stigma is 
related to the structures of power within a society. In the United States, society is structured 
around a system of power (nominally known as heterosexism or heterocentrism) which defines 
“heterosexuality as the normative standard of human sexuality” while stigmatizing – through 
“ostracism, discrimination, harassment, and violence” (Herek 2010) – sexual minorities (Purdie-
Vaughns and Eibach 2008; Herek 2007; Hegarty, Pratto, and Lemieux 2004; Harper and 
Schneider 2003). Sources of stigmatization for sexual minorities include “HIV/AIDS-related 
biases” (Worthen 2013; Wright, Mulick, and Kincaid 2007; Miller 2001) and religiously-based 
biases (Worthen 2013; Hinrichs and Rosenberg 2002; Selzer 1992), although sexual stigma may 
also originate within sexual minority communities. For example, gays and lesbians may hold 
negative stereotypical views of each other (Gordon 2006), while also holding negative 
stereotypical views of bisexuals (Ochs 1996; Rust 1996;1995).  
                                                 
10 Again, sexual stigma is used here to denote the stigmatization of non-heterosexuals. 
Transgender, transsexual and gender-nonconforming people also face strong structural barriers in 
the form of ‘androcentrism’ and transphobia (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008). Stigmatization 
of transgender people is often violent and gender-based stereotypes often fuel such biases (See 
Norton and Herek 2013 and Lombardi 2009). 
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 Research suggests that among sexual minorities, sexual stigma – especially if internalized 
– effects physical and mental health outcomes and is often correlated with increased stress, drug 
and tobacco use, risky sexual behavior including HIV/AIDS exposure, as well as homelessness, 
especially among sexual minority youth, and unemployment (Herek and Garnets 2007; Meyer 
2003; Diaz, Ayala, and Bein 2004; Diaz 1998). These factors are also often exacerbated by 
multiple minority identities – as will be discussed below. 
Politically, empirical research indicates that sexual stigma alone does not negatively 
affect participation or activism. To the contrary and, as Swank and Fahs (2013b:1390) note, to 
the consternation of “homophobic bullies,” stigmatization in the form of hate crime attacks 
appears to “generate resilient gays and lesbians who are more resolved in their political efforts” 
rather than “intimidate them into submission.” This is not an uncommon finding. Among racial 
minorities, “feelings of power deprivation” and “the belief that inequities in the social system are 
responsible for a group’s disadvantaged status in society” are two key components which 
motivate political action (Lien 1994; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981). Furthermoe, 
studies of resilience suggest that certain “innate” traits as well as psychological therapies can 
assist transgender people and gender minorities in avoiding negative psychological outcomes 
associated with “negative experiences and/or challenging environments,” although this research 
has not been extended explicitly to include effects on political participation or attitudes (Singh 
2013:692; Sevelius 2013; Singh and McKleroy 2011).  
This is certainly not to say, however, that all sexual minority political experiences are 
monolithic. The political effects of sexual stigma against bisexuals, for example, often results in 
a lack of association with gay and lesbian community and interest groups. As Rust (1995) 
suggests, bisexuality is considered “bad politics” among many gays and lesbians (quoted in 
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Worthen 2013; see also Burleson 2005; Ault 1996). Bisexual people are perceived as “less 
committed to the community,” because they can often ‘pass’ as straight (Ochs 1996:224). 
Biphobia, “erotophobia, and sexism” among heterosexual society stereotypes bisexuals as 
promiscuous and conduits for HIV/AIDS (Hutchins 1996:251; Ochs 1996), while stigma from 
gays and lesbians often results in bisexuals being excluded from sexual minority political 
associations and policy initiatives. The result is that bisexuals are less likely to politicize their 
sexuality, hold liberal political attitudes, or engage in political activity (Egan 2012; Lewis, 
Rogers, and Sherrill 2011). 
Intersectional Stigma 
 Like identity, stigmatization does not exist in a vacuum. That is, sexual minorities may 
not experience stigmatization based solely on a single social identity. Stigma may be experienced 
based on sexuality, race, gender, ability, class, etc. Like identity it is difficult to quantify so many 
experiences without introducing too much complexity into both theoretical and statistical models 
undertaken here (Young 2004; Warner 2008). Furthermore, some research suggests that it is 
difficult for multiple minorities to determine the exact source of stigmatization when it is 
expressed across multiple axes of discrimination (Meyer 2008) while others suggest that sexual 
minorities experience – especially – heterosexist stigma similarly regardless of race (Moradi, 
Wiseman, DeBlaere, Goodman, Sarkees, Brewster, and Huang 201011). Intersectional scholars 
hypothesize (Bedolla 2007) and research suggests (Swank and Fahs 2013a; Parks, Hughes, and 
Matthews 2004), however, that sexual minorities do experience stigmatization across multiple 
                                                 
11 This study admittedly suffers methodologically as the conclusions are based on a study of only 
178 lesbians, gays, and bisexuals – only half of which were dichotomously characterized as 
‘racial minorities.’  
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axes of identity simultaneously and this stigmatization has important effects on sexual minority 
politics. 
Diaz, et al. (2004), for example, observed stigmatization in the form of “rude 
mistreatment and physical abuse” based on both ethnicity and sexuality among a probability 
sample of gay Latinos in the United States. The researchers determined that these forms of 
discrimination are linked to mental distress, risky sexual behavior, homelessness, and poverty 
among gay Latinos (See also, Sandofrt, Melendez, and Diaz 2007; Diaz 1998).  
Similar patterns exist among Native Americans. Balsam, Huang, Fieland, Simoni, and 
Walters (2004:289) observed lesbian, gay, bisexual, and “two-spirit” Native Americans are more 
than “2.5 times” more likely than whites to experience “violent victimization,” with more than 
70% of attacks “perpetuated by assailants of another race” – a statistic, they note, which is “a 
significantly higher rate than that reported by European Americans or African Americans.” This 
appears to contribute to the finding that Native American sexual minorities are more likely than 
their heterosexual peers to experience negative physical and mental health outcomes. The 
researchers recommend that future health intervention strategies take into consideration the 
effects of “multiple minority” status on Native American sexual minorities.  
Like other racial minorities, the literature on Black experiences suggest that 
stigmatization can originate from within white communities, within sexual minority 
communities, as well as from within the black community (See: Chan 1989; Morales 1989; 
Thumma 1991; Garcia 1998; Moore 2011).  
Often, stigmatization of Black sexual minorities within Black communities takes the form 
of heterosexism, or sexual stigma, and, for Black gay men, is fueled by heterosexist conceptions 
of masculinity (Bowleg 2013; Bowleg, et al. 2011; Wilson and Miller 2002; Levant, Majors, and 
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Kelley 1998). Across six focus groups consisting of Black heterosexual men, Bowleg, et al. 
(2011:550), for example, noted a common theme among respondents, that “Black men who have 
sex with men are not real men.” Wilson and Miller (2002) also note the difficulty among Black 
gay men of “managing” the racism experienced in gay communities and the heterosexism 
experienced in Black communities.  
Among the gay community, Wilson, Valera, Ventuneac, Balan, Rowe, and Carballo-
Dieguez (2009) and Malebranche, Peterson, Fullilove, and Stackhouse (2004) observe white gay 
males racially and sexually stereotype black gay males, choosing partners based on racially-
motivated assumptions, for example. Icard (1986) and Loiacano (1989) note racism against 
Black sexual minorities in employment, advertisements, admittance to bars and clubs, even in 
“standards of beauty set forth by the gay male community” (Loiacano 1989:21).  
The Contested Effects of Stigma 
That stigmatization is experienced across multiple identities simultaneously is rarely 
disputed in the literature. It is important to note, however, that alternative theories of the 
experience and effect of stigmatization exist. For example, Veenstra (2013:648) tests the 
“subordinate male target hypothesis” which asserts that “people with multiple subordinate-group 
identities regularly experience less discrimination than people with a single subordinate-group 
identity.” This argument is somewhat antithetical to intersectional conceptions of identity, 
power, and discrimination, and focuses on an androcentrist view of the concept. That is, the heart 
of the theory is “intra-male competition,” or the idea that  
“oppression experienced by the men of subordinate groups – primarily at the hands of 
men of dominant groups – is greater than that experienced by women of the same 
subordinate groups because the men of subordinate groups tend to bear the brunt of the 




  It is the compounding and internalization of stigmatization, however, that contributes to 
behavioral and attitudinal variation among sexual minorities. While avoiding the ‘oppression 
Olympics’ and additive approaches to analysis (Walby, et al. 2012), this study measures 
stigmatization across two aspects of social identity – race & ethnicity and sexuality.  
Swank and Fahs (2013a) suggest that sexual stigma, alone, motivates political 
participation and a desire to challenge existing societal power structures which perpetuate 
inequality. Similarly, racism, alone, appears to motivate political participation among racial 
minorities (Lien 1994; Miller, et al. 1981). Intersectional stigmatization, however, can be 
experienced simultaneously across multiple aspects of identity. Bedolla (2007:242), for example, 
asserts, that those who experience sexual stigma in combination with racism, for example, may 
be more likely to “accept their lower status,” and “less likely…to challenge the structural barriers 
they face.” In this vein, Swank and Fahs (2013a) examined political participation among a 
sample of sexual minority activists and found that among lesbian women racial identity is 
significantly associated with less political participation. Specifically, they observed that “lesbians 
of color were significantly less likely to join gay and lesbian protests than White lesbians” 
(Swank and Fahs 2013a:666). Although this finding was not consistent across all measures of 
political activity it offers evidence to support the intersectional perspective that multiply 
marginalized people are less likely to “challenge” barriers to political participation (Bedolla 
2007). 
Social Networks 
 Social identity and self-categorization theories assert that social identities represent an 
attempt to “maximize differences” between groups in society (Green 2002; Brewer 1991; Turner, 
et al. 1987; Tajfel 1978). That is, social identity entails relational comparisons between groups 
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by which individuals pursue “optimal distinctiveness,” or the “need for differentiation of the self 
from others and inclusion of the self into larger social collectives” (Brewer 1993:3, quoted in 
Deaux, et al. 1999:98). This “bonding” often seeks to “reinforce exclusive identity” labels and 
preserve group “homogene[ity]” (Putnam 2000:22). Conversely, “bridging” social networks 
(Putnam 2000:22) are those “networks of people” which bring together individuals with 
“different opinions and backgrounds” (Quintelier 2012:868). Based on these ties, social 
organizations such as – community groups, ethnic or fraternal groups, religious groups, etc. – are 
formed which, in line with political resource theory – provide “practical opportunities to acquire 
democratic norms, skills, and experiences which can then be translated into political action in the 
form of increased political participation (Knoke 1990:1041; Brady, Verba, and Scholzman 
1995). Recent research suggests, however, that the structure of social networks – i.e., whether 
exclusionary (bonding) or inclusionary (bridging) is an important determinant of individual 
political attitudes and behaviors (Quintelier, et al. 2012; Mutz 2002a; 2002b).  
One important aspect of identity is relationality. That is, as Deaux, et al. (1999:106) note, 
the strength of attachment to an identity category is, in part, the product of relational 
comparisons, but is also related to how an identity allows for social interaction. McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001) suggest that individuals associate with those whom they perceive 
to be like them. This “homophily” in social networks is also observed by Knoke (1990:1043) 
who suggests that Americans “tend to conform to the political coloration of their intimates.” 
Diversity in social relationships, however, appear to have different effects on political attitudes 
and behaviors. Using national survey data and experimental procedures, Mutz (2002a), for 
example finds that “cross-cutting” social networks – or those social interactions and relationships 
which expose individuals to “conflicting political viewpoints,” in fact, are associated with 
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political tolerance, i.e., “greater awareness of rationales for oppositional viewpoints” as well as a 
willingness to protect the civil rights of others in society.  
Studies of political participation, however, suggest somewhat conflicted results regarding 
the effect of bridging social networks. Mutz (2002b), in an analysis of two nationally 
representative surveys, finds that “cross-pressures,” or political disagreement within a social 
network, is related to political ambivalence and decreased political participation as group 
members attempt to maintain “harmony of social relationships” by avoiding controversial 
political behaviors including voting for president. Conversely, Quintelier, et al. (2012), in an 
examination of social network change over time among Belgian youth, finds that political 
diversity is more common than racial, ethnic, or religious diversity among young people; and, 
that these politically diverse social networks are related to increased political participation. This 
study, however, excludes voting as a form of participation, which suggests that individual 
methods of participation are influenced differently by social network diversity.  
Socio-Historical Context 
Because of the ambiguous nature of identity (Jackson and Smith 1999), researchers 
studying identity-related phenomena often focus on the relational and affective aspects of 
identity, i.e., what individuals “believe others think about them” (Bedolla 2007:239; Greene 
2002). Another aspect of identity, however is “the relative social, political and economic 
standing that entails because of the group(s)” with which an individual identifies (Bedolla 
2007:239; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999). The former – what individuals believe others think about 
them – is encompassed by my conceptualization of identity as previously described. The latter, 
however, refers to what Bedolla (2007) recognizes as “socio-historical context.” Bedolla 
(2007:243) argues that “individuals are embedded within social and historical contexts which 
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affect their experiences and resulting world view.” The various “aspects of this context,” 
therefore, “need to be taken into consideration” by researchers when “questions of inequality and 
political incorporation are dealt with” (Bedolla 2007:244).  
As Deaux (1993:9) notes, role theory in social-psychology has long “emphasized the 
importance” of the “when and where of identity.” In this view, identities are conceptualized “in 
terms of relationships with others and a structural setting in which those relationships were 
carried out” (Deaux 1993:9) This view recognizes “that each identity has domains in which its 
influence is most likely to be evident” (Deaux 1993:9; McCall and Simmons 1978). In terms of 
politics, this means that “political socialization does not occur in isolation” (Bedolla 2007:245). 
Political orientations are influenced by social context – whether this is social networks (Knoke 
1990) or cultural and economic backgrounds. This is similar to Proshansky, Fabian, and 
Kaminoff’s (1993) conception of “place identity” which Deaux (1993:9) describes as “a sense of 
self in a particular geographical or environmental context” (Proshansky 1978). In this view, 
identity development and management – along with subsequent political orientations – can be 
influenced by past and present social contexts (Ethier and Deaux 1990; 1994). 
In intersectional terms, as previously mentioned, identity is structured by power relations. 
Racism, for example, structures the nature of racial minority identity vis-à-vis White privilege; 
sexism structures the nature of gender identity vis-à-vis male privilege; and, heterosexism 
structures the nature of sexual identity vis-à-vis heterosexual privilege. These structures and 
relationships define the social contexts within which social and political identities develop and 
are expressed. Specific social contexts are also related to certain demographic indicators. For 
example, African-Americans experience higher poverty rates, unemployment rates, incarceration 
rates, and mortality rates than do whites in the United States (Bolweg 2013; Murray, Kulkami, 
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Michaud, Tomijima, Bulzacchelli, Iandiorio, and Ezzati 2006). These structural inequalities are 
the result of historical racism, and the experiences, identities, and necessarily the political 
orientations of many African-Americans are affected by their relationship to these structures of 
power (Sue, Capodilupo and Holder 2008).  
 Similarly, women and gender minorities experience employment and wage 
discrimination – earning less, disproportionately achieving positions of power or even being 
hired – which appears rooted in male conceptions of power, authority, and domestic 
responsibility (Glick and Fiske 2001; Jacobs and Gerson 2004). Also, as previously noted, sexual 
minorities experience employment and housing discrimination, cultural opposition from many 
religious denominations, and until 2003 faced criminal sanction for same-sex sexual behavior in 
the United States, all enforced by structural homophobia that shapes the experiences and political 
identities of LGBT people. Similar processes appear at work for the differently-abled (Ethier and 
Deaux 1993; Jager and Bowman 2005) and transgender people (Singh and McKleroy 2011), 
among other social identity groups. 
 These processes define lived experiences, i.e., the individual socio-historical context. In 
turn, the economic, educational, geographic, and political choices available to both dominate and 
subordinate groups in society are structured by the context within which one exists. I am by no 
means advocating a determinist perspective. Instead, I suggest – as do many scholars of 
relational psychology and intersectionality – that social identities are variable, i.e., not stable and 
fixed; and, that “social processes such as social interaction, context, and social-structural factors 
inform and create social identities” (Bowleg 2013). Income, unemployment, religion, place of 
birth, place of residency, whether or not one owns a home, parental acceptance, and others are 
examples of contextual indicators which influence identity development and politics – and often 
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vary when viewed longitudinally. Egan (2012), for example, finds a relationship between 
contextual influences such as parental birth location, i.e., being born and raised in the United 
States, urban residency, the number of siblings in a household, and identification as a sexual 
minority among a sample of lesbian, gay, and bisexual survey respondents. Furthermore, Egan 
(2012) speculates that these contextual characteristics influence identity development and 
subsequent political orientation among sexual minorities (See also Gray 2009).  
 Socio-historical context, then, represents a web of past and future structural advantages 
and limitations available to individuals based on the various social identities they occupy that 
influence political socialization and shape perceptions about and the ability to participate in the 
political process as well as cognitive and affective assessments of policy and politicians. 
 
Survey Research Design 
 
 Having detailed the theoretical model adopted in this study I now turn to a discussion of 
the sample survey research design. According to Salant and Dillman (1994:4), the purpose of a 
sample survey “is to obtain information form a few respondents in order to describe the 
characteristics of hundreds, thousands, or even millions” of people in a given population. The 
survey results presented in later chapters are based on data collected form 1,216 sexual minority-
identified adults living in the United States. The sample was acquired from the survey research 
firm Qualtrics, while the number of respondetns was chosen in order to both maximize the 
amount of identity variation within the sample, as well as to minimize the confidence level of the 
survey at ± 3% (Salant and Dillman 1994). The survey instrument is self-administered via a web-
based platform and consists primarily of fourteen multi-item batteries. As previous studies have 
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shown (Koch and Emery 2001; Swank and Fahs 2013b:1386) web-based or online surveys are 
often “the best option when studying gay and lesbian populations.” To ensure that survey 
participants are eligible – i.e., over the age of 18 and identify as a sexual minority – a series of 
screening questions are employed. Relevant statistics for completion rates, times, and general 
demographics will be presented in Chapter 3. For a complete list of survey questions and 
response sets see Appendix A.  
Moving beyond comparisons with heterosexuals, I conduct an examination of intragroup 
differences among sexual minorities, specifically, an examination of the effects of cross-cutting 
identity influences on political attitudes and behaviors. Independent variables are constructed 
from survey responses measuring cognitive and affective aspects of sexual and racial identity as 
well as gender identity, religious, and class associations, social group demographics and personal 
experience with discrimination (The SMART Team 2009, The GenIUSS Group 2014). Four 
batteries of questions measure political attitudes and two batteries of questions measure political 
behavior and are operationalized as dependent variables to be included in multiple regression 
analyses (Aiken and West 1991).  
I advance the study and understanding of sexual minority communities by elucidating the 
processes which effect multiple-minority political attitudes and efficacy. Furthermore, I 
specifically advance the study of sexual minority political attitudes by expanding the scope of the 
issues under investigation beyond those with direct bearing on LGBT interests (e.g., same-sex 
marriage or anti-discrimination protections).  
In the following sections I describe the operationalization of the dependent and 
independent variables used in the proceeding analyses as well as specific hypotheses related to 





In accordance with my research goal – to analyze and explain political attitudinal and 
behavioral variation within sexual and gender minority communities in the United States – eight 
dependent variables are operationalized from a battery of questions measuring six distinct political 
attitudes and two aspects of political behavior. In the following sections I discuss each in turn. 
Political Attitudes: Role of Government, Private Rights, Egalitarianism, and Policy-Specific 
Indicators 
Attitudes, while not explicitly defined in the psychological literature, are often considered 
to be “sets of beliefs ‘whose referents have shared general societal relevance to many people in 
religious, economic, political, educational, ethnic, and other social areas’" (Kerlinger 1972:614 
cited in Saucier 2000:366) and are often considered evaluative in nature. That is, attitudes are often 
defined as a “like or dislike” of some ‘object’ (Saucier 2000:366). Consequently, “social attitudes 
constitute in part the lines along which one finds individual differences in ideology within a 
society” (Saucier 2000:367). In this study, I will measure participants’ evaluation of the role of 
government (Markus 1990; Feldman 1993), private rights (Woodmansee and Cook 1967; 
Woodmansee and Cook 1976; Biernat and Crandall 1993), egalitarianism (Kluegel and Smith 
1986; Feldman 1993), and three specific policies: gun control, immigration, and abortion (Comrey 
and Newmeyer 1965). Each attitude is coded to represent a liberal-conservative continuum and 
will be discussed in detail. 
Role of Government 
Attitudes toward the role of government are measured using three questions from the 
limited government subscale of the American National Election Studies Individualism Scales 
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(Markus 1990). This subscale is similar to the Comrey and Newmeyer (1965) welfare scale and 
measures attitudes toward “social welfare issue positions” (Feldman 1993:175). Survey 
participants are presented with three statements such as “The government should try to ensure that 
all Americans have such things as jobs, health care, and housing” and asked to rate their agreement 
with each using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ (See 
Appendix A, Q1a-c for original survey questions and response sets). Responses will be reverse 
coded where necessary to create liberal-conservative indicators where low scores represent liberal 
attitudes and high scores represent conservative attitudes. For role of government, the scale values 
will range from 3 – 15. Low scores represent the liberal attitude favoring expansive social welfare 
– or an expanded role for government in society – and high scores represent the conservative 
attitude favoring a limited role for government. 
Private Rights 
 Private rights refer to individual rights under the law and are often viewed in the context 
of competition (Woodmansee and Cook 1967). The two-item measure used here is adapted from 
the private rights subscale of the Woodmansee and Cook (1967; 1976) Multifactor Racial Attitudes 
Inventory (MRAI). The scale was originally developed to measure attitudes related to the private 
rights of business owners to maintain racially segregated facilities. In this instance, I have adapted 
the scale to measure attitudes toward the private rights of business owners to refuse service or hire 
to LGBT people (See Appendix A, Q2a-b). Survey participants are presented with two statements 
(1) “There should be a strictly enforced law requiring businesses to serve persons regardless of 
sexual orientation or gender identity,” and (2) “Regardless of their own views, an employer should 
be required to hire workers without regard to sexual orientation or gender identity.” The private 
rights scale ranges from 2 – 10. Low scores represent the liberal attitude that private ownership 
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rights are outweighed by the rights of a minority group to equal treatment and high scores represent 
the conservative attitude favoring private rights. 
Egalitarianism 
 Egalitarianism refers to individual beliefs about inequality, specifically, the “causes and 
consequences of income inequality” (Feldman 1993:169). The three-item measure used here is 
adapted from Kluegel and Smith’s (1986) egalitarianism scale and measures participants’ attitudes 
toward income inequality. Survey participants are presented with three statements such as “More 
equality of incomes would avoid conflicts between people at different income levels,” and, again, 
asked to rate their agreement with each on a five-point Likert scale (See Appendix A, Q3a-c). The 
egalitarianism scale ranges from 3 – 15. Low scores represent the liberal attitude that favors 
egalitarianism while high scores represent the conservative anti-egalitarian attitude. 
Policy-Specific Indicators 
 Along with the social-psychological scales, three measures of policy-specific attitudes are 
included. Similar to the previous measures, survey participants are presented with a statement 
about gun control (i.e., Government should protect the rights of gun owners), immigration (i.e., 
Immigrants burden the country), and abortion (i.e., Favor no restrictions on abortion) (Comrey 
and Newmeyer 1965) and asked to rate their agreement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 
‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ (See Appendix A, Q4a-c). The measures were chosen 
because they represent issues which are facially ideologically divisive (i.e., clearly have liberal 
and conservative poles) and attitudes about them are traditionally viewed as motivated by a social 
identity. For these reasons, they provide an opportunity to observe the cross-cutting influences of 
identity on issues not directly related to dominant constructions of sexuality. Scores range from 1 
– 5, and as with the previous measures, low scores indicate the liberal attitude (e.g., favors gun 
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control; believes immigrants pose no greater burden on society; opposes restrictions on abortion) 
while high scores indicate the conservative attitude (e.g., opposes gun control; believes immigrants 
burden society; and, favors restrictions on abortion). 
Political Behavior: Participation & Political Alienation 
Two aspects of political behavior are measured. First, actual political participation is 
measured using a scale adapted from the National Election Studies (ANES) model (Brady 1993). 
Survey participants are again presented with a series of statements indicating participation in 
primary/general election voting, persuading others to vote for a candidate, attending political 
events, donating money, or volunteering and asked to rate their involvement using a 4-point scale 
ranging from ‘never’ to ‘often’ (See Appendix A, Q5a-f). Cronbach’s Alpha scores are computed 
to determine the scalability of the measures and are reported in Chapter 3. The political 
participation scale ranges from 6 – 24. Low scores indicate less participation in politics while high 
scores indicate more participation in traditional political activities. 
Second, political alienation, defined as “powerlessness, self-estrangement, political 
ineffectiveness, and disorientation toward the political system” (Reef and Knoke 1993:433) is 
measured using a four-item scale adapted from Malik (1982). Survey respondents are presented 
with statements including, “Sometimes governmental and political affairs look so complex that I 
am unable to understand them;” “If government officials mistreat us we are unable to do anything 
against them;” and, “I think that other than voting there is no way whereby we can influence 
governmental decision-making,” and again, asked to rate their agreement on a five-point Likert 
scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ (See Appendix A, Q6a-d). The alienation 
scale ranges from 4 – 20 with low scores indicating less alienation from the political process and 
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high scores indicating more alienation. Attitudinal and behavioral dependent variables are included 




Independent variables are constructed from survey responses measuring social-
psychological characteristics of sexual and gender identity, as well as gender identity, religious, 
and class associations (Mael and Tetrick 1992; Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, and Chavous 
1998; The SMART Team 2009, The GenIUSS Group 2014). Indicators are also constructed which 
measure social group demographics and personal experience with discrimination. In the following 
sections I will describe each in detail. 
Identity Centrality, Public Regard, & Private Regard 
Consistent with Green (2002) and others, identity is operationalized as a function of both 
cognitive and affective indicators measuring ‘public’ and ‘private’ perceptions of group 
membership and ‘linked fate.’ Based on the Multidimensional Model of Racial Identity (MMRI) 
(Sellers et al. 1998) and the Identification with a Psychological Group or Organization (IPGD) 
scale (Mael and Tetrick 1992), survey participants are asked a serious of questions about two 
primary social identities, their sexual identity and their racial identity (Sellers et al. 1998). Survey 
participants I ask to identify their sexuality (See Appendix A, Q7) then, following Sellers et al. 
(1998), I present participants with a battery of questions which measure identity centrality, private 
regard and public regard, which I describe in turn below. 
Identity centrality is defined as the “extent to which a person normatively defines himself 
or herself with regard” to their sexual identity (Sellers et al. 1998:25). To measure sexual identity 
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centrality (SI centrality), participants are presented with a series of eight statements12 such as, “In 
general, being gay is an important part of my self-image;” “Being gay is not a major factor in my 
social relationships;” and “My destiny is tied to the destiny of other gays,” and asked to rate their 
agreement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree.’ 
Responses are reverse coded where necessary. The SI centrality scale ranges from 8 – 40. Low 
scores indicate that sexuality is not central to respondents’ overall identity and that they share no 
‘linked fate’ with other sexual minorities, while high scores indicate that sexuality is a central part 
of respondents’ overall identity and that they share ‘linked fate’ with other sexual minorities 
(Simien 2005) (See Appendix A, Q8a-i).  
Private regard is defined as personal “feelings of positivity and negativity toward” one’s 
sexual identity (Sellers, et al 1998:25). To measure sexual identity private regard (SI Private 
Regard), respondents are presented with a series of six statements such as, “I am happy about 
being gay,” and “I feel that the gay community has made valuable contributions to society,” and 
asked to rate their agreement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to 
‘strongly agree.’ The SI private regard scale ranges from 6 – 30. Low scores indicate that 
respondents have negative affect toward their sexual identity while high scores indicate that 
respondents have positive feelings toward their sexual identity (See Appendix A, Q9a-f). 
Similarly, public regard is defined as “the extent to which individuals feel that others view” 
their sexual identity as positive or negative (Sellers et al. 1998:26). To measure sexual identity 
public regard (SI Public Regard), respondents are asked to rate their agreement on a five-point 
                                                 
12 To ensure internal reliability and external validity, survey participants who identify as lesbian 
are presented with the same series of statements which substitute ‘lesbian’ for ‘gay.’ Similarly, 
participants who identify as ‘bisexual’ are presented with the same statements about bisexuality. 
This methodology is repeated for identity centrality, public regard, and private regard as well as 
in question wording regarding stigmatization. 
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Likert scale with a series of six statements such as, “Overall, gays are considered good by others,” 
and “Gays are not respected by the broader society.” The SI public regard scale ranges from 6 – 
30. Low scores indicate that respondents believe society devalues their sexual identity while high 
scores indicate respondents’ belief that society values their sexual identity (See Appendix A, 
Q10a-f). 
Participants are also asked to identify their racial identity (See Appendix A, Q13). 
Afterward, participants are presented with a battery of questions measuring racial identity 
centrality, public and private regard (See Appendix A, Q14a-i; Q15a-f; Q16a-f). Following the 
same procedures as the operationalization of the sexual identity independent variables, three 
additional identity independent variables will be operationalized from these measures: Racial 
Identity Centrality (RI Centrality), Racial Identity Private Regard (RI Private Regard), and Racial 
Identity Public Regard (RI Public Regard). Rather than simply interacting dichotomous terms 
(Landrine, Klonoff, Alcaraz, Scott, and Wilkins 1995) these measures allow for comparisons of 
social-psychological characteristics across identity categories. 
While current theory suggests multiple minority status (i.e., identifying with multiple 
minority social identities) is related to depressed political participation, political alienation, and 
moderation in political attitudes (Bedolla 2007; Swank and Fahs 2013), I propose that identity 
centrality and public/private regard have differential effects on political participation, alienation, 
and attitudes – also, that these identity variables have distinct effects from experiences with 
discrimination which will be described in detail later. Most survey research relies on categorical 
indicators (e.g., dichotomous identity categories) to ascribe behavioral and attitudinal 
characteristics. However, current research suggests that attributing attitudinal and behavioral 
differences to such categories may, in fact, be a “misattribution” (Shields 2008; Richards 2002: 
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Helms, Jernigan, and Mascher 2005). To test how the different aspects of identity interact to effect 
political attitudes and behaviors I propose several hypotheses which follow. 
 
H1: Sexual identity centrality and racial identity centrality are negatively associated with political 
alienation, positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism.   
Because, identity centrality asymmetrically influences political attitudes about issues related to 
specific categories of minority rights. That is, variation in identity centrality will reflect liberal 
attitudes toward policies specifically related to those aspects of one’s identity. Therefore, I 
hypothesize:   
H1a: Sexual identity centrality is positively associated with LGBT policy liberalism.  
H1b: Among racial minorities, racial identity centrality is positively associated with “role of 
government” policy liberalism.  
Lastly, because “white respondents are hard-pressed to define whiteness and the privileges it 
brings to those who own it,” yet whiteness becomes “much more definable when the privilege it 
accords its owners is lost” (Hurtado and Stewart 1997:299), I hypothesize: 
H1c: Among white respondents, racial identity centrality is negatively associated with immigration 
policy liberalism.   
While current theory suggests that multiple minority status (i.e., identifying with multiple minority 
social identities) is related to depressed political participation, political alienation, and moderation 
in political attitudes, I hypothesize the following: 
H2: Sexual identity private regard and racial identity private regard are negatively associated 




Hypothesis 2b expresses how private regard interacts across categories of identity to effect political 
alienation, participation, and attitudes and are indicative of interaction terms in statistical models. 
I hypothesize: 
H2a: Sexual identity private regard is negatively associated with political alienation, and 
positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism;   
H2b: Among racial minorities, both racial identity private regard and sexual identity private 
regard are negatively associated with political alienation, and positively associated with political 
participation and policy liberalism;  
Finally, as one’s perception about society’s value of a social identity is related to political 
participation (Sellers, et al 1998), I hypothesize: 
H3: Sexual identity public regard and racial identity public regard are negatively associated with 
political alienation, and positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism.   
Again, Hypothesis 3b expresses how public regard interacts across categories of identity to effect 
political alienation and are indicative of interaction terms in statistical models.  
H3a: Sexual identity public regard is negatively associated with political alienation, and positively 
associated with political participation and policy liberalism;    
H3b: Among racial minorities, both racial and sexual identity public regard are negatively 
associated with political alienation, and positively associated with political participation and 
policy liberalism.  
Social Networks 
 Social networks shape political attitudes and behaviors (Knoke 1990), and recent research 
suggests that social network diversity increases political participation (Quintelier, Stolle, and Harel 
2012). I measure social networks as per Quinteller, et al. (2012), by asking respondents to identify, 
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on a scale from 0 – 6, where 0 means none and 6 means all, how many of their close friends share 
their sexual orientation, their gender, their race, their religion (or are religious if they are not), and 
their political party (See Appendix A, Q18a-e). After determining the scalability of the indicators 
(using Cronbach’s Alpha), a scale is constructed which measures social network heterogeneity. 
Thus, Social network scale ranges from 0 – 30, and is reverse coded so that low scores indicate 
social network homogeneity while high scores indicate social network heterogeneity. Because 
urban areas present more opportunities for diverse social interaction, I include a dummy variable 
called urban in multiple regression estimates. The variable is a dichotomous indicator 
operationalized from a survey question measuring urbanity of residence. Categories ranging from 
1 – 4, where 1 = rural; 2 = small city (more than 50,000 people); 3 = medium city (more than 
100,000 people); and 4 = large city (more than 500,000 people) (See Appendix A, Q24) are 
collapsed and, urban takes on a value of ‘0’ for rural/small city and a value of ‘1’ for medium 
city/large city. I hypothesize: 
H4: Heterogeneity of social networks is negatively associated with political alienation, and 
positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism.  
Stigmatization 
 Determining the effects of stigmatization has been an integral component of intersectional 
analyses (Landrine et al. 1995). Stigmatization is defined as a threat to personal identity, and is 
commonly measured using indicators of “negative treatment or direct discrimination” (Major and 
O’Brien 2005:396). Along with influencing physical and mental health outcomes (Williams, Yu, 
Jackson, and Anderson 1997) and sexual behaviors (Diaz 1998), stigmatization is constructed 
around “systems of power relations” which also structure the “political choices” available to 
marginalized groups (Cohen 1997). While some stigmatization researchers compare health 
82 
 
outcomes related to discrimination between single subordinate-group and multiple subordinate-
group identities (i.e., between people who identify with one minority group versus people who 
identify with multiple minority groups) (Babbitt 2013; Veenstra 2013; Moradi, Wiesman, 
DeBlaere, Goodman, Sparkes, Brewster, and Huang 2010; Parks, Hughes, and Matthews 2004), 
in the political context, the consensus in the literature suggests that stigmatization, especially 
across multiples axes of discrimination, negatively effects political participation (Swank and Fahs 
2013; Bedolla 2007) and possibly influences reactionary ideologies. To test this assertion, similar 
to Williams, Yu, Jackson, and Anderson (1997), I operationalize sexual identity stigma as a scale 
(range 7 - 28) derived from a battery of questions which present respondents with seven statements 
describing acts of discrimination, such as “I have been subject to slurs or jokes,” or “have been 
treated unfairly by an employer” and ask respondents to indicate “whether or not any of the 
following have happened to you because you are or are perceived to be gay” (See Appendix A, 
Q12a-g). Similar to the identity independent variables, gender identity stigma and racial identity 
stigma scales are constructed from batteries which present respondents with the same seven 
statements, but insert their racial identity (Q17a-g).  
 Like identity, stigmatization may be experienced across multiple categories. That is, one 
may experience discrimination because of one’s sexuality, gender, or race – or all three at the same 
time (Collins 2000). Relative to the effects of discrimination on the political attitudes and 
behaviors of sexual minorities I hypothesize that H6: high values on the SI and RI stigma scales 
are positively related to the political alienation scale, negatively related to the political 
participation scale, positively related to the egalitarianism, private rights, and role of government 
scales, and policy-specific variables. As with the identity hypotheses, hypothesis 5a expresses how 
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stigmatization interacts across categories of identity to effect political alienation and are indicative 
of interaction terms in statistical models.   
H5: Sexual and racial identity stigma is positively associated with political alienation, and 
negatively associated with political participation and policy liberalism; 
Context 
 Because “political socialization does not occur in isolation,” structural and historical 
characteristics that reflect experiences with systems of inequality are important influences on 
political attitudes and participation (Bedolla 2007:245). For this reason, I include economic and 
demographic indicators including employment, education, and income to measure respondents’ 
experience with structural and historical systems of inequality (See Appendix A, Q23, Q27, Q28). 
Consistent with public opinion and intersectional literature (Bedolla 2007) I hypothesize that 
homeownership, employment, education, and income are all negatively related to the political 
alienation scale, positively related to the political participation scale, negatively related to the 
egalitarianism, private rights, and role of government scales, and policy-specific variables. 
Specifically, 
H6: Income is negatively associated with political alienation and positively associated with 
political participation and policy liberalism;  
H7: Education is negatively associated with political alienation, and positively associated with 
political participation and policy liberalism;  
H8: Employment is negatively associated with political alienation and policy liberalism, and 
positively associated with political participation.  
 Finally, I include in my analysis a contextual variables measuring religious affiliation. 
Religion is measured by asking respondents to indicate their religious affiliation from a list of 
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including Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, and Atheist (Appendix A, Q20). If 
respondents indicate Christian, they are asked to identify a specific denomination (Appendix A, 
Q21). First, religion is operationalized as a dichotomous indicator where 0 = non-religious (i.e., 
indicated Atheist) and 0 = religious (i.e., indicated a religious affiliation); and, evangelical 
Christian is operationalized as a dichotomous indicator where 0 = non-evangelical Christian (i.e., 
indicated affiliation with Mainline Protestant denominations) and 1 = evangelical Christian (i.e., 
indicated affiliation with evangelical Christian denomination). Mainline and evangelical 
denominations are drawn from Melton’s (1991) descriptions of denominational positions toward 
homosexuality. I hypothesize that  
H9: Religiosity is positively associated with political participation, and negatively associated with 
political alienation and policy liberalism; and 
H9a: Christianity is positively associated with political participation, and negatively associated 
with political alienation and policy liberalism. 
 
In this chapter I detailed the theoretical model used to guide this study, explained the survey 
and research methodology and operationalization of variables, and presented eleven hypotheses 
associated with each of the independent variables. In the following chapter I present the results of 













CHAPTER 3: IDENTITY MEASURES & SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
The central focus of this study is to better understand the effect of socially constructed 
identities, specifically at the intersection of sexuality and race, on political attitudes and 
behaviors. To achieve this goal, I conducted an internet-based survey using the methodology 
described in chapter 2 between November 4 and November 14, 2016 using a quota sample of 
LGBT-identified adults living in the United States. The sample frame of 1216 respondents was 
obtained from Qualtrics Panels with funds from a grant by the University of Tennessee. The 
survey instrument is a self-administered online questionnaire which presents respondents with 
approximately 93 questions, as previously described. With 1153 completed surveys, the 
completion rate is 94.8%. On average, it took survey participants approximately 15.9 minutes to 
complete the survey and internal quality checks (See Appendix A, Q8f and Q14f) confirm the 
reliability of the survey instrument. 
In the following sections, I describe the survey data including demographics and key 
indicators constructed to test the hypotheses from Chapter 2. Aside from standard descriptive 
demographic information, I present an analysis of six additive indices measuring social-
psychological identity indicators – racial and sexual identity centrality; racial and sexual identity 
private regard; and, racial and sexual identity public regard – described in Chapter 2. Finally, I 
present the results of statistical analyses and discuss evidence supportive of – and contradictory 








 Before proceeding to a discussion of regression modeling, it is important to first examine 
the demographics of the sample frame. The difficulty in obtaining a representative sample of 
LGBT survey respondents is widely documented (Rollins and Hirsch 2003). As previous 
research has shown (Koch and Emery 2001; Swank and Fahs 2013b:1386), web-based or online 
surveys are often “the best option when studying gay and lesbian populations” because they 
allow for the collection of data from a stigmatized population in a fashion which limits social 
desirability bias. Due to funding constraints, previously discussed in Chapter 1, this study is 
limited to the use of a quota sample of LGBT adults living in the United States. While not as 
accurate as a probability sample, quota sampling offers the best alternative given existing 
constraints.  
In this study, demographics represent more than simple categorical indicators; although, I 
adopt an “intercategorical” approach to describe sample demographics in the following sections 
(McCall 2005). One of the major contributions of this study to the body of LGBT politics 
research is in the more nuanced understanding of sexual identity and its interaction with racial 
identity that comes with altering long-standing survey methodologies (Hancock 2007b; Simien 
2007; Bedolla 2007; Emirbayer 1997). In the previous chapter, I describe scale measures of 
sexual and racial identity. While the social-psychological measures of identity used in this study 
are not innovations themselves, the use of multiple scale measures of identity among the same 
LGBT sample provides unique insight into the intersection of sexuality, race, and politics. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, identity centrality is defined by Sellers, et al. (1998:25) as the 
“extent to which a person normatively defines himself or herself with regard” to a specific 
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identity. Centrality, as a concept, denotes the extent to which individuals experience or share a 
particular group affiliation. Similarly, private regard for one’s identity refers to “feelings of 
positive or negative” affect toward an identity one inhabits (Sellers, et al. 1998:25); while, public 
regard for one’s identity refers to cognitive perceptions of societal rejection or acceptance of 
one’s identity. A total of six identity indices are operationalized from these concepts, using 
specific survey questions (See Appendix A, Q8a-i; Q9a-f; Q10a-f; Q13a-i; Q14a-f; and, Q15a-f). 
These indices – Sexual (SI) and racial identity (RI) centrality; SI and RI private regard; and, SI 
and RI public regard – are used as independent variables in multiple regression models described 
later in this chapter. In the following sections, I discuss these measures as they relate to sample 
demographics. I begin the discussion of demographics from Shield’s (2008) “both/and” 
perspective; that is, recognizing categorical descriptors for the purpose of organization (Hancock 
2007a), but also using them to “reveal the complexity of lived experience within social groups at 
neglected points of intersection” (McCall 2005:1773). 
Sexual Identity 
Figure 3.1 represents a graphic depiction of the distribution of categorical identity 
measures for self-reported sexual identity among survey participants. As the figure shows, a 
plurality of the sample (44.3 percent) identify as bisexual, while slightly smaller proportions 
(30.3 percent and 23.6 percent) identify as gay and lesbian, respectively. Of the small percentage 
(1.6 percent) of the sample who identify with a sexual identity other than lesbian, gay, or 
bisexual, the most common identities are ‘pansexual,’ ‘asexual,’ and ‘queer.’ This distribution is 
consistent with recent online survey research (Pew Research Center 2013); however, other 
samples from large urban areas report more self-identified ‘queer’ survey participants (Rollins 
and Hirsch 2003). 
88 
 
Along with standard categorical measures of sexual identity, the survey instrument – 
using a battery of twenty questions – also measures the relative strength with which individuals 
hold their sexual identity, or centrality; positive or negative feelings about one’s sexual identity, 
or private regard; and, perceived societal acceptance of sexual identity, or public regard (Selers, 
et al. 1998) (See Appendix A, Q8a-i; Q9a-f; and Q10a-f). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Sexual Identity 
 
Appendix A, Q8a-i shows the distribution of responses for items which comprise the SI 
centrality scale. The distribution of every item is characterized by a negative skew. That is, a 
majority of survey participants either agree or strongly agree with each statement. For example, a 
majority of survey participants (57.1 percent) either agree or strongly agree that “my destiny is 
tied to the destiny of other [LGB/Sexual Minority] people” (see Appendix A, Q8c). The only 



















displaying a slight negative skew, more closely approximates a normal curve, with the majority 
of responses clustered around the center of the distribution. Three items are reverse coded and, 
the eight items are operationalized as the SI centrality scale. As Appendix B shows, values on the 
scale range 8 – 40 and, the scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level (α = .797). Low scores 
on the scale represent low sexual identity centrality, or the feeling that one’s sexual identity is 
unimportant to one’s sense of self; while, high scores on the scale represent high sexual identity 
centrality, or the feeling that one’s sexual identity is important to one’s sense of self. 
Appendix A, Q9a-f shows the distribution of responses for items which comprise the SI 
private regard scale. Again, the distributions show a consistent negative skew as the majority of 
survey participants either agree or strongly agree with each statement. For example, more than 
three-quarters or participants (82.1 percent) either agree or strongly agree with the statement, “I 
feel good about being [LGB/Sexual Minority]” (see Appendix A, Q9a). There is one exception to 
this pattern. The distribution of item four (Q9d) exhibits a strong negative skew, as a majority of 
participants (77.5 percent) either disagree or strongly disagree with the statement, “I often regret 
that I am [LGB/Sexual Minority].” One item is reverse coded and, the six items are 
operationalized as the SI private regard scale. As Appendix B shows, the values on the scale 
range from 6 – 30 and, the scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level (α = .816). Low scores 
on the scale represent low sexual identity private regard, or a negative affective evaluation of 
one’s sexual identity; while, high scores represent high sexual identity private regard, or a 
positive affective evaluation of one’s sexual identity. 
Finally, Appendix A, Q10a-f shows the distribution of responses for items which 
comprise the SI public regard scale. In this case, the distributions show greater variation. The 
distributions of items one (Q10a) and four (Q10d) are negatively skewed. While a plurality of 
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survey participants (42.2 percent) either agree or strongly agree that “[LGB/Sexual Minority] 
people are considered good by others,” a majority of participants (56 percent) either agree or 
strongly agree that “[LBG/Sexual Minority] people are not respected by the broader society.” 
Conversely, the distribution of item six (Q10f) shows a slightly positive skew, as a plurality of 
survey participants (40.6 percent) either disagree or strongly disagree that “society views 
[LGB/Sexual Minority] people as an asset.” Finally, the distributions of items three (Q10c) and 
five (Q10e) appear mesokurtic, with the majority of responses clustered around the center of the 
distributions. Two items are reverse coded and the six items are operationalized as the SI public 
regard scale. As Appendix B shows, the values on the scale range from 6 – 30 and, the scale 
exhibits a strong alpha reliability level (α = .789). Low scores on the scale represent low sexual 
identity public regard, or a negative evaluation of societal acceptance of one’s sexual identity; 
while, high scores represent high sexual identity public regard, or a positive evaluation of 
societal acceptance of one’s sexual identity. 
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution and median scores on the RI centrality scale by sexual 
identity. As the figure shows, the highest median values on the sexual identity centrality scale 
(denoted by the lines within the black boxes) appear among the least represented group in the 
study, i.e., survey participants whose sexual identity is something other than gay, lesbian, or 
bisexual. Overall, median scores on the scale appear higher among gays, lesbians, and other 
sexual identities than bisexuals. That is, the relative strength of association with bisexual identity 
appears weaker than with gay, lesbian, or other sexual identities. An independent samples t-test 
using a dummy variable operationalized from a survey question measuring sexual identity (See 
Appendix A, Q7) appears to confirm this observation. The statistically significant t-value, 
t(1157) = 7.47, p = .000, shows that gay, lesbian, or another sexual identity (N = 648) is 
91 
 
associated with a higher score on the SI centrality scale, M = 24.97(SD = 6.20) than bisexual 
identity (N = 511), M = 22.2(SD = 5.87). (See Appendix B for descriptive statistics of variables 
used in statistical analyses). 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Sexual Identity Centrality Distribution by Sexual Identity 
 
A similar pattern holds for SI private regard (see Figure 3.3) and SI public regard (see 
Figure 3.4). As Figure 3.3 shows, gay survey participants appear to report the highest median 
scores on the SI private regard scale; whereas, as shown in Figure 3.4, median scores on the SI 
public regard scale appear only slightly higher among gays and lesbians than among bisexuals. 
The lowest median score on the SI public regard scale appears among those who report a sexual 
identity other than gay, lesbian, or bisexual. This is not surprising as sexual identities such as 
pansexual and asexual are rarely mentioned within the LGBTQ community and even less 































Figure 3.3: Sexual Identity Private Regard Distribution by Sexual Identity 
 
Statistically significant t-values, show that gay and lesbian identities (N = 648) are 
associated with higher scores on both the SI private regard, M = 25.6(SD = 3.96), t(1157) = 8.16, 
p = .000, and SI public regard, M = 17.9(SD = 4.35) scales, t(1157) = 3.70, p = .000, than 
bisexual identity (N = 511), M = 23.7(SD = 4.00) and M = 17.0(SD = 4.21), respectively. In 
short, bisexuals in this sample are significantly less likely to “normatively define” themselves 
with regard to their sexual identity (Sellers, et al. 1998), less likely to regard their sexual identity 
with positive affect, and more likely to perceive society as devaluing a bisexual identity than are 
gays and lesbians. Survey participants whose sexual identity is defined as something other than 
gay, lesbian, or bisexual, however, appear to be the most likely to view society as unaccepting of 

































Figure 3.4: Sexual Identity Public Regard Distribution by Sexual Identity 
 
Centrality, Private Regard and Public Regard: Interactions 
While an understanding of each scale independently is important, it is also necessary to 
examine the relationship between them. Given the data, it is difficult to confidently establish 
causation; however, the statistical models discussed in future sections will benefit from a 
correlational analysis. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 are scatterplots which graphically depict the 
relationship between the SI centrality, private regard, and public regard scales.  
There appears to be a moderately positive correlation (r = .334) between SI centrality and 
SI public regard. That is, increasing values on the SI centrality scale are associated with 





































Figure 3.5: Scatterplot, Sexual Identity Private Regard by Sexual Identity Centrality 
 
The relationship between SI centrality and SI public regard, however, is slightly negative (r = -
.077), although, as Figure 3.6 shows, the pattern is much more difficult to distinguish. It appears 
that increasing values on the SI centrality scale are associated a negative perception of societal 
acceptance of sexual minorities. Alternate modeling confirms these relationships across all 
categories of sexual identity in this study.  
The direction of the correlations presented are intuitive. That is, an identity central to 
one’s definition of self is likely to be looked upon positively by the individual holding the 
identity. While, at the same time, strongly associating with a sexual minority identity likely 
results in increased affiliation with other sexual minorities allowing for the transmission of 
shared political and social grievances (Swank and Fahs 2013b; Hartman 2006; Evans and 
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Figure 3.6: Scatterplot, Sexual Identity Public Regard by Sexual Identity Centrality 
 
of these scenarios are absolute, the implications for political behavior are, as H1, H2, and H3 in 
chapter 2 suggest, that an identity, or self-definition, which includes sexual identity as a strong 
cognitive and affective component will result in more political participation and policy liberalism 
among sexual minorities. 
Sexual Identity Stigmatization 
One possible explanation for the observed pattern between SI centrality, public and 
private regard, especially among bisexual survey participants, is experience with stigmatization. 
Appendix A, Q11a-g shows the distribution of responses for each item on the sexual identity 
stigmatization scale. Most of the distributions exhibit a positive skew, meaning a majority of 
survey participants indicate experience with discrimination rarely or never occurs. For example, 
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quarters of participants (77.7 percent) indicate that they have rarely or never been “threatened or 
physically attacked” because of their sexual identity. Only two items exhibit distributions with a 
negative skew. First, a majority of survey participants (53.7 percent) indicate that they are 
sometimes or often “subject to slurs or jokes” because of their sexual identity (see Appendix A, 
Q11b). Similarly, a majority of participants (57.2 percent) indicate they are sometimes or often 
“offended by a religious group or official” because of their sexual identity (see Appendix A, 
Q11e). These six items comprise an additive index operationalized as the SI stigmatization scale 
(see Appendix B). As Appendix B shows, values on the scale range from 7 – 28 and, the scale 
exhibits a strong alpha reliability level (α = .872). Low scores on the scale represent less 
experience with sexual stigma; while, high scores represent more experience with sexual stigma. 
 While there are various sources of stigmatization, sexual stigma refers to “the stigma 
attached to any nonheterosexual behavior, identity, relationship, or community” (Herek 
2010:6930). Sexual stigma can either originate within or be transmitted through sexual minority 
communities. In the latter case, group associations – including participation in LGBT 
organizations – allow for the transmission of shared grievances, such as perceived discrimination 
or stigmatization, even without all members directly experiencing abuse (Swank and Fahs 
2013b; Hartman 2006; Evans and Harriott 2004). In the former case, bisexuals are often targeted 
for stigmatization by gays and lesbians because of their ability to ‘pass’ as heterosexual, and thus 
avoid sexual stigma from heterosexuals (Rust 1995; Ochs 1996). So called “identity threat” 
research (Sevelius 2013; Major and O’Brien 2005) suggests this often results in bisexuals feeling 
disconnected from the gay and lesbian community (Rust 1995). Politically, Egan (2012) and 
Lewis, et al. (2011) suggest bisexuals have a less politicized identity, i.e., their sexual identity is 
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less salient as a source of political attitudes or behavior than gays and lesbians. The findings 
presented so far support this assertion. 
 According to scholars such as Swank and Fahs (2013b), sexual stigmatization often 
results in identity salience which increases political participation, especially among gays and 
lesbians. While the latter assertion will be tested later, if this is the case, there should be a 
positive relationship between the SI stigma scale – operationalized from seven questions 
measuring experience with discrimination based on one’s sexual identity (See Appendix A, 
Q11a-g) – and the SI centrality scale. Figure 3.7 is a scatterplot graphically depicting this 
relationship. As the figure shows, there appears to be a moderate positive correlation (r = .379) 
between the two indicators suggesting that sexual stigmatization is associated with higher levels 
of identity centrality. 
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But, are there any statistically significant differences in reports of sexual stigmatization 
between categories of sexual identity? Figure 3.8 plots the distribution and median scores of the 
SI stigma scale across the four categorical indicators of sexual identity. As the figure shows, 
participants whose sexual identity is something other than gay, lesbian, or bisexual appear to 
report the highest median scores on the SI stigma scale. Interestingly, it appears that bisexuals in 
this sample report the lowest levels of sexual stigma. Again, an independent sample t-test 
confirms this observation. The statistically significant t-value, t(1153) = 3.66, p = .000, shows 
that gay, lesbian, and other sexual identity (N = 645) is associated with a higher score, M = 
15.5(SD = 5.23), on the SI stigma scale than is bisexual identity (N = 510), M = 13.3(SD = 5.45).  
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Because the survey instrument does not explicitly ask about stigmatization from other 
LGBTQ people, it is difficult to determine if sexual stigma from the LGBTQ community is a 
factor which contributes to low identity centrality among bisexual survey respondents. Given the 
correlational data between SI stigma and centrality and that reports of stigmatization are lower 
among bisexuals in this sample, the results support the assertions of scholars such as Swank and 
Fahs (2013b), Egan (2012), and Lewis, et al. (2011) that bisexuals exhibit a less politicized 
sexual identity than gays and lesbians which contributes to political conservatism and depressed 
political activity. This also supports H1, H2, and H3 in chapter 2 which, again, suggest an 
identity, or self-definition, which includes sexual identity as a strong cognitive and affective 
component will result in more political participation and policy liberalism among sexual 
minorities. 
Gender & Sexual Identity 
There are also important subtleties which can be better articulated by an examination of 
sexuality and gender identity. As Figure 3.9 shows, the sample is almost evenly split between 
survey participants who identify as female (49.2 percent) and male (47.1 percent), while a small 
percentage of the sample (roughly 3 percent) identify as transgender. Of the respondents who do 
not identify as either male, female, or transgender (about 0.7 percent) the most common 
identities are ‘gender fluid’ and ‘non-binary.’ Again, this distribution is roughly equivalent to 
other recent online surveys of LGBTQ adults in the United States (Pew Research Center 2013). 
As Fassinger and Areseneau (2007) observe, social scientists often conflate gender and 
sexual identity under the broad ‘umbrella’ acronym LGBT. They, instead, suggest that 
transgender people “reveal the restrictive, proscriptive nature of socially constructed gender-role 
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ideologies” and the fallacy that “gender transgressions are indicative of same-sex sexual 
preferences” (Fassinger and Areseneau 2007:28,29). 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Distribution of Gender Identity 
 
These conclusions are born out in the data from this survey, in that, cross-tabulations 
reveal not all survey participants who identify as gay concurrently identify as male, nor do all 
participants who identify as lesbian concurrently identify as female. Furthermore, survey 
participants who identify as transgender, whether Female-to-Male (F-t-M) or Male-to-Female 
(M-t-F), identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual, and other sexual identities such as queer and 
pansexual. 
Two important political consequences are highlighted by these findings. First, the fluid 





















around which common political and social grievances can be established and from which 
collective political action can be initiated. For example, as previously illustrated, those who 
identify as bisexual appear to hold weaker ties to their sexual identity than gays or lesbians. This, 
along with research concerning sexual stigma against bisexuals, suggests that bisexual interests 
are not well-represented among LGBTQ civil rights organizations and are often not considered 
in policy decisions (Rust 1995; Ochs 1996), further contributing to disassociations between 
bisexual and lesbian/gay communities.  
Recent research suggests that transgender and gender queer individuals similarly find it 
difficult to join or influence LGBTQ community and political associations. As Fassinger and 
Gallor (2006) and Strolovich (2007) note, in the “socio-political arena,” the “inclusion of trans 
rights” is often “limited if it threatens LGB [Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual] legal or political 
progress” (Fassinger and Arseneau 2007:43). In this respect, “political advocacy requires 
essentialist definitions of sexuality” and gender, which “negate[s] the fluidity and flexibility of 
psychological identity development for many sexual minority people” (Fassinger and Arseneau 
2007:43). Not only this, but “rights granted in response to essentialist arguments” reinforce 
existing socially-constructed divisions further “cleav[ing] communities trying to fight 
collectively for those rights” (Fassinger and Arseneau 2007:43). 
While a relatively small number of survey participants identify as neither male nor 
female, an analysis of these essentialist gender binaries in relation to the SI centrality, private 
regard, and public regard indices reveal no statistically significant differences. That is, sexual 
identity does not appear to vary based on dichotomous categories of male/female gender. An 
interesting pattern emerges, however, at the intersection of trans and sexual identities. While the 
proportion of trans and gender queer survey participants is too small to draw generalizable 
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conclusions, in this sample, two different relationships emerge from an analysis using a 
dichotomous trans/cisgender indicator and the SI centrality and public regard indices.  
Specifically, independent sample t-tests show that, in this sample, transgender and gender 
queer survey participants (N = 41) exhibit significantly higher scores, M = 26.3(SD = 6.19), on 
the SI centrality scale t(1141) = - 2.68, p = .003, than cisgender survey participants (N = 1102), 
M = 23.7(SD = 5.52); while, the converse is observed for the SI public regard scale. That is, a 
significant t-value, t(1141) = 2.66, p = .003, shows that transgender and gender queer survey 
participants (N = 41) have significantly lower scores, M = 15.8(SD = 4.30), on the SI public 
regard scale than cisgender survey participants (N = 1102), M = 17.6(SD = 4.20). 
The reason for this variation may, again, be due to experience with stigmatization. A 
significant t-value, t(1141) = -4.20, p = .000, shows that trans and gender queer survey 
participants (N = 41) report significantly higher scores on the SI stigma scale, M = 18.4(SD = 
4.75), than cisgender (N = 1102) participants, M = 14.8(SD = 5.34). A similar result, t(1133) = -
2.72, p = .003, also suggests that cisgender female (N = 580) survey participants exhibit 
significantly higher scores on the SI stigma scale, M = 15.3(SD = 5.36), than cisgender males (N 
= 555), M = 14.5(SD = 5.33). The concomitant lack of differentiation in SI centrality between 
male/female respondents, however, is not consistent with this theory (i.e., a link between SI 
stigmatization and centrality) of the effect of stigmatization on political outcomes. 
The results suggest, then, that SI centrality is stronger among transgender and gender 
queer survey participants in this sample than cisgender participants, while SI public regard is 
significantly lower. Strong internalization of an identity perceived to be devalued by society may 
explain political differences between trans and cisgender survey participants better than SI 
stigmatization – although, again, I am unable to generalize beyond this sample. Future research 
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should apply similar methodologies in order to fully test the variation in identity among sexual 
and gender minorities. As I argue in chapter 1, the recognition of identity variation within sexual 
minority communities is important for the development of representative political and social 
organizations which advocate for policy changes that benefit the entire sexual minority 
community, not just those who represent the dominant socially-constructed characteristics. 
Racial & Ethnic Identity  
Figure 3.10 graphically depicts the distribution of racial identities among survey 
participants. Based on responses to the open-ended question regarding racial identity (See 
Appendix A, Q13), along with Black, Latino/a, and White, a fourth category of racial identity – 
Asian, comprised primarily of Korean, Japanese, and Chinese ethnicities – is constructed. Figure 
3.10 shows that a majority of survey participants identify as White (76. percent), while Latino/a 
(9.3 percent), Black (7.7 percent), and Asian (3.3 percent), together, make up slightly more than 
20 percent of the sample. Of the 2.6 percent of survey participants who identify as a race or 
ethnicity other than the four previously mentioned categories, Hispanic, Native American, 
Pacific Islander, and Mixed Race are the most common. As with sexual identity, the survey 
instrument also measures racial identity (RI) centrality, private regard, and public regard (Sellers, 
et al. 1998) (Appendix A, Q13a-i; Q14a-f; and, Q15a-f). 
Appendix A, Q13a-i shows the distributions of survey responses for items which 
comprise the RI centrality scale. The distributions of most items are negatively skewed. For 
example, a majority of survey participants (59.5 percent) either agree or strongly agree that being 
“[Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] has very little to do with how I feel about myself” (see 
Appendix A,Q13a). Similarly, a majority of participants (59.8 percent) either agree or strongly 
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agree that being “[Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] is unimportant to my sense of what 
kind of person I am” (see Appendix A, Q13d). 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Distribution of Racial Identity 
 
Conversely, the distribution of item three (Q13c) shows a slight positive skew, as a plurality of 
survey participants (42.6 percent) either disagree or strongly disagree that their “destiny is tied to 
the destiny of other [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people.” The skew in distributions 
observed among these items possibly reflect the skew in racial identity distribution, i.e., the large 
proportion of the sample that identify as White – a point which I explore in detail in the 
following section. Finally, responses to items five (Q13e) and seven (Q13h) are mesokuritc, with 
responses clustered around the center of the distribution. Three items are reverse coded and, 



















Appendix B). As Appendix B shows, values on the scale range from 8 – 40 and, the scale 
exhibits a strong alpha reliability level (α = .820). Low scores on the scale represent low racial 
identity centrality, or the feeling that one’s racial identity is unimportant to one’s sense of self; 
while, high scores on the scale represent high racial identity centrality, or the feeling that one’s 
racial identity is important to one’s sense of self. 
Appendix A, Q14a-f shows the distributions of survey responses for items which 
comprise the RI private regard scale. The distributions of all but one item exhibit pronounced 
negative skew. For example, more than three-quarters of survey participants (79.5 percent) either 
agree or strongly agree that “[Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people have made major 
accomplishments and advancements” (see Appendix A, Q14c). Only the distribution of item four 
(Q14d) exhibits a positive skew, as a majority of participants (64.1 percent) either disagree or 
strongly disagree with the statement, “I often regret that I am [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial 
Minority].” One item is reverse coded and, these six items comprise an additive index 
operationalized as the RI private regard scale (see Appendix B). As Appendix B shows, values 
on the scale range from 6 – 30 and, the scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level (α = .861). 
Low scores on the scale represent low racial identity private regard, or a negative affective 
evaluation of one’s sexual identity; while, high scores represent high sexual identity private 
regard, or a positive affective evaluation of one’s sexual identity. 
 Finally, Appendix A, Q15a-f shows the distributions of survey responses for items which 
comprise the RI public regard scale. The distributions of four items are characterized by a 
negative skew. For example, more than three-quarters of survey participants either agree or 
strongly agree that, “overall [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people are considered good 
by others” (see Appendix A, Q15a). Conversely, the distributions of items three (Q15c) and four 
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(Q15d) exhibit a slightly positive skew, as pluralities of participants (45.8 percent and 48 
percent, respectively) either disagree or strongly disagree that “most people consider 
[Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people to be more ineffective than other social groups;” 
and, “[Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people are not respected by the broader society.” 
Two items are reverse coded and these six items comprise an additive index operationalized as 
the RI public regard scale (see Appendix B). As Appendix B shows, values on the scale range 
from 6 – 30 and, the scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level (α = .797). Low scores on the 
scale represent low racial identity public regard, or a negative evaluation of societal acceptance 
of one’s racial identity; while, high scores represent high racial identity public regard, or a 
positive evaluation of societal acceptance of one’s racial identity. 
Figure 3.11 shows the distribution and median scores on the RI centrality scale by 
category of racial identity. The highest median scores on the RI centrality scale appear among 
Latino/a survey participants (as denoted by the lines within the black boxes), while the median 
score is noticeably lowest among Whites. An independent samples t-test using a dummy 
indicator constructed from a question measuring racial identity (see Appendix A, Q13) confirm 
this observation. That is, the significant t-value, t(1146) = -13.7, p = .000, shows that Racial 
Minorities (N = 265) have significantly higher scores, M = 26.8(SD = 5.87), on the racial 
identity centrality scale than Whites (N = 883), M = 21.0(SD = 6.00). Racial minorities, then, are 
significantly more likely to view themselves “with regard to” their racial identity, or see their 






Figure 3.11: Racial Identity Centrality Distribution by Racial Identity 
 
Figure 3.12 depicts the distribution and median scores of the RI private regard scale. As 
the figure shows, the pattern for racial identity private regard or, positive or negative affect 
toward one’s racial identity, is similar to that of RI centrality. In this case, the highest median 
scores on the scale appear among Black survey participants; while, again, the lowest median 
scores on the scale appear among Whites. An independent samples t-test confirms this 
observation. A significant t-value, t(1146) = -7.80, p = .000, shows that Racial Minorities (N = 
265) have significantly higher scores, M = 25.0(SD = 4.31), on the RI private regard scale than 
Whites in the sample (N = 883), M = 22.6(SD = 4.51). Racial minority survey participants, then, 































Figure 3.12: Racial Identity Private Regard Distribution by Racial Identity 
 
Interestingly, a converse pattern appears in Figure 3.13, which depicts the distribution 
and median scores on the RI public regard scale. In this case, Black survey participants appear to 
have the lowest median score on the scale, while White survey participants appear to have the 
highest. This suggests that Whites in the sample are more likely to believe that society positively 
views their racial identity than racial minorities. Again, the observation is confirmed by an 
independent samples t-test. The significant t-value, t(1146) = 13.22, p = .000, suggests that 
White participants (N = 883), have higher scores, M = 21.4(SD = 4.13), on the RI public regard 
scale than Racial Minorities (N = 265), M = 17.5(SD = 4.55). Whites, then, are more likely to 





































Figure 3.13: Racial Identity Public Regard Distribution by Racial Identity 
 
These findings comport with scholars such as Phinney (1989) and Hurtado and Stewart 
(1997:229) who, in their study of White racial identity, suggest that “white [survey] respondents 
are hard-pressed to define whiteness and the privileges it brings to those who own it;” however, 
they also note whiteness becomes “much more definable when the privilege it accords its owners 
is lost.” That is, whiteness, as a racial identity, holds little meaning until it is challenged. In this 
case, Whites in the sample view their racial identity as less important to their sense of self, hold 
less positive views of their racial identity, yet, at the same time, recognize that society positively 
regards their identity in comparison to unnamed ‘others.’ The relationship between these 
attitudes somewhat contradicts Hurtado and Stewart (1997), in that, White survey participants 
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Centrality, Public Regard, and Private Regard: Interactions 
The previous point is illustrated by Figures 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17, which show 
scatterplots graphically depicting the relationship between the RI centrality, private regard and 
public regard scales among the entire sample (Figures 3.14 and 3.15) and among White survey 
participants (Figures 3.16 and 3.17). 
Figure 3.14 shows a similar relationship between RI centrality and private regard as that 
observed between SI centrality and private regard. The moderate positive correlation (r = .480) 
means that RI centrality is associated with a positive affective evaluation of one’s racial identity. 
Like the relationship between SI centrality and public regard, the nature of the relationship 
between RI centrality and public regard is not as easily specified. 
 
 

































10 20 30 40




Figure 3.15: Scatterplot, Racial Identity Public Regard by Racial Identity Centrality 
 
As Figure 3.15 shows, there appears to be a slightly negative relationship (r = -.010) between the 
two scales. 
The pattern in Figure 3.16 is similar to that of Figure 3.14. That is, among White survey 
participants, RI private regard is positively correlated (r = .423) with RI centrality. However, as 
shown in Figure 3.17, the moderately positive correlation (r = .468) between RI public regard 
and centrality is a stark contrast to the pattern which exists overall. In this case, instead of 
perceived societal rejection, White identity centrality is more clearly associated with positive 
public regard. Again, while White survey participants may be “hard-pressed to define 
whiteness,” they appear well-aware of the privileges it brings (Hurtado and Stewart 1997:229), 
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Figure 3.16: Scatterplot, White Racial Identity Private Regard by White RI Centrality 
 
An examination of the relationship between RI centrality and public regard among Black 
and other racial minority survey participants yields the opposite pattern. Among Black 
participants, RI public regard and centrality are negatively correlated (r = -.074), if only slightly. 
A similar correlation appears (r = -.137) between the RI public regard and centrality of 
participants who identify as neither Black, White, or Latino/a. In these two cases, RI centrality 
appears to be associated with negative public regard – or a negative perception of societal 
acceptance. Just as with SI public regard, in terms of racial minority politics, this finding is 
intuitive. That is, strongly identifying as a racial minority likely results in a more politicized 
identity – one which makes political and social grievances more salient and, which heightens the 
































and Garza 1996; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, and Pratto 1997; Schildkraut 2005). This trend is 
not, however, consistent across all categories of racial identity in this study. 
 
 
Figure 3.17: Scatterplot, White Racial Identity Public Regard by White RI Centrality 
 
Specifically, among Latino/as in the sample, the relationship between RI centrality and public 
regard is positive (r = .171). Latino/a identity centrality appears to be associated with the 
perception that society accepts and values Latino/a identity. While facially counterintuitive, this 
finding comports with previous research which suggests that among Latino/as, “a sense of ethnic 
or national origin group solidarity,” in fact, counteracts the negative effects of discrimination and 

































It is important to recognize that identity is a composite of cognitive, affective, and 
relational factors. In this case, racial identity appears to be more important cognitively and 
affectively to Racial Minorities than to Whites. This finding somewhat supports H3b from 
chapter 2, which suggests that high scores on the RI centrality and private regard scales among 
White respondents will be associated with policy conservatism – especially when the policy in 
question threatens their racial identity, e.g., immigration liberalism. But, what accounts for 
variation in racial identity? As I have suggested previously, the answer may be related to racial 
stigmatization.  
Racial Identity Stigmatization 
 As with SI centrality, public and private regard, the patterns observed in the analysis of 
RI centrality, public and private regard may be related to stigmatization. It is already widely 
documented by social-psychologists and scholars of intersectionality that life experiences, 
including cultural, sociohistorical, and socioeconomic factors influence racial identity 
development (Green 1995; 1998; Bedolla 2007). Scholars of political behavior have also 
recognized that discrimination can act as either a motivating or mitigating factor for political 
attitudes and behavior given various contextual factors such as internalization, perceived intent, 
and perceived target of the abuse (Miller, et al. 1981; de la Garza, Falcon, and Garza 1996; 
Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, and Pratto 1997; Schildkraut 2005; Bedolla 2007; Swank and Fahs 
2013b). To capture these aspects of discrimination I measure public regard, as previously 
described, and experience with discrimination. The RI stigma scale is similar to the SI stigma 




Appendix A, Q16a-g shows the distributions of responses for items which comprise the 
RI stigma scale. The distributions of all items exhibit pronounced positive skew – meaning the 
majority of responses indicate participants have rarely or never experience racial discrimination 
related to the item under consideration. For example, more than two-thirds of survey participants 
(69.6 percent) indicate they have rarely or never been “subject to slurs or jokes” because of their 
racial identity (see Appendix A, Q16a). This, again, is likely explained by the relatively small 
proportion of racial minority respondents in the sample. The seven items comprise an additive 
index operationalized as the RI stigmatization scale (see Appendix B). As Appendix B shows, 
values on the scale range from 7 – 28 and, the scale shows a strong alpha reliability level (α = 
.907). Low scores on the scale represent less experience with racial stigma; while, high scores 
represent more experience with racial stigma. 
Figure 3.18 shows the distribution and median values of racial identity stigmatization by 
category of racial identity. It is apparent, and expected, that RI stigmatization is reported more by 
Black, Latino/a, Asian, and other racial minority survey participants than Whites. While Whites 
show the lowest median scores on the scale, the highest median scores appear among Latino/a 
survey participants. A significant t-value, t(1144) = -8.99, p = .000, confirms the observation 
regarding White stigmatization. That is, racial minorities (N = 264) report higher scores on the 





Figure 3.18: Racial Identity Stigma Distribution by Racial Identity 
 
 This finding is all the more interesting given that, in this sample, Latino/as centrality is 
positively associated with public regard – or a view that society is accepting of Latino/a 
ethnicity. It appears Schildkraut’s (2005:306) findings are confirmed by this data, in that, while 
Latino/as report the most personal experience with racial discrimination, a strong “sense of 
ethnic or national origin group solidarity” (i.e., centrality) appears to mitigate the negative effects 
of stigmatization, at least with regard to societal perceptions (i.e., public regard).  
Race, Ethnicity, & Gender Identity 
 Table 3.1 is a cross-tabulation of gender and racial categorical indicators showing 
observed frequencies from the sample. As discussed previously, the sample is relatively evenly 
split between male- and female-identified respondents. As Table 3.1 shows, this pattern is 
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that, independent samples t-tests reveal RI centrality, private, and public regard significantly 
vary based on categories of gender. Specifically, a significant t-value, t(1133) = 3.27, p = .000, 
indicates that cisgender male survey participants (N = 555) exhibit higher values on the RI 
centrality scale, M = 23.0(SD = 6.34), than cisgender female participants (N = 580), M = 
21.8(SD = 6.46). Also, significant t-values, t(1133) = 5.28, p = .000, show that cisgender male 
survey participants (N = 555) exhibit higher values on the RI private regard scale, M = 23.8(SD 
= 4.27) than cisgender female participants (N = 580), M = 22.4(SD = 4.72). A similar pattern is 
shown on the RI private regard scale, t(1133) = 3.72, p = .000, where M = 21.1(SD = 4.25) 
among cisgender male participants (N = 555) and M = 20.1(SD = 4.67) among cisgender female 
participants (N = 580).  
 
Table 3.1: Cross-Tabulation, Gender Identity by Racial Identity 
Gender Identity Black 
 















































































a denotes column percent 
b denotes row percent 
 
 
 In short, in this sample, cisgender males regard their racial identity as a more central part 
of their self-identity, more positively view their racial identity, and believe society values their 
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racial identity more than cisgender females. This, perhaps, lends some support to the 
‘subordinate male target hypothesis’ (Veenstra 2013); not that the theory itself is credible, but 
the assertion that cisgender men view themselves as the paradigm of their race may, in fact, be 
supported. This explanation is consistent with previous research (Sellers, et al. 1998; Phinney 
1989), and appears to confirm a long-standing tenant of intersectionality, namely, that women – 
especially racial and ethnicity minority women – experience multiplicative disadvantage from a 
society which devalues both their gender and racial identities (Crenshaw 1991; Baca-Zinn and 
Dill 1996).  
There is further evidence to support this assertion. For example, a significant t-test, t(82) 
= 3.71, p = .000, shows that Black cisgender women (N = 35) believe society devalues their 
racial identity, M = 14.8(SD = 5.05) more than Black cisgender men (N = 49), M = 18.4(SD = 
3.85) in this sample. Similarly, racial minority cisgender women – including Hispanics, Asian-
Americans, Native Americans, and Bi-Racial women – (N = 28) believe society devalues their 
racial identity, M = 16.9(SD = 4.12) more than racial minority cisgender men, M = 19.1(SD = 
4.88), t(66) = 2.39, p = .009; again, however, this pattern does not hold among Latina cisgender 
women. 
 As with sexuality, significant variation in racial identity public and private regard is 
associated with transgender and gender queer identities. As compared to cisgender people in the 
sample (N = 1102), transgender and gender queer people (N = 41) are more likely to exhibit 
lower scores on both the RI private, t(1141) = 2.45, p = .007, M = 23.2(SD = 4.45), and public 
regard t(1141) = 2.41, p = .008, M = 20.6(SD = 4.50), scales than cisgender participants, M = 
21.4(SD = 4.96) and M = 18.9(SD = 4.67), respectively. That is, transgender and gender queer 
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people hold less favorable affective views of their racial identity and believe society devalues 
their racial identity more than cisgender people in the sample. 
 The most within-group gender-based variation, however, appears between White men 
and women. Perhaps an artifact of the large number of White respondents in the sample, White 
identity centrality, private regard, and public regard all significantly differ based on binary 
categories of cisgender. Across all three racial identity scales, white men have significantly 
higher scores than white women. That is, white men in the sample (N = 412) are more likely to 
view their racial identity as a central characteristic of their definition of self, M = 21.8(SD = 
5.05), t(873) = 3.49, p = .000, more likely to view their racial identity as a positive part of their 
self-identity, M = 23.5(SD = 4.28), t(873) = 5.87, p = .000; and, more likely to believe society 
values their identity M = 21.9(SD = 3.98), t(873) = 3.37, p = .000, than white women (N = 463), 
M = 20.4(SD = 5.87), M = 21.8 (SD = 4.53) and, M = 21.0(SD = 4.19), respectively. Whiteness, 
then, may not only be a significant predictor of political attitudes and behavior when it is 
challenged (Hurtado and Stewart 1997). It may be that whiteness, in combination with a 
cisgender male identity provides motivation for political attitudes and behavior; and, also 
contributes to problems with political representation such as the lack of diversity within LGBTQ 
interest groups and racism within the LGBTQ community. 
 
Socioeconomic & Socio-Cultural Demographics 
 
 I will return to an intersectional discussion of race and sexual identity later; however, at 
the crux of intersectionality is the idea that socially-constructed identities such as race, ethnicity, 
sexuality, and gender do not exist in a vacuum. That is, as Bedolla (2007:239) observes, each 
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identity we inhabit exists as part of a socioeconomic, socio-cultural, and “socio-historical 
context” which helps define and inform the social, economic, and political choices we make. 
Education, for example, often defines income potential, but the concentration of wealth in the 
United States is defined by race. Religion, too, is often dictated by culture and history through 
socialization, and defines norms, customs, and standards of morality for a society. Even 
geography acts to define our identity by limiting or expanding the opportunity to interact with 
those different from ourselves. An understanding of these factors, then, will better inform our 
models of political attitudes and behavior. 
Social Networks 
 Social networks serve as an influence on political attitudes and behaviors in a number of 
ways. First, because we often “conform to the political coloration of [our] intimates” (Knoke 
1990:1043), social networks are often accurate predictors of individual political attitudes. Not all 
social networks, however, are homogenous. Heterogeneous social networks exhibit variation in 
demographics, culture, and politics, but are associated with differential effects on political 
attitudes and behaviors. Mutz (2002a), for example, suggests heterogeneous social networks are 
associated with values such as political tolerance, defined as a “greater understanding of 
oppositional viewpoints,” but also a willingness to protect the civil rights of others. 
Heterogeneous social networks, however, also appear to have a dampening effect on political 
participation. That is, similar to identity threat research (Major and O’Brien 2005), variation 
within social networks can lead individuals to avoid participation in political activities in an 
attempt to avoid conflict within their social networks (Mutz 2002b). On the other hand, 
contemporary research suggests the opposite (Quintelier, et al. 2012). Specifically, social 
network diversity among young Europeans is associated with greater political participation.  
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While these assertions will be tested in later sections, continuing the demographic 
analysis, several important observations arise when examining network diversity within this 
sample. First, social network diversity is measured using a serious of questions which ask survey 
participants to rate how many close friends share specific characteristics, including sexual 
identity, gender, race and ethnicity, religion, and partisan affiliation (see Appendix A, Q17a-e). 
Figure 3.19 is a boxplot showing the distribution and median sexual network diversity scores by 
category of sexual identity (see Appendix A, Q17a). While the median scores on the scale appear 
relatively equal across categories of sexual identity, bisexuals in the sample report more scores in 
the third quartile. An independent sample t-test confirms this observation. A significant t-value, 
t(1012) = -4.96, p = .000, shows that bisexuals in the sample (N = 456) exhibit more sexual 
diversity, M = 3.58(SD = 1.56), than lesbians, gays, and those reporting other sexual identities 
(N = 558), M = 3.11(SD = 1.45). Because the survey instrument does not quantify diversity 
among specific categories of sexual identity, a number of social scenarios are possible. It may be, 
for example, that social connections among bisexuals reflect broad sexual diversity, 
encompassing gay, lesbian, and heterosexualities. It may also be that these networks solely 
reflect connections with heterosexuals. In terms of social connections with sexual minorities, this 
finding is consistent with previous results which suggest gays and lesbians are more likely to 
associate with sexual minority communities than bisexuals. This, again, reinforces the gay and 




Figure 3.19: Social Network Sexual Diversity Distribution by Sexual Identity 
 
Figure 3.20 is a boxplot showing the distribution and median racial network diversity 
scores (see Appendix A, Q17c). As the figure shows, Black and White survey participants report 
the lowest median scores suggesting that their social networks more closely mirror their racial 
identity than others in the sample. A significant t-value, t(938) = -6.06, p = .000, confirms this 
observation. That is, Racial Minorities (N = 209) in the sample report more racially diverse 
social networks, M = 2.92(SD = 1.61), than Whites (N = 731), M = 2.28(SD = 1.26).  
This is a troubling confirmation of the racial divide within the LGBTQ community. 
Previous research shows racism across axes of sexuality, beauty, and social interaction within the 
LGBTQ community (Wilson, et al. 2009; Malebranche, et al. 2004; Green 1998; Loicano 1989; 
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etc. LGBTQ people suggests a pattern of racial stigma and isolation that holds many 
consequences for LGBTQ people of color. 
 
 
Figure 3.20: Social Network Racial Diversity Distribution by Racial Identity 
 
First, racial stigmatization within the LGBTQ community is likely to continue. This poses 
serious risks to people of color who lack access to resources, interest groups, and political elites. 
Second, racial isolation threatens the legitimacy of the LGBTQ movement. As I note in chapter 
1, traditional political conceptualizations of identity which limit group association to a single 
descriptor necessarily result in the disenfranchisement of millions of people who only partially 
share the dominant social identity (Purdie-Vaughs and Eibach 2008). Just as the feminist 
movement was criticized for ignoring women of color, so too can the LGBTQ movement be 
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color. The only remedy is a recognition of the diversity which exists within the community, as 
well as an understanding that not everyone in the community fits the prototypical standard of 
gayness or lesbianism as defined by White social science. 
Finally, Figure 3.21 is a boxplot showing the distribution and median political network 
diversity scores (see Appendix A, Q17e) over collapsed categories of political affiliation (see 
Appendix A, Q29, Q30). As the figure shows, Democrats exhibit the lowest median scores on 
the scale, suggesting that they are less likely to associate with members of other political parties. 
Again, an independent sample t-test confirms this observation. A significant t-value, t(840) = 
6.83, p = .000, shows that Democrats (N = 549) are less likely to report politically diverse social 
networks, M = 2.43(SD = 1.40), than Republicans and Independents (N = 293) in the sample, M 
= 3.15(SD = 1.54).  
 
 































Numerous studies have shown that LGBTQ people are generally more liberal, and 
especially more likely to identify with the Democratic Party than the general population 
(Edelman 1993; Sherrill 1996; Hertzog 1996; Smith and Haider-Markel 2002; Shaffner and 
Senic 2006). While not all LGBTQ people identify with the Democratic Party (Rogers and Lott 
1997), the political dynamic between the LGBTQ community and the Democratic Party can be 
increasingly characterized by the term “electoral capture” (Smith 2007; Egan 2012). That is, a 
system in which one party (Democrats) takes for granted the support of a particular group in 
society (LGBTQ people) while the same group goes uncontested by the other major party 
(Republicans).  
These results suggest, however, that this system is two-tiered. Not only do Republicans 
fail to electorally contest the LGBTQ community, LGBTQ Democrats fail to associate beyond 
their partisan affiliations, perhaps giving little reason to electorally contest the group. Politically, 
this can have serious consequences. As Overby and Barth (2002) and Barth, Overby and 
Huffman (2009) suggest, contact with LGBTQ individuals can favorably influence individual 
attitudes toward the group. A lack of contact with opposing partisans, then, may reinforce 
existing negative conceptions of the LGBTQ community, provide little incentive to support 
LGBTQ equality or inclusion, and further divide partisan positions leaving the LGBTQ 
community with no representation in Republican-dominated political institutions. 
These items are reverse coded and, along with measures of gender and religious social 
network diversity, comprise an additive index operationalized as the network diversity scale (see 
Appendix B). As Appendix B shows, values on the scale rage from 0 – 30 and, the scale exhibits 
a strong alpha reliability level (α = .680). Low scores on the scale represent less social network 




 More than half of the survey participants in this sample (52 percent) report an annual 
household income of less than $50,000 (see Appendix A, Q27). This is consistent with previous 
research which suggests that stereotypes of affluence within the LGBTQ community are simply 
that, stereotypes perpetuated by popular media representations of LGBTQ characters as well-
educated, metropolitan, elites (Sears and Badgett 2012). In actuality, more than one-quarter of 
gays and lesbians in this sample and almost one-third of bisexuals report an annual household 
income less than $30,000. Cross-tabulations also show income disparities across categories of 
race. Whereas about twenty-eight percent of Whites report an annual household income less than 
$30,000, nearly forty percent of Black participants report at this income level. Similarly, whereas 
almost one-third of Whites (30.2 percent) report a household income over $75,000, only about 
one-quarter (24.3 percent) of Latino/as and about nineteen percent of Black participants report at 
this level. 
More than one-third of the sample (36.9 percent) report receiving a 2-year or 4-year 
degree, while roughly eighteen percent of participants report having a high school diploma or 
less education. As with income, employment among the LGBTQ community is stereotyped as 
professionalized and high-earning. However, again consistent with previous research (Movement 
Advancement Project, et al. 2013), more than one-quarter (25.9 percent) of survey participants 
report being unemployed (see Appendix A, Q22). Cross-tabulations show that, while still higher 
than U.S. averages, about eighteen percent of gay participants report being unemployed; 
whereas, almost one-quarter of lesbians (22.3 percent) and nearly two-thirds of bisexuals (32.9 
percent) report being unemployed. Similarly, more than one-quarter (28.9 percent) of Latino/as 
and more than one-third (34.1 percent) of Black participants report unemployment. 
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Again, the compounding of economic and educational disadvantage based on categories 
of sexual and racial identity represent serious problems within the LGBTQ community. As long 
as stereotypes of affluence dominate in popular and academic depictions of LGBTQ people, 
there is little incentive to focus on anti-poverty, employment, or social justice issues – which 
appear to affect more than one quarter of this sample. This is reflective of a long-standing debate 
within the LGBTQ community over the utility of pursuing “neoliberal” policy priorities such as 
legal same-sex marriage and ending the United States military’s ‘don’t ask don’t tell’ policy 
(Warner 1999).  
The nodes of contention over LGBTQ movement policy priorities are often defined in 
terms of economics. Egan and Sherrill (2005), for example, find that among lesbians, gays, and 
bisexuals, college education is a significant predictor of support for same-sex marriage. 
Educational attainment suggests economic stability and marriage provides a mechanism to 
protect one’s family and property against economic hardship. Those who would potentially 
benefit from same-sex marriage, then, even if not a majority of the LGBTQ community, are the 
most likely to support the policy and be heard by the relevant political interests (Strolovich 
2007). For this reason, critical scholars refer to same-sex marriage as a way for wealthy gays and 
lesbians to “concentrate wealth and power” at the expense of economic and social assistance for 
low-income and LGBTQ people of color (Stanley 2014:27; Spade and Willse 2014; Strolovich 
2012; Currah 2008; Duggan 2003; Cohen 1997). That is, those gays and lesbians who have 
achieved economic affluence, through same-sex marriage, have a way to secure their property 
against punitive governmental policies; while the policy simply reinforces the existing capitalist 
power structure which disadvantages the poor, women, and people of color. 
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While an often-overlooked factor in LGBTQ political calculus (Strolovich 2007), the role 
of social class is a key consideration for scholars of intersectionality (Collins 1993; Dawson 
1994; Landry 2004; Weber 2004; Strolovich 2006; Strolovich 2007; Meyer 2008). The 
construction of classes in society, and our relationship to them, inform our political decisions 
because they frame the available choices (Bedolla 2007). Not only this, but, as Collins (2000) 
suggests, and as the data here show, race, gender and sexuality intersect and interact with social 
class producing new experiences, (dis)advantages, and political choices. As with the general 
population, income, education and employment are consistently strong predictors of LGBTQ 
political attitudes and behavior (Lewis, et al. 2011). This study nuances our understanding of 
socio-economics by further examining social class at the intersection of sexual and racial 
identities. LGBTQ people are more likely to live in poverty than are heterosexuals. Within the 
LGBTQ community, women and people of color are more likely to be undereducated and 
unemployed (Sears and Badgett 2012; MAP, et al. 2013). The data here support these findings 
and suggest greater attention be paid to the role of economics in LGBTQ politics.  
Cultural Indicators 
 As Bedolla (2007) makes clear, one key to understanding the effect of identity on 
political attitudes and behaviors is by examining socio-cultural influences. Post-modern and 
intersectional scholars make it clear that identities exist within a “matrix of domination” (Collins 
2000:18). That is, systems of power – whether race-based, class-based, gender-based, or 
sexually-based – structure the advantages/disadvantages, privileges/disprivileges, and choices 
available to us based on where our identities fit within the system of power. Norms and values 
are the primary tools used to shape our life (and political) choices. In this way, it is apparent that 
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other systems, such as religion and geography, effect change in the political choices available to 
a particular group in society. 
Religion 
After an examination of the open-ended questions related to religious affiliation (see 
Appendix A, Q19, Q20), among this sample, almost three-quarters (72.7 percent) of participants 
report some religious affiliation. While more than one-quarter of participants report being 
agnostic or no religious affiliation (27.2 percent), a majority of participants affiliate as Christian 
(51.7 percent), followed by Jewish (3.6 percent), Wiccan or Pagan (3.1 percent), Buddhist (2.2 
percent), or report some other religious affiliation (3.5 percent). Interestingly, cross-tabulations 
reveal, of the survey participants who identify as religious, almost three-quarters (72.7 percent) 
report attending an institution that is not affirming of their sexual identity. Of those who identify 
as Christian, more than half (60.1 percent) report attending a non-affirming church. 
Religion and its relationship with political attitudes and behaviors is an under-analyzed 
topic within the LGBT studies discipline. Of the studies which have assessed religious affiliation 
among LGBTQ survey respondents, Egan (2012) notes that neither religious fundamentalism nor 
moderation in families affects LGBTQ identity in adulthood. A recent Pew Research Center 
study, however, suggests that LGBTQ people are less likely to self-report a religious affiliation 
than heterosexuals, and are significantly less likely to affiliate with Christianity (Murphy 2015; 
Pew Research Center 2013). Similarly, Egan, Edelman, and Sherrill (2008) find that more than 
one quarter of survey participants report becoming “less religious” after publicly coming out as 
lesbian, gay, or bisexual; while, Lewis, et al. (2011:671), in their study of the 2000 presidential 
election, note ‘outness’ – a psychological resource relevant to political participation – is more 
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prevalent among “non-Judeo-Christian religions” and the non-religious. Religious affiliation, 
then, appears to exert a mitigating effect on policy liberalism. 
This is somewhat at odds with the results of this study which finds more than half the 
sample identify as religious – the largest proportion of which identify as Christian. Given that 
affiliation with conservative – and especially Christian – religious tradition is associated with 
hostile attitudes toward LGBTQ people (Norton and Herek 2013; Negy and Eisnmann 2005; 
Hinrichs and Rosenberg 2002; Selzer 1992), it is understandable that LGBTQ people would 
avoid affiliation with such denominations. Yet, previous research failed to determine how 
LGBTQ survey participants evaluate their religion’s position toward their own sexual identity.  
In terms of political behavior, religious affiliation, and especially participation in 
religious activities, is thought to provide a political resource translatable to secular political 
pursuits (Brady, et al. 1995). Although untested, Swank and Fahs (2013b) suggest that 
participation in LGBT-affirming religious institutions increases political participation and, 
perhaps, policy liberalism, as it allows the transmission of shared political grievances, similar to 
the function of an interest group (Hartman 2006; Evans and Harriott 2004).  
While statistical tests reveal no significant difference in SI centrality between 
dichotomous categories of religious affiliation, a significant t-value, t(1141) = -2.88, p = .002, 
shows that non-religious LGBTQ people in the sample (N = 312) hold higher scores, M = 
25.3(SD = 3.80), on the SI private regard scale than religious LGBTQ people (N = 831), M = 
24.6(SD = 4.15). Conversely, a significant t-value, t(1141) = 4.02, p = .000, also shows that 
religiously-identified LGBTQ people (N = 831) exhibit higher scores, M = 17.8(SD = 4.25) on 
the SI public regard scale than non-religious LGBTQ people (N = 312), M = 16.7(SD = 4.36). 
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Among this sample, religious affiliation is associated with a negative view of one’s sexual 
identity, but also with a belief that society positively views one’s sexual identity. 
Although it may sound counterintuitive, this may be because more than half of religious 
survey participants report conflict between their religion and sexual identity. While still 
internalizing religious heteronormativity, the identity conflict may be associated with a view of 
society as a respite from oppressive religious doctrine; or, at least a view of society as 
permissive. Contrary to Swank and Fahs’ (2013a) untested assertion, this may suggest that 
religious participation – even without conflict between religious and sexual identities – may not 
supply the cognitive resources (Harris 1994; Calhoun-Brown 1996), including shared concern 
with the LGBTQ community and outness, necessary to motivate political participation.  
Indeed, a significant t-value, t(733) = -2.68, p = .003 – using a dummy variable 
constructed from a question measuring religious/sexual conflict (see Appendix A, Q21) – shows 
that religious LGBTQ participants who report conflict between their religious and sexual 
identities (N = 535) exhibit lower scores, M = 23.2(SD = 6.25), on the SI centrality scale than 
participants who report no conflict (N = 200), M = 24.6(SD = 5.28). Furthermore, conflict (N = 
535) is significantly associated, t(733) = -2.91, p = .001, with lower scores, M = 17.6(SD = 4.29) 
on the SI public regard scale than none (N = 200), M = 18.6(SD = 4.17). This lends support to 
H9 in chapter 2 which suggests religiosity is positively associated with political participation and 
negatively associated with policy liberalism; while, conflict between sexual and religious 
identities produce the converse. 
Geography 
 The sample frame also provides an interesting perspective on geographic diversity among 
LGBTQ people. As previously discussed, one problem with traditional LGBTQ social science 
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literature is the consistent stereotypical narrative that LGBTQ people are wealthy urbanites who 
only achieve social acceptance and political power in the context of large, diverse cities (Wald, 
Button, and Rienzo 1996). Contemporary research, however, suggests that LGBTQ identity is 
equally entwined with rural life experiences (Gray 2009). This is reflected in the sample frame in 
that slightly more than forty percent of survey participants report living in a small or rural city of 
no more than 50,000 residents (See Appendix A, Q23).  
 According to Gray (2009), in these rural areas, LGBTQ people increasingly rely on 
familial identities rather than sexual identity as a means of integration into traditionally 
heteronormative communities. Interestingly, in this sample, a significant t-value, t(1139) = -3.35, 
p = .000, indicates that urban residents (N = 674) do exhibit higher scores on the SI centrality 
scale, M = 24.3(SD = 6.12), than rural residents (N = 467), M = 23.0(SD = 6.16), although the 
pattern does not hold for SI public or private regard. While internal and external evaluations of 
sexual identity are consistent across geographic settings, the finding shows support for Gray’s 
(2009) assertion that rural LGBTQ people define themselves with familial connections – in an 
effort to integrate into an unsupportive environment – rather than as sexually distinct – which 
may prove an unsafe gambit (Roen 2001). Another significant rural/urban difference occurs in 
reports of sexual stigma. Again, a significant t-value, t(1139) = -2.34, p = .009, indicates that 
urban residents (N = 674) exhibit higher scores on the SI stigma scale, M = 15.3(SD = 5.40) than 
rural residents in the sample (N = 467), M = 14.5(SD = 5.27). This is consistent with previous 
findings in this study; namely, that SI stigmatization is positively correlated with SI centrality. In 
this sample, urban residents appear more likely to experience sexual stigmatization which could 




 In this sample, the strength of racial identity also appears to be associated with 
rural/urban residency. Specifically, a significant t-value, t(1139) = -1.66, p = .048, shows that 
urban residency (N = 674) is associated with higher scores, M = 22.6(SD = 6.50), on the RI 
centrality scale than rural residency (N = 467), M = 22.0(SD = 6.31). While there is no 
significant difference between rural and urban residency related to the RI private regard scale, 
again, a significant t-value, t(1139) = 2.66, p = .003, indicates rural residency (N = 467) is 
associated with higher scores, M = 21.0(SD = 4.41), on the RI public regard scale than urban 
residency (N = 674), M = 20.2(SD = 4.57). In this sample, rural residents view their racial 
identity with less centrality, yet also view society as more accepting of their racial identity than 
urban residents. While this could be contributed to reliance on familial relationships – as 
opposed to sexual- or race-based categories of identity – as Gray (2009) suggests, these findings 
could also be attributable to the small number of non-White rural respondents in the sample. 
Indeed, cross-tabulation shows that, by a two-to-one margin, more Blacks, Latino/as, and Asians 
in the sample reside in urban areas. This, too, likely accounts for the significantly higher, t(1139) 
= -2.34, p = .009, number of race-based discrimination reports among urban residents (N = 674), 
M = 15.3(SD = 5.40), than among rural residents (N = 467), M = 14.5(SD = 5.27).  
 
Beyond Categorical Analyses 
 
One important goal of this study is to better understand sexual identity at the intersection 
of race and ethnicity. While categorical-based analyses can provide insight into important 
aspects of social and political behavior (McCall 2005), I move beyond categorical analyses by 
adopting measures of identity which provide social-psychological context to the various 
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categorical indicators traditionally employed in survey research. It is understood that culture, 
race, and ethnicity represent sources of intersectional influence on sexual identity (Chan 1989; 
Loiacano 1989; Thumma 1991; Rogers and Lott 1997; Garcia 1998; Green 1995;1998). Not only 
this, but the various identities we occupy structure systems of advantage/disadvantage and 
privilege/disprivilege (Bedolla 2007; Hancock 2007a; 2007b) which, in turn, shape our social 
and political experiences. In order to “reveal the complexity of lived experience within social 
groups at neglected points of intersection” (McCall 2005:1773), the following section examines 
the intersection of the previously-discussed additive identity indices for sexual and racial 
identity. 
Perceptions at the Intersection of Sexual and Racial Identities 
 Figures 3.22, 3.23, and 3.24 graphically depict the distribution and median scores for the 
SI centrality, private regard, and public regard indices by categories of sexual and racial identity.  
As Figure 3.22 shows, the lowest median score on the RI centrality scale appears among White 
survey participants who identify as pansexual, asexual, etc.; while, the highest median score 
appears among lesbian participants who identify as a racial minority other than Black, Latino/a, 
or Asian. On the SI private regard scale, Figure 3.23 shows the highest median score appears 
among gay survey participants who identify as a racial minority other than Black, Latino/a, or 
Asian; while, the lowest median score appears among Asian bisexual participants. Finally, as 
Figure 3.24 shows, the highest median score on the SI public regard scale appears among lesbian 
survey participants who identify as a racial minority other than Black, Latino/a, or Asian; while, 
the lowest median score appears among White participants who identify with a sexual identity 




Figure 3.22: Sexual Identity Centrality Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity 
 
This is an interesting and counterintuitive finding. That is, those survey participants who 
report the lowest median SI centrality score also report the highest SI public regard score. Even 
though sexuality appears to be a less central component to the identity of racial minority 
lesbians, this group appears to believe society greatly values their sexuality. From these graphic 
depictions, two important observations emerge. First, median values on each of the three sexual 
identity indices appear relatively consistent across categories of racial identity. Indeed, 
categorical tests of association reveal no significant differences based on racial identity. Second, 
across almost all categories of racial identity, bisexual survey participants consistently show 
lower median scores on each of the sexual identity indices. Among bisexuals, however, Black 



















































































































distributions of the SI private and public regard scales shows that across all categories, survey 
participants report consistently higher SI private regard scores. 
 
 
Figure 3.23: Sexual Identity Private Regard Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity 
 
In this sample, personal regard for one’s sexual identity is consistently evaluated more positively 
than society’s regard for one’s sexual identity.  
Figures 3.25, 3.26, and 3.27 graphically depict the distribution and median scores for the 
RI centrality, private regard, and public regard indices by categories of sexual and racial identity. 
As Figure 3.25 shows, the highest median scores on the RI centrality scale appear among Black 
bisexual and Latino/a lesbian participants; while, the lowest median score appears among White 
participants who identify as neither gay, lesbian, nor bisexual. A similar pattern appears in 
























































































































Black lesbian participants; while, again, the lowest median score appears among White 
participants who identify as neither gay, lesbian, nor bisexual. 
 
 
Figure 3.24: Sexual Identity Public Regard Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity 
 
Finally, as Figure 3.27 shows, the highest median score on the RI public regard scale appear 
among White participants who identify as neither gay, lesbian, nor bisexual; while, the lowest 
median scores appear among Black and Asian lesbian participants. 
From these figures, two important observations can be made. First, the findings outlined 
in previous sections, namely that White survey participants report lower scores on the centrality 
and private regard scales, appears to hold across all sexual identities. The converse pattern for 

























































































































higher scores on the RI public regard scale across all sexual identities, with the highest median 
score appearing among White participants who identify as neither lesbian, gay, nor bisexual. 
 
 
Figure 3.25: Racial Identity Centrality Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity 
 
Second, as with the measures of SI public and private regard, among racial minority 
participants, scores on the private regard scale appear consistently higher than the public regard 
scale, while scores appear relatively static among White participants. As with sexuality identity, 
among racial minorities, personal regard for one’s racial identity is consistently evaluated more 
positively than society’s regard for one’s racial identity.  
Stigmatization at the Intersection of Sexual and Racial Identities 
Stigmatization is both an important component of identity development and important 
predictor of political outcomes because experience with discrimination both informs one’s 


















































































































based on one’s socially-constructed identity (Swank and Fahs 2013a; 2013b; Hartman 2006; 
Evans and Harriott 2004). 
 
 
Figure 3.26: Racial Identity Private Regard Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, Bedolla (2007:242) asserts, that those who intersectionally 
experience discrimination, i.e., a Black lesbian woman experiencing sexism, racism, and 
homophobia, may be more likely to “accept their lower status,” and “less likely…to challenge 
the structural barriers they face.” Because this theory is challenged in the literature (Swank and 
Fahs 2013a; 2013b), it is important to examine how LGBTQ people experience both 
heterosexism and racism in order to better understand the effects of discrimination originating 


























































































































Figure 3.27: Racial Identity Public Regard Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity 
 
  Figures 3.28 and 3.29 graphically depict the distributions and median scores for the SI 
and RI stigma indices by categories of sexual and racial identity. Contrary to studies such as that 
conducted by Moradi, et al. (2010), as shown in Figure 3.28, it appears that heterosexist 
stigmatization is experienced differently across categories of race and ethnicity. In this sample, 
gay and bisexual Asian participants exhibit the lowest median scores on the SI scale; while, 
Latino/a, White, and those who identify as a racial minority other than Black, Latino/a, or Asian 
appear to report the highest median scores on the scale. Consistent with previous findings, across 
three of the five racial and ethnic categories – Black, Latino/a, and White – Figure 3.28 shows 


























































































































Figure 3.28: Sexual Identity Stigma Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity 
 
Figure 3.29 shows racial stigmatization is also experienced differently across categories 
of racial identity (Landrine, et al. 1995). As discussed in previous sections, White participants – 
across all categories of sexual identity – appear to report the lowest median scores on the RI 
stigma scale, while the highest median score is exhibited by Latino/a participants who identify 
with a sexual identity other than gay, lesbian, or bisexual. This is not an attempt to revise the 
“oppression Olympics” (Walby, et al. 2012); however, it is necessary to depict the nature of 



























































































































From an examination of sample demographics alone, the assertions of scholars such as 
Worthen (2013), Egan (2012), Eliason (2010), Lombardi (2009), Fassinger and Arseneau (2007), 
Weiss (2004), and Mohr and Rochlen (1999) who suggest the existence of heterogeneity within 
the often-homogenized LGBT community are confirmed. 
 
 
Figure 3.29: Racial Identity Stigma Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity 
 
Adopting McCall’s (2005:1773) “intercategorical” approach and Shield’s (2008) ‘both/and’ 
approach to intersectional analysis allows for the “provisional” use of categorical indicators in 
order to explore the diversity within the LGBTQ community, but also highlight the experience of 




















































































































In this chapter, I reviewed the demographics and social-psychological identity measures 
gathered from an online survey conducted using a sample frame of LGBTQ adults living in the 
United States. According to the data, the sample is majority White and plurality bisexual. 
Consistent with previous research, bisexuals in this sample exhibit significantly lower scores on 
the SI centrality, private and public regard scales – meaning, bisexuals in the sample are less 
likely to consider their sexual identity as a central component of their sense of self, are less likely 
to positively view their sexual identity, and view society as less accepting of their sexual identity 
than gays and lesbians. One possible explanation offered here is the differential in experience 
with sexual stigma. Bisexuals in this sample are significantly less likely to report experience with 
sexual stigma than gays and lesbians. The moderate positive correlation between sexual stigma 
and sexual identity centrality suggests that stigmatization helps solidify one’s sexual identity, 
making that identity more emotionally and politically salient. This is consistent with previous 
research which observed increased participation and policy liberalism among gays and lesbians 
compared to bisexuals (Swank and Fahs 2013a; 2013b; Egan 2012; Lewis, et al. 2011). In the 
next section I will evaluate this claim using the social-psychological measures of sexual identity 
to predict political attitudes and participation of the survey participants. 
In this sample, White survey participants exhibit significantly lower scores on the RI 
centrality and private regard scale – meaning, Whites in the sample are less likely to consider 
their racial identity as a central component of their sense of self, and are less likely to positively 
view their sexual identity. While this is consistent with previous research, e.g., Hurtado and 
Stewart (1997), who suggest White identity is only salient when challenged, the findings here 
somewhat contradict existing literature as Whites in the sample recognize the privilege 
associated with their racial identity, as they exhibit significantly higher scores on the RI public 
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regard scale than racial minorities. As expected, racial minorities in the sample experience 
significantly more racial discrimination than Whites. Again, stigmatization and experience with 
discrimination may be one mechanism which increases identity salience and centrality 
contributing to policy liberalism and political action.  
The recognition of White identity privilege also highlights the issue of racism within the 
LGBTQ community. Racial discrimination is well-documented among LGBTQ people (Wilson, 
et al. 2009; Malebranche, et al. 2004; Green 1998; Loicano 1989; Icard 1986). However, the 
research presented here adds a new dimension to the problem, namely White LGBTQ people in 
this sample are significantly less likely to associate with people who do not share their racial 
identity. Social networks are one mechanism which informs our view of politics and the world 
(Quintelier, et al. 2012; Mutz 2002a; 2002b). Racial isolation within the LGBTQ community 
threatens to perpetuate underrepresentation in movement organizations and policy priorities as 
well as the disenfranchisement of racial minority LGBTQ people (Strolovich 2006; 2007).  
The sample demographics also highlight the importance of intersectional research by 
emphasizing the gender, class, and cultural heterogeneity which exists within the LGBTQ 
community. As previous scholars recognize, gender and sexuality are distinct, not 
interchangeable, concepts in social science. The small number of transgender and gender queer 
survey participants help to nuance our understanding of sexuality at the intersection of gender 
fluidity. Not all men in the sample identify as gay, nor do all women identify as lesbian. In fact, 
not all survey participants identify with a binary gender construct. This variation is an important 




Finally, this study refutes stereotypes of LGBTQ people perpetuated in popular media 
and social science by demonstrating economic, cultural, and geographic variation. Almost one-
quarter of survey participants live at or near the federal poverty line, while more than one-third 
of Blacks and bisexuals in the sample are unemployed. This is a stark contrast to popular images 
of affluent urban gays and lesbians who exert enormous social and political power. Not only this, 
but the sample demographics reveal religious diversity within the LGBTQ community which 
mirrors society at-large. While about one-quarter of the sample report no religious belief, nearly 
half report being Christian – a finding somewhat counter to contemporary research which 
suggests LGBTQ people are more likely to reject religious belief (Murphy 2015; Pew Research 
Center 2013; Lewis, et al. 2011; Egan, et al. 2008). Combined with the fact that almost three-
quarters of religious survey participants report attending a religious institution which does not 
affirm their sexuality, future research should more fully explore religious diversity within the 
LGBTQ community, but also the effects of religious and sexual identity conflict on political 
outcomes. 
Having reviewed the sample demographics and distributions of social-psychological 
identity measures, I now focus on the questions which are central to this study. Namely, what, if 
any of these variables effect the political attitudes and behaviors of LGBTQ people. In the next 
chapter I review the dependent variables in this study, i.e., six measures of political attitudes and 
two measures of political behavior. In chapter 5, I synthesize the information from chapters 3 





CHAPTER 4: POLITICS AT THE INTERSECTION: STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF 
POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR 
 
In chapter 2, I describe the methodology for conducting an online survey of LGBTQ 
adults living in the United States. In chapter 3, I present the demographics of the quota sample of 
1216 participants including the distributions of social-psychological measures of sexual and 
racial identity, the key independent variables of this research project. In the proceeding sections, 
I review the eight dependent variables and present an analysis of each in relation to the 
categorical measures of identity described in the previous chapter. I then report the results of 
OLS regression modeling using the eight dependent variables and present evidence in support of 
the hypotheses outlined in chapter 2. In addition, I present the results of hierarchical OLS 
regression modeling to explore the intersection of the previously described identity measures and 
the utility of interaction terms in explaining variation in the dependent variables. Finally, I 




 In chapter 2, I describe the operationalization of eight political attitudinal and behavioral 
measures from two batteries of survey questions measuring attitudes regarding the role of 
government, private rights, egalitarianism, and policy-specifics including gun control, 
immigration, and abortion rights, as well as political participation and political alienation (see 
Appendix A, Q1a-c, Q2a-b, Q3a-c, Q4a-c, Q5a-f, and Q6a-d). In the following sections, I review 
the operationalization of these measures and present distributional data for each. Later, I present 
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the results of OLS regression estimation using these eight measures as dependent variables to test 
the hypotheses posited in chapter 2.  
Political Attitudes 
 Attitudes are “sets of beliefs ‘whose referents have shared general societal relevance to 
many people in religious, economic, political, educational, ethnic, and other social areas’" 
(Kerlinger 1972:614 cited in Saucier 2000:366). Furthermore, attitudes are evaluative, often 
defined as a “like or dislike” of some ‘object’ (Saucier 2000:366). In this study, survey 
participants are asked to evaluate various statements which measure attitudes toward the 
concepts mentioned above, e.g., role of government, egalitarianism, etc. In the following sections 
I present descriptive and distributional data related to each. 
Role of Government 
Attitudes toward the role of government are measured using questions derived from the 
limited government subscale of the American National Election Studies Individualism Scales 
(Markus 1990). This subscale is similar to the Comrey and Newmeyer (1965) welfare scale and 
measures attitudes toward “social welfare issue positions” (Feldman 1993:175). The distribution 
of responses for each question is shown in Appendix A, Q1a-c. The distribution of item one 
(Q1a) exhibits a pronounced negative skew as more than three-quarters (83.8 percent) of survey 
participants either agree or strongly agree with the statement, “The government should try to 
ensure that all Americans have such things as jobs, health care, and housing.” The distribution of 
the other two items in the subscale, however, more closely approximate a normal curve, with 
responses clustered in the center of the distribution. As shown in Appendix A, Q1b, a plurality of 
participants (42.1 percent) either agree or strongly agree that “government has gotten bigger 
because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves;” while, attitudes 
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appear almost evenly split in thirds regarding the statement, “The free market can handle today’s 
complex problems without government being involved.”  
These three items comprise an additive index operationalized as the role of government 
scale (See Appendix B for descriptive statistics for each dependent and independent variable 
used in statistical analyses). All attitudinal scales are coded on a liberal – conservative 
continuum. That is, low scores on attitudinal scales represent liberal positions while high scores 
represent conservative positions. To this end, one item is reverse coded. Values on the role of 
government scale range from 3 – 15 and, as Appendix B shows, the scale exhibits a moderately 
strong alpha reliability level (α = .534). Low scores represent the liberal position favoring 
government intervention; while, high scores represent the converse conservative position. Figure 
4.1 shows the distribution and median scores on the role of government scale divided by 
categories of sexual and racial identity. As the figure shows, median scores on the role of 
government scale are relatively evenly distributed across identity categories. The highest median 
scores appear among survey participants who identify as a racial minority other than Black, 
Latino/a, or Asian; while, the lowest median score appears among lesbian-identified Asian 
participants. 
Private Rights 
Private rights refer to individual rights under the law and are often viewed in the context 
of competition (Woodmansee and Cook 1967). Here, a two-item measure is adapted from the 
private rights subscale of the Woodmansee and Cook (1967; 1976) Multifactor Racial Attitudes 
Inventory (MRAI). The scale was originally developed to measure attitudes related to the private 
rights of business owners to maintain racially segregated facilities. In this instance, I have 
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adapted the scale to measure attitudes toward the private rights of business owners to refuse 
service or hire LGBT people. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Role of Government Scale Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity 
 
The frequency distribution of responses for each question is shown in Appendix A, Q2a-b. The 
distributions of both items exhibit a pronounced negative skew, as a clear majority of survey 
participants agree or strongly agree with laws which prohibit discrimination against LGBTQ 
people in the provision of services (84 percent) and in hiring (90.5 percent). 
These two items comprise an additive index operationalized as the private rights scale 
(see Appendix B). To maintain the liberal – conservative continuum, both items are reverse 
coded. Values on the scale range from 2 – 10 and, as Appendix B shows, the scale exhibits a 















































































































rights claims outweigh private rights claims; while, high scores represent the converse 
conservative position. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution and median scores on the private rights 
scale divided by categorical indicators of sexual and racial identity. As the figure shows, median 
scores on the scale are low across all categories of identity. This is expected as the rights in 
question directly implicate the sexual and gender identities of survey participants. Later analyses 




Figure 4.2: Private Rights Scale Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity 
 
Egalitarianism 
 Egalitarianism refers to individual beliefs about inequality, specifically, the “causes and 











































































































adapted from Kluegel and Smith’s (1986) egalitarianism scale and measures participants’ 
attitudes toward income inequality. The frequency distribution of survey responses for each of 
the three items is shown in Appendix A, Q3a-c. The distribution of the first item (Q3a) is 
negatively skewed, as more than two-thirds of survey participants (67.4 percent) either agree or 
strongly agree that “equality of income would avoid” class-based conflict. The second item 
(Q3b) is platykurtic – more closely approximating a normal curve, with most responses clustered 
around the center of the distribution, while the distribution of the third item (Q3c) is negatively 
skewed. In short, as a reason to support equality of income, a plurality of participants (41.5 
percent) believe “everybody’s contribution to society” is “equally important;” while, a majority 
(59.6 percent) of participants either agree or strongly agree that “every family’s needs” are the 
same. 
 These three items comprise an additive index operationalized as the egalitarianism scale 
(see Appendix B). To maintain the liberal – conservative continuum, two items are reverse 
coded. Values on the egalitarianism scale range from 3 – 15 and, as Appendix B shows, the scale 
exhibits a relatively strong alpha reliability level (α = .664). Low scores represent the liberal 
position favoring economic equality, while high scores represent the converse conservative 
position. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution and median scores on the egalitarianism scale divided 
by categorical indicators of sexual and racial identity. As the figure shows, the distribution of 
values on this scale shows greater variation than the two previous scales. Median scores on the 
scale appear consistently higher among gay-identified participants across all categories of racial 
identity, while Black participants exhibit consistently lower scores across categories of sexual 
identity. Consistent with results described in chapter 3, the distribution of scores on the 




Figure 4.3: Egalitarianism Scale Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity  
 
Policy-Specific Attitudes 
 Because policy-specific indicators often reveal greater variation across categories of 
identity (Holbrook, Sterrett, Johnson, and Krysan 2016), along with the three attitudinal indices, 
three policy-specific items are included as response variables: gun control, immigration, and 
abortion. As the data in Appendix A, Q4a indicate, attitudes toward gun control exhibit a 
relatively normal platykurtic distribution. Less than one-third of respondents either strongly 
agree (14.5 percent) or disagree (17.5 percent) with the statement, “Government should do more 
to protect the rights of gun owners.” As Appendix B shows, attitudes toward gun control are 











































































































represent the liberal position favoring gun control; while, high scores represent the converse 
conservative position.  
 As Appendix A, Q4b shows, the distribution of attitudes toward immigration among the 
sample show a pronounced positive skew. That is, a majority of survey participants (57.7 
percent) either disagree or strongly disagree with the statement, “Immigrants to the United States 
burden the country because they take our jobs.” As Appendix B shows, attitudes toward 
immigration are operationalized as the variable immigration. Values range from 1 – 5, where low 
scores represent the liberal position favoring immigration and high scores represent the converse 
conservative position.  
Finally, as Appendix A, Q4c shows, the distribution of attitudes toward abortion among 
the sample exhibit a pronounced negative skew, as a majority of survey participants either agree 
or strongly agree (66.2 percent) with the statement, “There should be no restrictions on the 
ability of a woman to get an abortion.” As Appendix B shows, attitudes toward abortion are 
operationalized as the variable abortion. The values are reverse coded to maintain the liberal – 
conservative continuum. Again, values range from 1 – 5 and low scores represent the liberal 
position supporting fewer restrictions on abortion; while, high scores represent the converse 
conservative position. 
Political Behavior: Participation & Alienation 
 Two aspects of political behavior are analyzed in this study, political participation and 
political alienation. Political participation is measured using a scale adapted from the National 
Election Studies (ANES) model (Brady 1993) which is composed of items related to traditional 
aspects of political action such as voting, volunteering, attending, meetings, and donating money. 
Appendix A, Q5a-f shows the distribution of responses for each behavior in the study. Not 
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surprisingly, the distribution of items one (Q5a) and two (Q5b), related to voting, as well as item 
three (Q5c), exhibit a pronounced negative skew. That is, a majority of survey participants report 
voting either sometimes or often for presidential candidates in primary (81.8 percent) and general 
(87.8 percent) elections, and attempting to persuade people to vote for a particular party or 
candidate (66.5 percent). Conversely, the distributions of items four (Q5c), five (Q5e), and six 
(Q5f) in Appendix A show pronounced positive skews, as a majority of survey participants 
report rarely or never attending a political meeting (71 percent), contributing money to a political 
cause (70.8 percent), or volunteering with a political interest group (74.9 percent).  
 These six items comprise an additive index operationalized as the political participation 
scale (see Appendix B).  As Appendix B shows, values on the scale range from 6 – 24 and, the 
scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level (α = .794). Low scores on the scale represent less 
political participation while high scores represent more political participation. Figure 4.4 shows 
the distribution and median scores on the political behavior scale divided by categories of sexual 
and racial identity. As with the attitudinal measures, median scores appear to vary across all 
categories; however, there appears to be no immediately discernable pattern. The lowest median 
score appears among gays who identify as a racial minority other than Black, Latino/a, or Asian, 
and the highest median score appears among Whites who identify as a sexual minority other than 





Figure 4.4: Political Participation Scale Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity 
 
Lastly, political alienation, is defined as “powerlessness, self-estrangement, political 
ineffectiveness, and disorientation toward the political system” (Reef and Knoke 1993:433). In 
this study, the concept is measured using a four-item scale adapted from Malik (1982). Appendix 
A, Q6a-d shows the distribution of responses for each item on the scale. The distribution of items 
two (Q6b) and three (Q6c) are negatively skewed, as a majority of survey participants (52.7 
percent) either disagree or strongly disagree that “there is no way whereby we can influence 
governmental decision-making;” while a plurality (45.5 percent) either disagree or strongly 
disagree that “we are unable to do anything against” the government in the event we are 
“mistreat[ed].” Conversely, the distribution of items one (Q6a) and four (Q6d) are positively 
skewed – with a plurality of survey participants (44.7 percent) either agreeing or strongly 



















































































































them” and, a majority of participants (53.1 percent) either agreeing or strongly agreeing that “the 
government does not care for people like me.”  
 
 
Figure 5.5: Political Alienation Scale Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity 
 
 These four items comprise an additive index operationalized as the political alienation 
scale (see Appendix B). As Appendix B shows, values on the scale range from 5 – 20 and, the 
scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level (α = .659). Low scores on the scale represent feeling 
less political alienation while high scores represent more political alienation. Figure 5.5 shows 
the distribution and median scores on the political alienation scale divided by categories of 
sexual and racial identity. As the figure shows, political alienation varies all categories of sexual 















































































































participants, while the highest median scores appear among lesbian-identified Black participants. 
Latino/a, Asian, and White bisexuals exhibit the highest median scores within their respective 
racial identity categories. 
 
Explaining Political Outcomes 
 
The analysis of response distributions, alone, again confirms the intersectional tenant of 
intra-group heterogeneity. However, categorical identity indicators do not provide an accurate 
description of LGBTQ politics. As this study argues, the relationship between politics and 
identity is more nuanced. In the following sections, I review the results of eight OLS regression 
model estimations (Aiken and West 1991) using the dependent and independent variables 
described in this and the previous chapters (see Appendix B; see Appendix C for a correlation 
matrix of all independent variables used in regression estimations).  
Attitudes: Role of Government 
Table 4.1 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using the role of government 
scale as the dependent variable. As the table shows, Model 1a is significant at the ninety-nine 
percent confidence level and, explains roughly thirty percent of the variation in the role of 
government scale (r2 = .298). Diagnostics reveal normality in model residuals (W = .996; z = 
1.92, p = .027) and no problem with heteroscedasticity (LM = .798, p = .670) or multicollinearity 
(VIF = 1.53). 
 All attitudinal scales are operationalized on a liberal – conservative continuum, i.e., 
negative coefficients are associated with policy liberalism while, positive coefficients are 
associated with policy conservatism. After controlling for partisanship and political ideology, the  
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* p ≤ .1 
** p ≤ .05 




Variable Model 1a Model 1b 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
SI Centrality -.054*** .012 -.051*** .012 
SI Private Regard -.044** .018 -.047** .018 
SI Public Regard .070*** .016 .063*** .016 
SI Stigma .028* .017 -.070** .031 
RI Centrality .007 .012 .006 .012 
RI Private Regard .029 .018 .029 .018 
RI Public Regard -.008 .015 -.016 .015 
RI Stigma .032* .017 -.157** .053 
Gender -.330** .136 -.308** .136 
Network Diversity .008 .012 .012 .012 
Income .059* .034 .053 .033 
Education .028 .050 .022 .050 
Unemployment -.093 .157 -.092 .156 





































Ideology -.353*** .061 -.354*** .060 
Interaction Terms 


























coefficient estimates of nine independent variables achieve statistical significance. Consistent 
with H1, H2, and H3, the coefficient estimates for SI centrality, private and public regard are 
statistically significant at either the ninety-five percent or ninety-nine percent confidence level. 
The direction of the relationship between SI centrality, private regard and the role of government 
scale are also consistent with H1 and H2. That is, SI centrality (β = -.054, p = .000) and private 
regard (β = -.044, p = .016) are positively associated with policy liberalism. Although significant 
at the ninety-nine percent confidence level, the direction of the relationship between SI public 
regard and the dependent variable is the converse of that predicted in H3. In this case, SI public 
regard (β =.070, p = .000) is associated with policy conservatism. 
Although no racial identity coefficient estimate achieves statistical significance, 
consistent with H5, at the ninety percent confidence level, the coefficient estimates of both SI 
and RI stigma are statistically significant. Furthermore, the direction of the relationship between 
both variables and the role of government scale is consistent with H5. That is, SI stigma (β = 
.028, p = .090) and RI stigma (β = .032, p = .066) are positively associated with policy 
conservatism. Studies of political behavior suggest stigmatization increases identity salience 
which, in turn, motivates political action to eliminate societal inequalities related to that identity 
(Swank and Fahs 2013b; Lien 1994; Miller, et al. 1981). The correlational findings in chapter 3 
are consistent with this theory, in that stigmatization is strongly correlated with identity 
centrality. The effect of stigmatization on political attitudes, however, is not as clearly defined in 
the literature. Bedolla (2007:242) asserts that stigmatization across multiple axes of identity not 
only discourage political participation, but make those who experience intersectional 
stigmatization “less likely to challenge the structural barriers they face.”  
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In order to evaluate this intersectional claim, I estimate Model 1b in Table 4.1 with an 
interaction term – operationalized by multiplying the SI and RI stigma scales (Frederich 1982; 
Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). As Model 1b shows, the coefficient estimates of both the SI 
and RI stigma scales remain statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level; 
however, the directionality of the relationship to the role of government scale reverse from 
Model 1a to Model 1b. Consistent with intersectional scholarship, the coefficient estimate of the 
interaction term is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level, and in the 
expected direction. That is, while SI and RI stigmatization exhibit independent main effects – 
i.e., are associated with policy liberalism, intersectional stigmatization is associated with policy 
conservatism (β = .009, p = .000). The results presented here suggest that the individual effects 
of identity-based stigmatization are increasing identity salience and concomitant political 
attitudinal and behavioral orientations which reflect a challenge to the discriminatory status quo. 
When identity-based stigmatization is experienced across multiple social identities 
simultaneously, however, the likelihood that an individual will attitudinally challenge the status 
quo, even regarding a relevant policy issue such as the provision of government services, is 
diminished. 
As Model 1b in Table 4.1 shows, the coefficient estimate for gender is statistically 
significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level and negatively related to the role of 
government scale (β = -.308, p = .023). Cisgender females in this sample, then, hold more liberal 
attitudes toward the role of government than cisgender males. Similarly, the coefficient estimate 
for age is statistically significant and in the same direction (β = -.015, p = .002). Age, too, is 
associated with policy liberalism. Finally, as Model 1b in Table 4.1 shows, consistent with H9, 
the coefficient estimate for Christianity is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent 
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confidence level and positively related to the role of government scale (β = .544, p = .001). As 
the model uses non-religious participants as the base category, survey participants who identify 
as Christian hold significantly more conservative attitudes toward the role of government than 
non-religious participants. 
Attitudes: Private Rights 
Table 4.2 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using the private rights scale as 
the dependent variable. As the table shows, Model 2a is significant at the ninety-nine percent 
confidence level and explains slightly more than sixteen percent of the variation in the private 
rights scale (r2 = .168). Diagnostics show normality in the residuals of Model 2a (W = .856; z = 
11.4, p = .000), and no problems with multicollinearity (VIF = 1.53); however, there appears to 
be an issue with heteroscedasticity (LM = 26.6, p = .000). For this reason, I estimate Model 2b in 
Table 4.1 using robust standard errors. 
After controlling for partisanship and political ideology, the coefficient estimates of only 
five variables achieve statistical significance in Model 2b. Consistent with H2, the coefficient 
estimates for SI and RI private regard are statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent and 
ninety-five percent confidence levels, respectively, and in the hypothesized directions (β = -.093, 
p = .000 and β = -.012, p = .002, respectively). While the coefficient estimate for SI public 
regard is statistically significant, the directionality of the relationship is, again, contrary to H3. 
Interestingly, SI public regard is positively related to policy conservatism (β = .033, p = .003), 
even when the policy in question directly implicates sexual identity by permitting discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation and/or gender identity. 
Again, the coefficient estimates for the SI and RI stigmatization scales achieve statistical 
significance, although, in opposing directions (β = -.024, p = .048 and β = .027, p = .034,  
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* p ≤ .1 
** p ≤ .05 







Variable Model 2a Model 2b 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
SI Centrality -.006 .009 -.006 .008 
SI Private Regard -.093*** .013 -.093** .013 
SI Public Regard .033** .011 .033** .011 
SI Stigma -.024** .012 -.024** .012 
RI Centrality .014 .009 .014 .009 
RI Private Regard -.046*** .013 -.046** .014 
RI Public Regard -.012 .011 -.012 .012 
RI Stigma .027** .012 .027** .012 
Gender -.118 .098 -.118 .094 
Network Diversity -.0004 .008 .0004 .009 
Income .022 .024 .022 .024 
Education -.014 .036 -.014 .035 
Unemployment -.053 .114 -.053 .113 





































Ideology -.119** .044 -.119** .048 
















respectively). Unlike with the role of government scale, alternate regression modeling using an 
interaction term yields no significant changes in the model specification. 
In this case, it appears that while sexual stigma increases the likelihood that one supports 
civil rights of LGBTQ people over the private rights of business owners, racial stigma exhibits 
the converse relationship. That is not to say there is no intersectional effect, however. That is, 
experience with racial discrimination may not increase policy conservatism as much as make it 
less likely that one would expose themselves to further stigmatization by advocating for a policy 
which may expose their sexual identity. 
Attitudes: Egalitarianism 
 Table 4.3 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using the egalitarianism scale as 
the dependent variable. As the table shows, Model 3a is significant at the ninety-nine percent 
confidence level and explains more than twenty-one percent of the variation in the egalitarianism 
scale (r2 = .216). Diagnostics show normality in model residuals (W = .995; z = 2.88, p = .001), 
and no problems with either heteroscedasticity (LM = 3.07, p = .214) or multicollinearity (VIF = 
1.53).  
 After controlling for partisanship and political ideology, the coefficient estimates for 
seven independent variables achieve statistical significance. Consistent with H1, H2, and H3, the 
coefficient estimates for SI centrality, public and private regard are all statistically significant at 
either the ninety-five percent or ninety-nine percent confidence level. Coefficients for both SI 
centrality and private regard are in the hypothesized direction; while, again, the coefficient 
estimate for SI public regard is positively related to the egalitarianism scale, the converse of H3. 
SI centrality and private regard are positively related to policy liberalism (β = -.040, p = .009, 
and β = -.102, p = .021, respectively), while SI public regard is positively related to policy  
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* p ≤ .1 
** p ≤ .05 






Variable Model 3a 
 Coefficient S.E. 
SI Centrality -.040** .015 
SI Private Regard -.102*** .021 
SI Public Regard .045** .019 
SI Stigma -.023 .020 
RI Centrality -.014 .014 
RI Private Regard .038* .021 
RI Public Regard -.031 .018 
RI Stigma -.015 .021 
Gender -.710*** .162 
Network Diversity -.005 .014 
Income .211*** .040 
Education -.013 .059 
Unemployment -.359* .187 























Ideology -.339*** .072 












conservatism (β = .045, p = .021). Only one racial identity coefficient estimate shows 
significance; although only at the ninety percent confidence level and, the observed direction of 
the relationship is the converse of that predicted in H2. In this case, RI private regard is 
positively related to the egalitarianism scale (β = .038, p = .075). 
Again, the coefficient estimate for gender shows significance at the ninety-nine percent 
confidence level and, in a negative direction (β = -.710, p = .000). In this sample, cisgender 
females exhibit significantly more policy liberalism regarding income equality than cisgender 
males. Finally, the coefficient estimates for two context variables achieve statistical significance. 
First, income is positively related to policy conservatism at the ninety-nine percent confidence 
level (β = .211, p = .000). This is consistent with H6, although the directionality is transposed. 
The finding is intuitive, however, as survey participants with more personal wealth are more 
reluctant to support policies which would mandate income equality. Second, consistent with H8, 
unemployment is positively related to policy liberalism (β = -.359, p = .055). 
Political Attitudes: Policy Specifics 
 Table 4.4 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using gun control as the 
dependent variable. As the table shows, Model 4a is statistically significant at the ninety-nine 
percent confidence level and explains slightly more than thirty percent of the variation in 
attitudes toward gun control (r2 = .307). Diagnostics show normality in model residuals (W = 
.997; z = 1.73, p = .041) and, no problems with multicollinearity (VIF = 1.53); however, there 
appears to be an issue with heteroscedasticity (LM = 38.5, p = .000). For this reason, I estimate 
Model 4b in Table 4.4 with robust standard errors. 
 After controlling for partisanship and political ideology, the coefficient estimates for ten 
independent variables achieve statistical significance in Model 4b. Consistent with H1, H2 and  
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Table 4.4: OLS Regression Estimation, DV = Gun Control 
a model estimated with robust standard errors 
* p ≤ .1 
** p ≤ .05 





Variable Model 4a Model 4ba Model 4ca 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
SI Centrality -.019** .006 -.019** .007 -.018** .007 
SI Private Regard .004 .009 .004 .011 .003 .010 
SI Public Regard .022** .008 .022** .009 .019** .009 
SI Stigma -.013 .009 -.013 .009 -.054*** .018 
RI Centrality .004 .006 .004 .010 .003 .007 
RI Private Regard .028** .009 .028** .010 .028** .010 
RI Public Regard -.004 .008 -.004 .009 -.007 .009 
RI Stigma .047*** .009 .047*** .009 -.031 .032 
Gender .032 .073 .032 .073 .041 .072 
Network Diversity -.008 .006 -.008 .007 -.007 .007 
Income -.041** .018 -.041** .018 -.043** .018 
Education -.051* .027 -.051* .026 -.054** .026 
Unemployment -.201** .084 -.201** .085 -.201** .084 



















































Ideology -.079** .032 -.079** .036 -.079** .036 
Interaction Terms 


































H3, the coefficient estimates for SI centrality and public regard and RI private regard are 
statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level. As predicted, SI centrality is 
positively related to policy liberalism (β = -.019, p = .008); however, both SI public regard (β = 
.022, p = .015) and RI private regard (β = .028, p = .006) are positively related to policy 
conservatism.  
Consistent with H5, the coefficient estimate for RI stigma is statistically significant and 
positively related to the dependent variable (β = .047, p = .000). Given previous findings 
regarding stigmatization, however, Model 4c in Table 4.4 is estimated with an interaction term – 
again, operationalized by multiplying the SI and RI stigma scales. From Model 4b to Model 4c, 
the coefficient estimate for RI stigma no longer achieves statistical significance; however, the 
direction of the relationship with the dependent variable is revered. With the inclusion of the 
interaction term, the coefficient estimate for SI stigma achieves statistical significance at the 
ninety-nine percent confidence level and exhibits a negative relationship (β = -.054, p = .001) 
with policy conservatism.  
Finally, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is statistically significant at the 
ninety-five percent confidence level and exhibits a positive relationship (β = .003, p = .004) with 
policy conservatism. While inconsistent with H5, this finding comports with previous research 
(Bedolla 2007; Swank and Fahs 2013a; 2013b) in that SI stigmatization, alone, is associated with 
a challenge to the status quo, i.e., policy liberalism. However, as previously described, when 
identity-based stigmatization is experienced across multiple social identities simultaneously, the 
likelihood that an individual will attitudinally challenge the status quo is diminished. 
 Table 4.5 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using immigration as the 
dependent variable. As the table shows, Model 5a is statistically significant at the ninety-nine  
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Table 4.5: OLS Regression Estimation, DV = Immigration 
a model estimated with robust standard errors 
* p ≤ .1 
** p ≤ .05 





Variable Model 5a Model 5ba Model 5ca 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
SI Centrality -.006 .007 -.006 .007 -.004 .007 
SI Private Regard -.028** .010 -.028** .010 -.029** .010 
SI Public Regard .020** .009 .020** .009 .017* .009 
SI Stigma -.001 .009 -.001 .009 -.014** .019 
RI Centrality .013** .006 .013* .007 .013* .007 
RI Private Regard .011 .010 .011 .010 .011 .010 
RI Public Regard .033*** .008 .033*** .009 .030*** 009 
RI Stigma .051*** .009 .051*** .010 -.025 .034 
Gender -.049 .075 -.049 .075 -.040 .075 
Network Diversity -.008 .006 -.008 .007 -.006 .007 
Income -.042** .018 -.042** .018 -.044** .018 
Education -.018 .028 -.018 .027 -.020 .027 
Unemployment -.061 .087 -.061 .088 -.060 .087 



















































Ideology -.112*** .033 -.112** .036 -.112** .036 
Interaction Terms 


































percent confidence level and explains roughly twenty-seven percent of the variance in attitudes 
toward immigration (r2 = .270). Diagnostics show normality in model residuals (W = .983; z = 
6.05, p = .000) and no problems with multicollinearity (VIF = 1.53); however, there appears to 
be an issue with heteroscedasticity (LM = 51.1, p = .000). Because of this, I estimate Model 5b 
with robust standard errors. 
After controlling for partisanship and political ideology, the coefficient estimates for 
seven independent variables achieve statistical significance in Model 5b. Consistent with H2 and 
H3, the coefficient estimates for SI private and public regard are statistically significant at the 
ninety-five percent confidence level. As predicted, SI private regard is positively related to 
policy liberalism (β = -.028, p = .009); however, again, SI public regard exhibits a positive 
relationship with policy conservatism (β = .020, p = .041). Also, consistent with H1 and H3, 
coefficient estimates for RI centrality and public regard are statistically significant at the ninety 
percent and ninety-nine percent confidence levels, respectively. In both cases, the direction of the 
relationship is the converse of that specified by the relevant hypotheses. Both RI centrality (β = 
.013, p = .055) and RI public regard (β = .033, p = .000) are positively related to policy 
conservatism.  
Consistent with H5, Model 5b shows the coefficient estimate for RI stigma is statistically 
significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and positively related to the dependent 
variable (β = .051, p = .000). Again, to better model the intersectional effect of stigmatization, 
Model 5c in Table 5.5 is estimated with an interaction term – operationalized by multiplying the 
SI and RI stigma scales. As Model 5c shows, the coefficient estimate for RI stigma no longer 
achieve statistical significance; however, the direction of the relationship with the dependent 
variable is reversed. With the inclusion of the interaction term, the coefficient estimate for SI 
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stigma achieves statistical significance at the ninety-five percent confidence level and exhibits a 
negative relationship (β = -.014, p = .029) with policy conservatism. Finally, the coefficient 
estimate for the interaction term is statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence 
level and positively related (β = .003, p = .020) to policy conservatism. As with attitudes toward 
gun control, SI stigma and RI stigma (although not statistically significant in this case), 
independently, are associated with an attitudinal challenge to immigration policy status quo, i.e., 
policy liberalism. However, again, when identity-based stigmatization is experienced across 
multiple social identities simultaneously, the likelihood that an individual will attitudinally 
challenge the status quo is diminished. 
As Model 5c in Table 4.5 shows, consistent with H9, the coefficient estimate for 
Christian religiosity is statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level and in 
the hypothesized direction. That is, survey participants who identify as Christian exhibit more 
conservative attitudes toward immigration (β = .295, p = .001) than participants who do not 
identify as religious. Finally, consistent with H6, the coefficient estimate for income is positively 
associated with policy liberalism (β = -.044, p = .016) and in the hypothesized direction. 
Table 4.6 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using abortion as the dependent 
variable. As the table shows, Model 6a is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent 
confidence level and explains only about eighteen percent of the variation in attitudes toward 
abortion (r2 = .189). Diagnostics show normality in the model residuals (W = .966; z = 7.83, p = 
.000) and no problems with multicollinearity (VIF = 1.53); however, again, there appears to be 
an issue with heteroscedasticity (LM = 69.5, p = .000). For this reason, Model 6b in Table 4.6 is 
estimated using robust standard errors. 
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a model estimated with robust standard errors 
* p ≤ .1 
** p ≤ .05 






Variable Model 6a Model 6ba 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
SI Centrality -.006 .007 -.006 .007 
SI Private Regard -.033** .010 -.033** .011 
SI Public Regard .006 .009 .006 .009 
SI Stigma -.006 .009 -.006 .010 
RI Centrality -.011 .007 -.011 .007 
RI Private Regard .033*** .010 .033** .010 
RI Public Regard -.011 .009 -.011 .009 
RI Stigma -.012 .010 -.012 .010 
Gender -.125 .077 -.125 .077 
Network Diversity .007 .006 .007 .007 
Income -.045** .019 -.045** .018 
Education .012 .028 -.012 .027 
Unemployment .018 .089 .018 .090 





































Ideology -.105** .034 -.105** .040 
















After controlling for partisanship and political ideology, the coefficient estimates for 
seven independent variables achieve statistical significance in Model 6b. Consistent with H2, the 
coefficient estimates for SI and RI private regard are statistically significant at the ninety-five 
percent confidence level. While the relationship between SI private regard and the dependent 
variable is in the expected, negative (β = -.033, p = .004), direction, as Model 6b shows, there is 
a positive relationship between RI private regard (β = .003, p = .002) and policy conservatism. 
Regarding attitudes toward abortion, contextual factors appear to have the most significant 
effects. Consistent with H6, the coefficient estimate for income is significant at the ninety-five 
percent confidence level and positively related to policy liberalism (β = -.045, p = .016). 
Similarly, the coefficient estimate for age (β = -.005, p = .035) and urbanity (β = -.228, p = .002) 
are statistically significant and positively related to policy liberalism. Finally, consistent with H9, 
the coefficient estimates for both categorical religion indicators are statistically significant. As 
the model uses non-religious participants as the base category, survey participants who 
identify as Christian (β = .524, p = .000) or with another religion (β = .242, p = .012) hold 
significantly more conservative attitudes toward abortion than non-religious participants. 
Political Attitudes: Summary of Findings 
 After reviewing the attitudinal models, a number of significant findings appear. First, 
consistent with H1 and H2, the relationship between SI centrality, private regard at the attitudinal 
dependent variables, where statistically significant, is in the expected negative direction. That is, 
a sexual minority identity which is a central part of a person’s definition of self is related to 
policy liberalism. Similarly, a positive affective evaluation of one’s sexual minority identity is 
also related to policy liberalism. An unexpected relationship emerges, however, between SI 
public regard and policy conservatism. It appears the more LGBTQ people perceive society as 
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accepting of their sexual identity, the more conservative the political attitudes they hold. This 
relationship is statistically significant in every attitudinal model except attitudes toward abortion. 
In that case, as Model 6b in Table 4.6 shows, while not statistically significant, the directionality 
of the relationship remains consistent. In light of intersectional scholarship, this finding is 
intuitive and consistent with H5b. That is, a perception of oppression is associated with a 
political orientation which challenges inequality in society. However, when oppression is not 
perceived, there appears to be no motivation to challenge the political status quo. 
 This finding is bolstered by evidence from the analysis of stigmatization. A cursory 
examination of the regression modeling yields contradictory results, in that RI stigmatization, 
when significant, is consistently positively related to the attitudinal dependent variables; while, 
SI stigmatization, when significant, exhibits both positive and negative relationships with policy 
conservatism. While consistent with H5, this does not appear to be an accurate representation of 
the relationship between identity-based stigmatization and political attitudes. Model 1b in Table 
4.1, Model 4c in Table 4.4, and Model 5c in Table 4.5, which include interaction terms 
representing intersectional stigmatization, yield results consistent with previous research 
(Bedolla 2007; Swank and Fahs 2013a; 2013b) and appear to more accurately model this 
relationship.  
 The evidence presented here suggests that both experience with and perception of 
stigmatization are significant predictors of political attitudes (Sidanius, et al. 1997; Schildkraut 
2005). Although observed with political behavior (Swank and Fahs 2013a; 2013b), the 
intersectional effects of stigmatization on political attitudes is rarely discussed in the political 
literature (Bedolla 2007). It appears that, like political behavior, intersectional stigmatization 
lessens the likelihood that an individual will – even attitudinally – challenge the political status 
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quo by adopting a liberal political position – even regarding policies such as the provision of 
government services and immigration, which likely have direct bearing on their livelihood. 
Consistent with H1b, H1c, H2b, and H3b, a review of the models in the previous sections 
also shows a pattern of negative relationships between the racial identity indices and the 
attitudinal dependent variables. This is especially noticeable in Models 5a, 5b, and 5c in Table 
4.5 – regarding the relationship between racial identity and attitudes toward immigration. The 
pattern observed in these models, specifically, is consistent with H1c which posits that RI 
centrality will be positively associated with policy conservatism, especially when the policy in 
question challenges White racial identity. Because the relationships between RI centrality, 
private and public regard are consistent across most of the attitudinal dependent variables, the 
overrepresentation of White survey participants in the sample may skew the coefficient estimates 
for these indicators. Indeed, in alternate regression modeling (analysis not shown) using only 
White RI centrality, public and private regard indicators, RI centrality and private regard are 
consistently positively related to policy conservatism. White RI public regard, however, exhibits 
a consistent negative relationship with policy conservatism (see Appendix D for alternate 
regression modes). As discussed in chapter 3, this suggests the relationship between political 
attitudes and White racial identity somewhat contradicts Hurtado and Stewart (1997), in that, 
White identity public regard may act as a barometer for understanding ‘White privilege.’ While 
White centrality is associated with policy conservatism, when White participants recognize the 
privilege afforded their racial identity – indicated by high scores on the RI public regard scale – 
it appears they are more likely to favor policy liberalism. Future research should evaluate this 
claim with appropriate survey data. 
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Finally, consistent with H6-9, all socio-economic and socio-cultural variables achieve 
statistical significance in relation to the attitudinal dependent variables. Income was the most 
consistent socio-economic predictor of political attitudes, exhibiting a statistically significant 
relationship with five out of six attitudinal dependent variables. While positively related to gun 
control, immigration, and abortion policy liberalism, regression model estimates for the role of 
government and egalitarianism scales exhibit the converse relationship. Similarly, Christian 
religiosity exhibits a statistically significant positive relationship with four of the six attitudinal 
dependent variables. In each case – role of government, gun control, immigration, and abortion – 
as compared to the base category of non-religious survey participants, Christian religiosity is 
related to policy conservatism.  
Political Participation & Alienation 
 Table 4.7 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using the political participation 
scale as the dependent variable. As the table shows, Model 7a is statistically significant at the 
ninety-nine percent confidence level and explains more than twenty-seven percent of the 
variation in the political behavior scale (r2 = .274). Diagnostics show normality in model 
residuals (W = .997; z = 1.37, p = .085) and no problems with multicollinearity (VIF = 4.08); 
however, there does appear to be an issue with heteroscedasticity (LM = 14.2, p = .000). For this 
reason, Model 7b in Table 4.7 is estimated using robust standard errors. 
The political participation scale is operationalized so that low values on the scale 
represent less political participation and high values represent more political participation in 
Model 7b. Therefore, negative coefficients equate to reduced participation while positive 
coefficients equate to increased participation. After controlling for partisanship and political 
ideology, the regression coefficients of eight independent variables achieve statistical  
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a model estimated with robust standard errors 
* p ≤ .1 
** p ≤ .05 




Variable Model 7a Model 7ba 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
SI Centrality .071*** .021 .071*** .021 
SI Private Regard .033 .031 .033 .031 
SI Public Regard .049* .027 .049* .028 
SI Stigma .144** .053 .144*** .058 
RI Centrality .025 .021 .025 .020 
RI Private Regard -.060** .030 -.060 .029 
RI Public Regard .017 .026 .017 .026 
RI Stigma .161* .090 .161*** .101 
Gender .040 .230 .040 .236 
Network Diversity .004 .020 .004 .020 
Income .286*** .057 .286*** .058 
Education .242** .085 .242** .084 
Unemployment -.724** .265 -.724** .276 





































Ideology -.147 .103 -.147 .107 
Interaction Terms 


























significance. Consistent with H1 and H3, the coefficient estimates for SI centrality and public 
regard are statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent and ninety percent confidence levels, 
respectively. Furthermore, both SI centrality (β = .072, p = .001) and public regard (β = .047, p = 
.083) are positively related to political participation.  
Consistent with H5, the coefficient estimates for SI and RI stigmatization are statistically 
significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and positively related to the dependent 
variable. To test for intersection effects, an interaction term is included – again, operationalized 
by multiplying the SI and RI stigma scales. As Model 7b in Table 4.7 shows, there is no 
significant interactive stigmatization effect on political participation. That is, both SI stigma (β = 
.144, p = .000) and RI stigma (β = .161, p = .000) are associated with independent increases in 
political participation.  
Finally, consistent with H6, H7, H8 and political resource theory (Brady, et al. 1995), the 
coefficient estimates for income, education, age and unemployment are statistically significant. 
As Model 7b in Table 4.7 shows, income (β = .286, p = .000), education (β = .241, p = .005), and 
age (β = .017, p = .036) are positively associated with the dependent variable; while, 
unemployment (β = -.724, p = .006) is negatively associated with political participation. 
Table 4.8 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using the political alienation 
scale as the dependent variable. As the table shows, Model 8 is statistically significant at the 
ninety-nine percent confidence level and explains slightly more than seventeen percent of the 
variation in political alienation (r2 = .173). Diagnostics shows normality in model residuals (W = 
.998; z = .675, p = .249) and no problems with multicollinearity (VIF = 4.08) or 
heteroscedasticity (LM = .657, p = .719).  
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a model estimated with robust standard errors 
* p ≤ .1 
** p ≤ .05 




Variable Model 8 
 Coefficient S.E. 
SI Centrality -.013 .019 
SI Private Regard -.033 .027 
SI Public Regard -.041* .024 
SI Stigma -.185*** .047 
RI Centrality .005 .018 
RI Private Regard -.003 .027 
RI Public Regard -.013 .024 
RI Stigma -.194** .081 
Gender .335 .205 
Network Diversity -.066*** .018 
Income -.189*** .051 
Education -.143** .076 
Unemployment -.088 .237 























Ideology .102 .092 
Interaction Terms 


















The political alienation scale is operationalized so that low values on the scale represent 
less political alienation while high scores represent more political alienation in Model 8. 
Consistent with H3, the coefficient estimate for SI public regard is negatively related to the 
political alienation scale (β = -.041, p = .098). Intuitively, it appears the perception that society 
values one’s sexual identity is associated with less political alienation. Again, consistent with 
H5, the coefficient estimates for SI and RI stigma are statistically significant at the ninety-nine 
percent and ninety-five percent confidence levels, respectively. As Model 8 indicates, both SI 
stigma (β = -185, p = .000) and RI stigma (β = -.194, p = .016) are negatively related to political 
alienation when an interaction term – again, operationalized by multiplying the SI and RI stigma 
scales, is included in the regression model.  
As the model also shows, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is statistically 
significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and positively related to the dependent 
variable (β = .018, p = .000). As Model 8 shows, stigmatization exhibits an intersectional effect 
on political alienation. While SI and RI stigma exert independent negative effects on political 
alienation, stigmatization experienced across multiple social identities increases feelings of 
political powerlessness. 
Consistent with H4, the coefficient estimate for network diversity is statistically 
significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and negatively related to the dependent 
variable (β = -.066, p = .000). As predicted, heterogeneity in social networks appears to reduce 
political alienation. Similarly, the coefficient estimates for income (β = -.189, p = .000), 
education (β = -.143, p = .059), and age (β = -.018, p = .013) are statistically significant and in 
the expected negative direction, consistent with H6 and H7. Conversely, and contrary to H9, the 
coefficient estimate for Christian religious affiliation is statistically significant at the ninety-five 
180 
 
percent confidence level and positively related to the dependent variable (β = .582, p = .014). 
Survey participants who identify as Christian, then, experience more political alienation than 
participants who do not identify as religious. This is a curious finding considering religiosity is 
often considered a political resource which enables political activity (Brady, et al. 1995); 
however, as discussed in chapter 3, more than half (60.1 percent) of survey participants who 
identify as Christian report attending a church which does not affirm their sexual identity. It is 
possible this finding is reflective of the isolation, both social and political, brought about by 
attending a non-affirming congregation. 
Intersectional Identity Effects 
 After reviewing the regression results, the most significant intersectional finding is 
related to stigmatization. As previously discussed, the main effect of both SI and RI 
stigmatization is an increase in policy liberalism and political participation, and a decrease in 
political alienation. Where statistically significant, the interactive effects of stigmatization, 
however, appear to result in policy conservatism, political alienation, and depressed political 
participation. While the primary goal of this study is to explain identity-based attitudinal and 
behavioral variation in LGBTQ politics, the intersectional approach undertaken here also 
demands an investigation of the effect of identity intersection, focusing on how much attitudinal 
and behavioral variation can be contributed to the phenomenon. In the final steps of this analysis, 
I conduct a series of hierarchical OLS regression estimations – which input ‘blocks’ of 
independent variables and measure the change in residual r2 values to determine how much 
explanatory value the variables in each block contribute to the overall model (Becker and 
Scheufele 2011). To analyze the effect of sexual and racial identity intersection, four interaction 
terms are included as a ‘block’ in the model estimations. The interaction terms are 
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operationalized by multiplying the RI and SI centrality, private regard, and public regard scales 
(Frederich 1982; Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). 
 Model 9 and Model 10 in Table 4.9 show the results of hierarchical OLS regression 
estimation using the role of government and private rights scales, respectively, as dependent 
variables. As the table shows, independent variables are entered into the model in blocks, 
beginning with the partisanship and ideology control variables. The incremental r2 values show 
the amount of variation in the dependent variable explained by the inclusion of each block of 
variables (Becker and Scheufele 2011). As Table 4.9 shows, the largest incremental r2 value in 
Model 9 appears after the inclusion of the first variable block, or the control variables (21.3 %, p 
= .000); while the largest incremental r2 value in Model 10 appears after the inclusion of block 
three – the sexual identity variables (7.8%, p = .000). As a whole, the sexual and racial identity 
variables account for more variation in the private rights scale than other variable blocks in the 
model.   
Only one interaction term achieves statistical significance in the final standardized log 
odds for Model 9 in Table 4.9. In this case, consistent with previous OLS models, the coefficient 
estimate for the intersectional stigmatization variable is statistically significant at the ninety-nine 
percent confidence level and positively related to the dependent variable (β = .009, p = .000). 
Also, as Model 9 in Table 4.9 shows, while small, the incremental r2 value for block five (.012, p 
= .001) – the interaction terms – is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence 
level, meaning the block explains a significant portion of the variation in the role of government 
scale beyond the other four blocks of variables. Similarly, only one interaction term achieves 
statistical significance in the final standardized log odds for Model 10 in Table 4.9. In this case, 
the coefficient estimate for the public regard interaction term is statistically significant at the 
182 
 












































* p ≤ .1; ** p ≤ .05; *** p ≤ .01 
 
 Model 9 
DV = Role of Government 
Model 10 
DV = Private Rights 
 Upon-Entry 
Standardized 
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RI Private Regard 

























Block 5: Intersection 
SI x RI Centrality 
SI x RI Private Regard 
SI x RI Public Regard 



































ninety-five percent confidence level and negatively related to the private rights scale (β = -.004, 
p = .044). However, the relatively small and statistically insignificant incremental r2 value for 
block five (.005, p = .192) indicates the inclusion of interaction terms in this model does not 
significantly improve the model fit.  
 Model 11 and Model 12 in Table 4.10 show the results of hierarchical OLS regression 
estimation using the egalitarianism scale and gun control, respectively, as dependent variables. 
Again, the independent variables are entered in blocks beginning with the partisan and 
ideological control variables. As Table 4.10 shows, the largest incremental r2 value appears after 
the inclusion of the first variable block, or control variables, in both Model 11 (r2 = 11.2%, p = 
.000) and Model 12 (r2 = 17%, p = .000). Similarly, the contextual variable block accounts for 
more variation in the egalitarianism scale (r2 = 5.5%, p = .000) and attitudes toward gun control 
(r2 = 8%, p = .000) than the identity or intersectional blocks.  
Again, only one interaction term achieves statistical significance in both models. As 
Model 11 in Table 4.10 shows, consistent with previous research, stigmatization exhibits both 
individual main effects and interaction effects. In this case, the final standardized log odds for SI 
and RI stigmatization are statistically significant and positively related to the egalitarianism 
scale, i.e., policy conservatism (β = .069, p = .066 and β = .162, p = .011, respectively). 
The stigmatization interaction term in Model 11 is also statistically significant at the 
ninety-five percent confidence level and negatively related to the dependent variable (β = -.008, 
p = .003). This relationship is the converse of that observed between stigmatization and the other 
attitudinal dependent variables. That is, the independent or main effect of SI and RI 
stigmatization is a reduction in policy liberalism related to economic equality; while, the 
intersectional effect of stigmatization is an increase policy liberalism.  
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* p ≤ .1; ** p ≤ .05; *** p ≤ .01 
 
 Model 11 
DV = Egalitarianism 
Model 12 
DV = Gun Control 
 Upon-Entry 
Standardized 
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SI Centrality 
SI Private Regard 
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The relationship between stigmatization and attitudes toward gun control shown in Model 
12 in Table 4.10 is consistent with previous findings. That is, the final standardized log odds of 
both the SI stigma scale and the stigmatization interaction term are statistically significant; and 
express converse relationships with the dependent variable. While SI stigma is positively related 
to policy liberalism (β = -.056, p = .001), the stigmatization interaction term is positively related 
to policy conservatism (β = .008, p = .014). Although the final log odds of the RI stigma scale do 
not achieve statistical significance, the negative direction of the relationship with the dependent 
variable is consistent with previous findings.  
Concerning the effect of the interaction terms on model fit, as Table 4.10 shows, the 
incremental r2 values for block five – the interaction terms – are statistically significant at the 
ninety-five percent confidence level for both Model 11 (r2 = .8%, p = .014) and Model 12 (r2 = 
1%, p = .005). That is, the inclusion of the interaction terms accounts for a statistically 
significant portion of the variation in both the egalitarianism scale and attitudes toward gun 
control.  
Model 13 and Model 14 in Table 4.11 show the results of hierarchical regression 
estimation using attitudes toward immigration and abortion, respectively, as the dependent 
variables. The control blocks show the highest incremental r2 values in both models. Both 
dependent variables, however, measure attitudes toward identity-based policy questions, i.e., 
immigration is associated with ethnicity while abortion is associated with gender. Not 
surprisingly, then, as Table 4.11 shows, the identity and contextual variable blocks account for 
















































* p ≤ .1; ** p ≤ .05; *** p ≤ .01 
 
 Model 13 
DV = Immigration 
Model 14 
DV = Abortion 
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Standardized 
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Two interaction terms achieve statistical significance in the final standardized log odds of 
Model 13 in Table 4.11. Again, stigmatization exhibits both an individual main effect and an 
interaction effect on attitudes toward immigration. In this case, the coefficient estimate for SI 
stigmatization is statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level and 
negatively associated with the dependent variable (β = -.045, p = .010). Furthermore, the 
coefficient estimate for the SI and RI stigma interaction term is statistically significant and 
positively related to the dependent variable (β = .004, p = .003). While the coefficient estimate 
for RI stigma does not achieve statistical significance, the direction of the relationship specified 
in the final standardized log odds of Model 13 is consistent with previous findings. Again, the 
main effect of stigmatization is an increase in policy liberalism, while the interaction effect of 
stigmatization is an increase in policy conservatism in attitudes toward immigration. 
Model 13 in Table 4.11 also shows that public regard exhibits both main effects and an 
interaction effect on attitudes toward immigration. In this case, the coefficient estimate for the SI 
and RI public regard interaction term is statistically significant and negatively related to the 
dependent variable (β = -.003, p = .013). The coefficient estimates for SI public regard (β = .009, 
p = .004) and RI public regard (β = .096, p = .001) are also statistically significant, but positively 
related to the dependent variable. This is consistent with previous findings, in that public regard 
is positively related to policy conservatism; however, the relationship between the interaction 
term and the dependent variable specified in the final standardized log odds of Model 13 
suggests, in this case, that a positive evaluation of societal acceptance of one’s sexual and racial 
identities results is policy liberalism in attitudes toward immigration.  
While Model 14 in Table 4.11 again shows both main effects and interaction effects of 
stigmatization on attitudes toward abortion, the direction of the relationship specified in the final 
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standardized log odds is the converse of that observed previously. That is, the coefficient 
estimates for both SI (β = .035, p = .053) and RI stigma (β = .069, p = .024) are statistically 
significant and positively related to the dependent variable; while, the SI and RI interaction term 
is negatively related to the dependent variable (β = -.004, = .005). In this case, the main effect of 
SI and RI stigmatization is an increase in policy conservatism while the interaction effect is an 
increase in policy liberalism in attitudes toward abortion. 
 As Table 4.11 shows, the incremental r2 value for block five – the interaction terms – 
achieves statistical significance in both Model 13 (r2 = 1%, p = .005) and Model 14 (r2 = .8%, p 
= .028). The inclusion of the interaction terms accounts for a statistically significant portion of 
the variation in attitudes toward both immigration and abortion and significantly improves the 
model fit for both models in Table 4.11.  
 Model 15 and Model 16 in Table 4.12 show the results of hierarchical regression 
estimation using the political participation and political alienation scales, respectively, as 
dependent variables. In neither model does the control block show the highest incremental r2 
value. Instead, the highest incremental r2 values in Model 15 appear after the inclusion of block 
two (r2 = 9.4%, p = .000) – the context variables – and block four (r2 = 9.4%, p = .000) – the 
sexual identity variables. While, in Model 16, the highest incremental r2 values appear after the 
inclusion of the context variable block (r2 = 7%, p = .000) and the racial identity variable block 
(r2 = 4.2%, p = .000).  
 As the final standardized log odds of Model 15 in Table 4.12 show, no interaction term 
achieves statistical significance in relation to political participation. However, as the final 
standardized log odds of Model 16 show, two interaction terms achieve statistical significance in  
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relation to political alienation. First, as Model 16 shows, consistent with previous findings, 
stigmatization exhibits both individual main effects and an interaction effect. Specifically, the 
coefficient estimates for SI (β = -.194, p = .000) and RI (β = -.207, p = .011) are statistically 
significant and negatively related to political alienation. While the SI and RI interaction term is 
statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level, it is positively related to the 
dependent variable (β = .019, p = .000). Second, also consistent with previous findings, public 
regard exhibits both individual main effects and an interaction effect. That is, the coefficient 
estimates for SI (β = .196, p = .037) and RI (β = .177, p = .018) public regard are statistically 
significant and positively related to political alienation. Conversely, the SI and RI public regard 
interaction is statistically significant, however, the coefficient estimate shows a negative 
relationship with the dependent variable (β = -.011, p = .009). In this case, the main effect of 
stigmatization appears to be a decrease in political alienation, while the interaction of SI and RI 
stigma appears to result in an increase in alienation. Conversely, the main effect of public regard 
appears to be an increase in political alienation, while the interaction of SI and RI stigma appears 
to result in a decrease in alienation.  
As Table 4.12 shows, the incremental r2 value associated with the intersectional block of 
variables only achieves statistical significance in Model 16 (r2 = 2.4%, p = .000). In this case, the 
inclusion of the interaction terms significantly improves the fit of Model 16 – describing the  
predictors of political alienation. On the other hand, as the incremental r2 value of the 
intersectional block of variables in Model 15 does not achieve statistical significance, the 







 The purpose of the preceding analysis is to determine whether the inclusion of identity 
interaction terms more accurately describes the relationship between the identity measures and 
the attitudinal and behavior dependent variables by significantly improving model fit. In all but 
two models, the inclusion of interaction terms significantly improves model fit, as shown by the 
statistical significance of the incremental r2 value associated with block five in Tables 4.9, 4.10, 
4.11, and 4.12. 
It should be noted, however, that the inclusion of the interaction terms improved model fit, on 
average, by less than one percentage point. Even though the intersectional variables only account 
for a small percentage of attitudinal and behavioral variation, the variation is significant and, 
most importantly, provides nuance to the nature of the relationships predicted in chapter 2.  
 For example, stigmatization shows both a main effect and interaction effect with most of 
the dependent variables – although the evidence here is mixed. In most cases, consistent with the 
extant literature, the main effect of stigmatization is an increase in policy liberalism; while, in 
half of the hierarchical OLS regression models the interaction between SI and RI stigmatization 
results in policy conservatism – as predicted by H5 in chapter 2. However, in the other half of 
cases where the SI and RI stigmatization interaction term is statistically significant, the direction 
of the relationship is the opposite. That is, intersectional stigmatization is associated with policy 
liberalism. The relationship between policy conservatism and intersectional stigmatization, 
therefore, may best be described as policy-specific (see Holbrook, et al. 2016).  
The intersectional effects of stigmatization also extend to political participation – 
specifically, to alienation from the political system. As Model 16 in Table 4.12 shows, the main 
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effects of both SI and RI stigma are a decrease in political alienation; while the intersectional 
effect is an increase. As the extant literature suggests, identity-based stigma may provide 
increased motivation to participate in political activity (Swank and Fahs 2013b; Lien 1994; 
Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981); however, stigmatization experienced 
simultaneously, across multiple socially-constructed identities, although not significantly 
reducing political participation, does significantly increase the likelihood that one feels alienated 
from the political system.   
 Stigmatization is not the only concept which exhibits both main and interaction effects. In 
three hierarchical OLS regression models, public regard shows positive main effects and 
negative interaction effects. That is, while SI and RI public regard are independently associated 
with policy conservatism, intersectional public regard is associated with policy liberalism. 
Specifically, as Model 10 in Table 4.9 and Model 13 in Table 4.11 show, the main effects of both 
SI and RI public regard are policy conservatism related to private rights and immigration, 
respectively. However, a positive evaluation of societal acceptance of one’s sexual and racial 
identity is likely to result in policy liberalism. Similarly, political alienation is reduced among 
participants who report positive public regard across multiple social identities. 
Also, consistent with H1-9, the inclusion of SI/RI identity measures and contextual 
indicators significantly improve the fit statistics of every model. However, identity measures 
account for more variation in political attitudes when the identity is implicated in the policy 
outcome. That is, as Model 10 in Table 4.9 shows, sexual identity measures explain a larger 
proportion of the variation in the private rights scale – which contrasts the civil rights of LGBTQ 
people with the private rights of business owners – than any other attitudinal dependent variable. 
Similarly, in Model 12, contextual variables, including socio-economic indicators account for 
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more variation in attitudes toward economic equality; while, racial identity measures account for 
a significant portion of the variation in attitudes toward immigration, as shown in Model 13.  
In the previous sections I describe the distributions of the dependent variables, OLS 
regression estimation predicting political attitudes and behaviors, and hierarchical OLS 
regression estimation determining the effectiveness of interaction terms in nuancing the 
relationship between social identity and political outcomes. In the next chapter, I synthesize the 
findings from chapter 3 and chapter 4 into a discussion of LGBTQ politics and quantitative 
intersectional research. I conclude this study with a discussion of the limitations of the current 































CHAPTER 5: THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL IDENTITY, LOOKING FORWARD 
 
 In the previous chapters I describe the results of statistical analyses using data obtained 
from a survey of 1216 LGBT-identified adults in the United States. While cognizant of the 
limitations of the current work, in this concluding chapter, I continue the discussion of the 
politics of sexual identity and offer direction for future LGBTQ political research. I begin by 
revisiting the hypotheses proposed in chapter 2 – offering supportive or contradictory evidence 
for each. Next, I discuss important study findings not directly implicated in the original 
hypotheses, yet which indicate the necessity of future research. Before concluding, I recognize 




 Quantitative identity research in the field of American politics is often employed to 
examine “political choices” (e.g., vote choice or policy preferences) (Berelson, et al. 1954:54). 
Since the outset of such research, it has been thought that political variation within society 
reflects social divisions – or cleavages – such as racial or ethnic, class, gender, religious, or 
sexual identities. Much of the political survey research from the past fifty years rely upon 
theories of identity politics which equate differences in categorical identity with homogeneous 
political attitudes and behavior (Shields 2008). Contrary to early research, however, “common” 
group “characteristics” do not inevitably result in “internal cohesiveness” (Berelson, et al. 
1954:63). For a number of reasons – most relevant to this study the intersectional notions of 
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identity cross-pressures and socio-historical context (Bedolla 2007) – even within identity 
categories perceived to be politically cohesive, attitudinal and behavioral variation exists.  
Sexual and Racial Identity 
 As H1, H2, and H3 indicate, I hypothesize three factors which contribute to attitudinal 
and behavioral variation in sexual minority politics are identity centrality, public and private 
regard. Specifically, H1 suggests that high identity centrality – or the extent to which an 
individual “defines” one’s self “with regard” to a particular identity (Sellers, et al. 1998:25) – is 
positively related to political participation and policy liberalism and negatively related to 
political alienation. 
Identity Centrality 
H1 is partially confirmed in that, when statistically significant, sexual identity centrality 
is positively associated with policy liberalism and political participation. Consistent with 
previous research, e.g., Egan (2012) and Lewis, et al. (2011), the data in chapter 3 show that gays 
and lesbians exhibit higher levels of sexual identity centrality than bisexuals. Along with the 
regression data from chapter 4, this suggests that gays and lesbians – with higher identity 
centrality – are more likely to translate sexual identity into political activity and policy liberalism 
than bisexuals.  
As discussed in chapter 3, one possible motivator of sexual identity centrality is 
experience with discrimination. Indeed, other studies find that sexual and racial stigma result in 
more salient (socially and politically) sexual and racial identities (Swank and Fahs 2013b; Lien 
1994; Miller, et al. 1981). That bisexuals in this sample report, on average, less experience with 
sexual stigma supports these assertions. The consequences for sexual minority political 
mobilization and representation are clear. Bisexuals – who do not fit the dominant paradigm of 
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sexuality among either hetero- or homosexual communities – are likely to be underrepresented 
and disproportionately neglected in policy formulation. 
 H1 also concerns racial identity centrality. Unlike sexual identity centrality, racial 
identity centrality only achieves statistical significance in one model (see Table 4.5); and, in this 
instance, the nature of the relationship is contrary to that predicted in H1. Not surprisingly, racial 
identity centrality is highest among racial minority survey participants. Like sexual identity, one 
motivator is possibly racial stigmatization. Again, the correlational data from chapter 3 are 
consistent with this theory. That is, experience with stigmatization likely drives identity salience 
(Lien 1994; Miller, et al. 1981) which, in turn, affects political outcomes.  
The associational data from chapter 3, however, show that racial identity is experienced 
differently depending upon the socially-constructed category under consideration, whether race-, 
gender-, or sexuality-based (see Moradi, et al. 2010). Future research, then, should disentangle 
the scale measure used here and examine racial identity data independently. That is, while racial 
identity centrality appears to be an insignificant determinant of political attitudes and behavior, it 
is likely that the finding is only reflective of the majority-white sample. Indeed, alternate 
regression estimations using individual racial identity centrality measures, e.g., White RI 
centrality, Black RI centrality, and Latino/a RI centrality, reveal White identity centrality and 
private regard to be consistent predictors of policy conservatism. This relationship is also 
reflected in Table 4.5 – the one model in which RI centrality achieves statistical significance and 
is positively associated with conservative attitudes toward immigration. That is, in instances 
where White identity is said to be challenged, racial identity centrality is a significant predictor 




Identity Private Regard 
H2, which suggests sexual and racial identity private regard will be positively associated 
with policy liberalism and political participation and negatively associated with political 
alienation, is also partially confirmed. While there is no relationship between sexual identity 
private regard and political behavior, sexual identity private regard is positively associated with 
policy liberalism in all but one case (i.e., attitudes toward gun control). Similarly, there appears 
to be no significant relationship between racial identity private regard and political participation.  
As predicted, in one model, racial identity private regard is significantly associated with 
policy liberalism (see Table 4.2). However, in three models (see Table 4.3, Table 4.4, and Table 
4.6), racial identity private regard is significantly associated with policy conservatism. These 
contrary findings are not surprising as previous studies have elucidated the asymmetrical effects 
of identity on policy-specific attitudes (Holbrook, et al. 2016). However, after controlling for the 
interactive effects of private regard, all but one of the significant contradictory relationships 
either reverse or disappear. That is, both SI and RI private regard perform as expected, 
significantly predicting policy liberalism (see Model 10, Table 4.9).  
 Whereas most research recognizes the importance of group association for group 
mobilization (Tarrow 1998; Cole 2008; Abdelal, et al. 2009; Lewis, et al. 2011; Egan 2012), the 
findings here indicate that internal cognitive and affective processes are just as important to the 
formation of political attitudes and behaviors. While not a significant predictor of political 
behavior, positive internal evaluations of one’s sexual and racial identity are associated with 
liberal policy positions in at least one case, when the interactive effects of identity are taken into 
consideration. Specifically, sexual and racial identity private regard are significantly associated 
with the liberal policy position which favors the rights of LGBT people in public accommodation 
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disputes. Beyond group association (i.e., identifying with a social group), positive internal 
identity evaluations appear to motivate more robust identity-based claims to political rights. 
Identity Public Regard 
 Finally, H3, which suggests sexual and racial identity public regard will be positively 
associated with policy liberalism and political participation and negatively associated with 
political alienation, is also partially confirmed. Sexual identity public regard is positively 
associated with political participation and negatively associated with political alienation. 
Contrary to H3, however, when statistically significant, the variable is positively associated with 
policy conservatism. Specifically, perceptions of societal acceptance of one’s sexual identity are 
associated with conservative attitudes toward the role of government, private rights, 
egalitarianism, gun control, and immigration. This finding is intriguing, in that it suggests sexual 
minorities who believe society accepts, or at least positively evaluates, their sexual identity are 
more likely to participate in politics and hold politically conservative attitudes, even in instances 
when such a position would jeopardize sexual minority civil rights claims (see Table 4.2) – a 
finding to which I will return later.  
The associational data from chapter 3 show that White sexual minorities exhibit higher 
scores on the racial identity public regard scale than any other racial identity. Contrary to 
Hurtado and Stewart (1997:229), it appears that White sexual minorities are well aware of their 
racial privilege, i.e., the understanding that whiteness is associated with societal acceptance. It 
might be expected, then, that the recognition of personal privilege is associated with an 
attitudinal orientation disfavoring societal inequality, e.g., preferring those who do not share the 
identity characteristic in question be treated equally. Interestingly, racial identity public regard, 
alone, does not translate to policy liberalism. Indeed, only after controlling for the interactive 
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effects of public regard does the relationship between public regard and political attitudes 
achieve statistical significance; and then, the results indicate significant, and different, main and 
interaction effects (see Model 13, Table 4.11 and Model 16, Table 4.12). While the main effects 
of RI public regard are policy conservatism and political alienation, when interacted, the 
converse relationship is observed. That is, when multiple social identities are perceived as 
privileged, i.e., accepted by society, sexual minorities are more likely to express policy 
liberalism and decreased political alienation.  
Because this finding extends across racial and sexual identity public regard, it may be 
that the concept of public regard, alone, measures a sense of race- or sexuality-based 
competition. That is, the privileges associated with any racial or sexual identity are perhaps 
perceived as zero-sum – they can only be exercised by one category of identity. The main effect 
of the perception of race- and sexuality-based social acceptance, then, is to prefer a policy which 
disallows race (or ethnic) or sexual privilege to be distributed equally among society.  
In this case, the data specifically denotes this relationship in attitudes toward immigration 
policy and private rights. Reflecting the long-standing racial, sexual, and gender divisions within 
the LGBT community, the data indicate that racial and sexual privilege – when considered 
independently – cannot be conveyed to recent immigrants or those making ‘additional’ sexual- or 
gender-based civil rights claims, e.g., transgender rights claims. Only when one’s identity-based 
privilege is recognized as compounded across various categories of identity does this competitive 
model of civil rights give way to a cooperative model, which is associated with the view that 
identity-based civil equality is not a zero-sum venture, and that those who do not share one’s 




Identity Centrality, Public and Private Regard: A Summary of Findings 
The findings presented here progress the study of sexual minority politics beyond the 
existing literature by quantitatively demonstrating that sexual minority politics are motivated by 
more than simple group identification or selection into a category (Egan 2012; Lewis, et al. 
2011). The data show that sexual minorities use cognitive and affective evaluations of society as 
well as relational identity comparisons in their internal political calculus. In addition, the data 
show that these internal and relational comparisons extend to the various identity categories 
which each individual occupies. Finally, the data suggest that liberal (i.e., economically 
redistributive, pro-civil rights, or anti-status quo) political claims, as well as participation in and 
alienation from the American political system, occur as sexual minorities evaluate their own 
sexual and racial identities in relation to heteronormative, racist, and androcentric power 
structures in society. Furthermore, these internal and external comparisons exhibit separate and 
significantly different main and interactive effects.   
Specifically, it appears that sexual minorities who perceive society as more accepting of 
non-heterosexualities participate more in politics, hold more conservative political attitudes, and 
experience less political alienation. While this may appear to be a benign social process, it takes 
on a more insidious caste in the context of political participation, representation, and democratic 
governance. That is, individual perceptions of sexual acceptance also drive participation in the 
political process. Sexual minorities who view society as less accepting – likely in conjunction 
with experiences of discrimination – participate less in politics and feel more politically 
alienated. Furthermore, the data here provides quantitative evidence of the pervasiveness of 
heterosexist power structures in society. Namely, heterosexim is so ubiquitous that even 
strongly-identified sexual minorities form notions about their own civil rights vis-à-vis dominant 
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heterosexist acceptance of their sexuality. That is, sexual minorities are more likely to support 
anti-status quo policy positions when it is clear society will accept them (i.e., their identity). It is 
likely the fear of heterosexist, racist, or androcentric stigmatization, i.e., a fear of personal or 
political reprisal, informs this relationship. Indeed, as Appendix C shows, SI public regard 
exhibits a moderate negative correlation with SI stigmatization. 
The data also suggest these same internal and relational comparisons occur regarding 
racial identity. Again, beyond phenotypical or even psychological association, affective internal 
and external evaluations of personal and societal acceptance of one’s racial identity drive 
political outcomes – even after controlling for how strongly one defines oneself in relation to that 
racial identity. This suggests the belief among participants that race and sexuality-based political 
progress is zero-sum, i.e., cannot be distributed equally across all sexual or racial categories. 
This political selfishness has been described by Fassinger and Arseneau (2007) and others 
among LGBT interest group and social movement organization priorities. Namely, Fassinger and 
Arseneau (2007) and Fassinger and Gallor (2006) show that when the inclusion of transgender 
civil rights claims jeopardize gay and lesbian civil rights claims, gay and lesbian interest groups 
are more likely to abandon trans-inclusive policy. The data here, however, present the first 
indication that a similar evaluation occurs at the individual-level. That is, psychological identity 
evaluations appear to drive policy preferences which disfavor the equal distribution of racial (or 
ethnic) or sexual privilege across all members of society.  
This, however, appears to be only the main effect of racial and sexual identity as 
interactive effects appear to mitigate and, in some cases, reverse the relationship with political 
attitudes and behavior. When one recognizes societal acceptance (i.e., positive public regard) – 
or privilege – across multiple social identities, one is more likely to support liberal and 
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redistributive policy preferences. For example, while the main effect of both SI and RI public 
regard are policy conservatism toward immigration and private rights, the interactive effect is 
policy liberalism, favoring the conveyance of identity-based privilege to immigrants and ‘other’ 
sexual and gender identities, respectively. 
The implications for sexual minority politics are tremendous. For example, using sexual 
and racial distinctiveness as the basis for civil rights claims may, in fact, sharpen the divisions 
both within the LGBT movement and between the LGBT movement and society at-large. That 
is, highlighting categorical distinctiveness may prove counterproductive, if the goal is inspiring 
social empathy. The perception of identity-based rights claims as zero-sum may preclude some 
members of society from supporting LGBT rights based solely on identity distinctiveness. Such 
an identity-based struggle is currently transpiring between sexual minorities and religious 
conservatives in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision legalizing same-sex marriage in 
the United states (Obergefell v. Hodges 2015). Both sides view the other’s identity-based claims 
to civil rights as an erosion of their own identity-based claims, with religious conservatives often 
criticizing LGBT-inclusive public accommodation laws as capitulation to ‘special rights’ (see 
Tadlock, Gordon, and Popp 2007). While not a panacea, the prescription offered here, i.e., 
making civil rights claims which highlight the privileged status of dominant (heterosexual) 
identity categories vis-à-vis sexual minorities, have proven effective in provoking pro-sexual 
minority political change from federal and state judiciaries. Most notably, in their landmark 
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) decision, the Supreme Court of the United States used language 
from the petitioner’s (same-sex couples’) brief recognizing the 1,138 federal benefits reserved 
only to heterosexual couples by same-sex marriage bans as justification for striking down those 
bans (see Cravens unpublished manuscript). 
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 Furthermore, sociologists and some political scientists have long criticized identity 
politics for the reasons highlighted above. Notably, Sidney Tarrow (1998:119) recognized that 
social movements constructed around a single rigid conceptualization of identity would produce 
“insular, sectarian, and divisive movements incapable of expanding membership, broadening 
appeals, and negotiating with prospective allies” (See also Gitlin 1995; Gamson 1995; Stein and 
Plummer 1994). Indeed, the political priorities of the modern LGBT movement exemplify this 
characterization. As noted previously, Fassinger and Gallor (2006), for example, recognize that 
when transgender rights claims potentially weaken the political position of gay and lesbian rights 
organizations, a competitive model of civil rights advocacy ensues and trans rights claims are 
dismissed as unrealistic or unachievable. Furthermore, until recently, as the data here suggest, 
LGBT people are racially and politically isolated; and, this isolation may reinforce competitive 
(i.e., zero-sum) perceptions of civil rights claims. Highlighting the privileges associated with 
identity (not just focusing on identification with an identity), and educating the public and those 
within the LGBT movement about how privilege is compounded across the various categories of 
identity in society may prove a more unifying and politically successful message for the LGBT 
movement.  
Most important, it appears, is the work of problematizing heterosexism and racism – the 
dominant structures of power in American politics – which are shown here to construct the very 
arena in which sexual and racial equality claims are issued. It has been nearly forty years since 
the Black lesbian feminist scholar Audre Lorde questioned the under- and misrepresentation of 
women of color and lesbians in feminist scholarship by asking a room of mostly white, 
heterosexual, cisgender female scholars, “What does it mean when the tools of a racist patriarchy 
are used to examine the fruits of that same patriarchy?” (Lorde 1984:111-12). In response, she 
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noted “it means that only the most narrow perimeters of change are possible and allowable” 
(Lorde: 1984:112). Using androcentric and heteronormative conceptions of what femininity 
should be, and then judging female expression by that standard, she warned, is only beneficial to 
those who “still define the master’s house as their only source of support” (Lorde 1984:112). The 
data here suggests that, in fact, sexual minorities engage in politics as if heterosexism and racism 
are their only ‘sources of support.’ That is, the dominant perception is that civil rights are only 
distributed as part of a zero-sum game; and, even when civil rights claims are made, they are 
voiced only after society is perceived to be accepting. Specifically, the data show that the 
perception of societal acceptance of a sexual minority identity is associated with an anti-
egalitarian, status quo political orientation. The more accepted one feels by heterosexist society, 
the less likely one is to challenge the social hierarchy which perpetuates inequality against 
oneself and others who share the label ‘sexual minority.’  
Instead, Lorde charges us to dismantle our conceptions of scholarly and political 
engagement by adopting a new understanding of what femininity – and sexuality – should be. 
Not constructed from heterosexist, androcentric, or racist conceptions which only seek to limit 
the potential for radical reform, keeping those at the margins of society from achieving equality; 
but, from a perspective that will “enable us to bring about genuine change” (Lorde 1984:112). 
Because, she famously declares, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house” 
(Lorde 1984:111).  
Social Networks 
One telling indicator which provides evidence of the social context in which we make 
relational comparisons involves the diversity of the social networks we inhabit. In H4, I suggest 
that social network heterogeneity is positively related to political participation and policy 
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liberalism and negatively related to political alienation. However, there is little evidence to 
support this assertion. The social network diversity scale only achieves statistical significance in 
one model (see Table 4.8). In this case, as predicted, social network heterogeneity is negatively 
associated with political alienation.  
While I cannot replicate the findings of Muntz (2002a; 200b) or Quintelier, et al. (2012), 
the correlational and associational analyses in chapter 3 are revealing of a pattern of sexual, 
racial, and political isolation among sexual minorities in this sample. First, the data reveal that 
bisexuals in this sample are more likely to report sexually diverse social networks than gays and 
lesbians; while, White sexual minorities are less likely to report racially diverse social networks 
than Blacks, Latino/as, or Asians. Finally, Democrats in this sample are less likely to report 
politically diverse social networks than Republicans or Independents. While the additive index 
measured here showed little predictive value, future analysis should examine the individual 
components in more detail to untangle the effects of social isolationism on LGBTQ politics.  
Stigmatization 
 H5, which suggests sexual and racial stigma is positively associated with political 
alienation and negatively associated with political participation and policy liberalism, is 
confirmed, specifically, in relation to the intersectional effects of sexual and racial 
stigmatization. Contrary to previous research, the associational analyses in chapter 3 show that 
heterosexist and racist experiences are not evenly distributed across categories of sexual and 
racial identity (Moradi, et al. 2010). As expected, in this sample, Black, Latino/a, and Asian 
respondents are more likely to experience racism than Whites. Furthermore, gays and lesbians in 
the sample are more likely to experience heterosexist stigma than bisexuals. These two findings 
are important in conjunction with the correlational data from chapter 3. Namely, sexual and 
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racial stigma are positively correlated with sexual and racial identity centrality, respectively. 
While causality is not examined in this study, it may be that, as Lien (1994), Miller, et al. (1981), 
Swank and Fahs (2013b), and others observe, sexual and racial stigmatization likely result in a 
highly salient and politicized identity. This could account for the ‘selection’ effect observed by 
Egan (2012). In the psychological literature, the concept of resilience is suggested to account for 
the motivational effects of stigma (Singh 2013; Sevelius 2013). That is, rather than negative 
health or social consequences, certain innate psychological characteristics lead individuals, in 
some cases, to overcome stigmatizing experiences. In this case, as with Swank and Fahs 
(2013b:1390), contrary to the intent of “homophobic bullies,” the main effect of stigmatization 
appears to “generate resilient gays and lesbians who are more resolved in their political efforts.” 
Consistent with H5, however, experience with stigmatization across multiple axes of 
identity demonstrates a decidedly negative effect. Specifically, intersectional stigmatization is 
negatively associated with political participation and positively associated with political 
alienation and policy conservatism. Actual experience with heterosexist and racist power 
structures in society negatively affects participation and seems to preclude challenges to the 
policy status quo, again, even in situations which directly implicate racial and sexual minority 
civil rights.  
Socio-Economic and Cultural Factors 
 Another component of the social context which is predicted to influence political 
outcomes relates to socioeconomics. Socioeconomic indicators represent resources, 
asymmetrically available to groups in society, which consistently predict political behavior 
(Brady, et al. 1995). In H6, I propose that income is negatively associated with political 
alienation and positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism. The 
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evidence presented here confirms this hypothesis. In all but one case, i.e., egalitarianism (see 
Model 3a in Table 4.3), where statistically significant, income is positively related to policy 
liberalism. 
 Similarly, H7 and H8 predict that education and employment, respectively, will be 
negatively associated with political alienation and positively associated with political 
participation and policy liberalism. Again, the hypotheses are confirmed. Economic resources 
appear to act as political resources by providing tangible benefits for participation and, also 
inform policy positions. The demographic data presented in chapter 3, however, emphasize the 
asymmetrical distribution of these resources among the sample. As indicated, the results are 
consistent with contemporary research (Sears and Badgett 2012; Movement Advancement 
Project, et al. 2013) which highlights the fallacy of the wealthy, effete, White, gay male often 
perpetuated in popular media and among LGBTQ political elites. Sexual minorities in the sample 
experience disproportionately higher levels of unemployment and poverty, for example, than 
heterosexuals. These disparities are further compounded among racial and ethnic minorities. 
Combined with associational data relating to social networks, it may be that sexual minorities are 
increasingly divided along class lines as well. As discussed in chapter 3, there are practical 
political implications for these divisions and the failure to fully address the issue of poverty 
among sexual minorities. A focus on same-sex marriage rights and military service, for example, 
may come at a high social cost as poverty, unemployment, undereducation, and personal security 
appear to be more common experiences and concerns among sexual minorities than political 
elites realize (Strolovich 2012). 
 The construction of classes in society, and our relationship to them, inform our political 
decisions because they frame the available choices (Bedolla 2007). Not only this, but, as Collins 
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(2000) suggests, and as the data here show, race, gender and sexuality intersect and interact with 
social class producing new experiences, (dis)advantages, and political choices. As with the 
general population, income, education and employment are consistently strong predictors of 
sexual minority political attitudes and behavior (Lewis, et al. 2011). This study nuances our 
understanding of socio-economics by further examining social class at the intersection of sexual 
and racial identities. LGBTQ people are more likely to live in poverty than are heterosexuals. 
Within the LGBTQ community, women and people of color are more likely to be undereducated 
and unemployed (Sears and Badgett 2012; MAP, et al. 2013). The data here support these 
findings and suggest greater attention be paid to the role of economics in LGBTQ politics.  
 Finally, one understudied aspect of cultural distinction among sexual minorities concerns 
religion. Like economic resources, religiosity is theorized to act as a psychological and 
behavioral resource which can be translated into secular political action (Brady, et al. 1995). In 
H9, I propose that religiosity is positively associated with political participation and negatively 
associated with political alienation and policy liberalism. Secondarily, I hypothesize that 
Christian religiosity, specifically, is likely to be associated with policy conservatism more than 
other religious affiliations. H9 is partially confirmed. Sexual minorities who identify as Christian 
hold more conservative political attitudes than non-religious sexual minorities. Interestingly, 
sexual minorities who identify as Christian also experience more political alienation than non-
religious sexual minorities. Instead of acting as a political resource which motivates participation 
in the political process, it appears that Christian religiosity – perhaps because of its devalued 
status within sexual minority communities – inspires feelings of alienation from politics.  
Another possible source of attitudinal and behavioral variation among religious sexual 
minorities involves the discursive treatment of sexuality among religious denominations. Swank 
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and Fahs (2013a), for example, hypothesize – although do not test – a relationship between 
membership in a religious congregation which affirms one’s sexual identity and political 
participation. As the data here suggest, religious affiliation among sexual minorities is more 
common than popular media and even scientific literature portray. Indeed, more than half of the 
sample identify with some religious tradition. Future political research should fully interrogate 
tensions between religious doctrine and sexual identity.  
 
For Further Exploration: Gender 
 
At the outset of this study I recognize the distinction between sexual orientation and 
gender identity. The implications of this distinction are, obviously, more than semantic. For 
decades, sexuality and gender research have conflated the two terms – often to psychologically 
disastrous effect among gender variant, queer, and transgender people (Fassinger and Arseneau 
2007). Likewise, the conflation of gender and sexuality is expressed in the lack of transgender 
representation among sexual minority political elites and policy positions. Again, Fassinger and 
Arseneau (2007), Fassinger and Gallor (2006) and others suggest that in political situations when 
trans-inclusive policies conflict with sexual minority policy positions, the trans-inclusive policies 
are often abandoned.  
Due to funding limitations, this study is not able to fully interrogate gender identity in the 
manner prescribed for sexual and racial identity. While the categorical measure of gender in the 
survey instrument allows for non-binary or transgender expression, the statistical analyses rely 
on dichotomous indicators of cisgender. As discussed in chapter 1, this methodology is not 
inconsistent with intersectional theory (McCall 2005), however I do recognize the limitations it 
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imposes on the study findings. Still, the associational data presented in chapter 3 and the 
regression data in chapter 4 present compelling evidence for the effects of gender identity on 
sexual minority politics. 
First, as discussed in chapter 3, transgender and gender queer survey participants are 
more likely than cisgender participants to believe society devalues their sexual identity. 
Similarly, tans and gender queer participants are more likely to report experiences with sexual 
stigma than cisgender participants. The question of stigmatization still looms over transgender 
studies. Sevelius (2013), for example, recognizes the resilience of transgender individuals in the 
face of discriminatory experiences. Does intersectional (i.e., gender and sexual) discrimination 
exhibit the same effects as sexual and racial intersectional stigma? If so, we would expect 
transgender and gender queer people to participate less in politics, feel more politically alienated, 
and, if the current data hold, less likely to support transgender-inclusive civil rights policies.  
Second, an examination of gender at the intersection of race demonstrates the 
subordination of racial minority cisgender female identities. That is, in this sample, cisgender 
males regard their racial identity as a more central part of their definition of self, more positively 
view their racial identity, and believe society values their racial identity more than cisgender 
females. Indeed, across two of the three categories of racial minority identity examined in this 
study, cisgender females are more likely to believe society devalues their racial identity than 
cisgender males. As discussed in chapter 3, this, perhaps, lends some support to one aspect of the 
‘subordinate male target hypothesis’ (Veenstra 2013); not that the theory itself is credible, but 
the assertion that cisgender men view themselves as the paradigm of their race may, in fact, be 
supported. This explanation is consistent with previous research (Sellers, et al. 1998; Phinney 
1989), and confirms a long-standing tenant of intersectionality, namely, that women – especially 
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racial and ethnicity minority women – experience multiplicative disadvantage from a society 
which devalues both their gender and racial identities (Crenshaw 1991; Baca-Zinn and Dill 
1996).  
Finally, after controlling for the interactive effects of sexual and racial identity in 
multiple regression analyses, while there appears to be no relationship between participation or 
political alienation and cisgender, cisgender women are more likely to exhibit policy liberalism 
than cisgender men (see Model 9, Table 4.9, Model 11, Table 4.10, and Model 14, Table 4.11). If 
the current data hold, this is may be due to gender-based stigmatization which – when considered 
independently – works to motivate anti-status quo policy positions.  
 
For Further Exploration: Geography 
 
 After controlling for the interactive effects of identity, urbanity – or urban residency – is 
positively associated with policy liberalism and negatively associated with political alienation. 
Specifically, urban sexual minorities hold more liberal attitudes toward gun control and abortion 
(see Model 12, Table 4.10 and Model 14, Table 4.11, respectively) than rural sexual minorities; 
while, rural sexual minorities experience more political alienation (see Model 16, Table 4.12) 
than urban residents. This dichotomous characterization of LGBTQ politics is a common refrain 
in the extant literature (Bailey 1999). The historical evolution of the LGBTQ rights movement 
has long been linked to post-WWII urbanization (D’Emilio 1983). The diversity inherent in large 
population centers allows for the recognition of a shared social identity. Gay bars, nightclubs, 
and other entertainment venues, for example, have long been recognized as a source of collective 
identity and political mobilization (Sherrill 1993). The combination of moral permissiveness, 
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individual anonymity, and political collectivism contributes to the perception of cities as bastions 
of gay identity and legal protection (Wald, et al. 1996). 
 LGBTQ identities do exist and thrive in rural areas, however, often through the 
cultivation of local resources and reliance on family – not sexuality – as the primary form of 
collective identity (Gray 2009). While it is expected that rural queer people will abandon their 
‘backward’ homelands in favor of urban acceptance, in reality, most rural queer people have 
neither the resources nor the desire to sever those connections – especially after ‘coming out’ 
(Weston 1995). Furthermore, advances in technology and communication, not the least of which 
involves social media and the internet, allow for the cultivation of a queer identity without the 
traditional ‘face-to-face’ interaction associated with gay bars in the late 20th Century (Gray 
2009). In short, the list of divisions which threaten the LGBTQ movement also includes a 
rural/urban divide – with rural being “the devalued term” (Halberstam 2005:36; Quoted in Gray 
2009:10). This divide, though understudied, is perhaps one of the most consequential for the 
success of pro-LGBTQ public policy. While LGBTQ groups focus attention on urban centers, 
the stark reality is that rural areas consistently vote against LGBTQ issues and candidates. As the 
data presented suggests, rurality and urbanity affect LGBTQ politics differently. The failure to 
recognize the divide, as Hancock (2007a:65) suggests, will only “silence sub-group members in 
an effort to present a united front” politically. This subjugation will likely exacerbate the 
rural/urban divide among LGBTQ people and between LGBTQ people and rural American 








 For this study, I created and implemented a unique sample survey of 1216 LGBT-
identified adults living in the United States. I measure cognitive and affective aspects of sexual 
and racial identity – not simple dummy indicators – in order to analyze the effects of intersecting 
socially-constructed identities on political attitudes (i.e., toward income inequality, government 
provision of services, private vs. public rights, and policy-specifics such as gun control and 
immigration) and behaviors (i.e., political participation and alienation from the political process).  
 First, the data indicate that the social category of ‘sexual minority’ – here defined 
primarily by lesbian, gay, and bisexual identity – is heterogeneous in its cultural, economic, 
racial, and sexual composition. That is, identity politics-based conceptions of LGBTQ politics 
reveal sexual minorities to be distinctly liberal and Democratic, but to ascribe social or political 
homogeneity based solely on group association – especially when the categories of associations 
are imposed by social scientists – falsely represents the extent of within-group variation and 
further subjugates those at the margins of the community who do not share the dominant sexual, 
racial, class, etc. characteristics. Not only this, but identities are asymmetrically experienced 
across socially-constructed categories of sexuality and race. Exogeneous factors, including 
experience with stigmatization and social network diversity, as well as inhabiting multiple social 
identities contribute to variation in identity centrality, public and private regard.   
Second, the data presented here suggest that along with cognitive and affective 
evaluations of group association, internal affective evaluations of sexual and racial identity as 
well as external evaluations of societal acceptance of sexual and racial identities motivate the 
political attitudes and behaviors of sexual minorities. Furthermore, the data here provides 
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quantitative evidence of the pervasiveness of heterosexist and racist power structures in society 
and their perverse effect on sexual minority identity evaluations. For example, heterosexim 
appears to be so ubiquitous that even strongly-identified sexual minorities form notions about 
their own civil rights vis-à-vis dominant heterosexist acceptance of their sexuality. That is, 
policy liberalism is contingent upon society’s acceptance of LGBTQ civil rights claims. This 
appears to be a form of internal policing – where only those claims to rights are made which are 
consistent with societal approval.  
 Third, consistent with intersectionality, identity and stigmatization exhibit both main 
effects and interactive effects. In the case of stigmatization, when experienced across multiple 
social identities, the effect is sufficient to alter political outcomes. Whereas experiencing sexual 
or racial stigmatization, individually, motivates political participation and policy liberalism, 
discrimination across multiple axes of identity contributes to political alienation and policy 
conservatism.  
 Finally, the socio-economic and socio-cultural diversity of sexual minorities mirrors that 
of the broader society. What is apparent, however, is the asymmetrical economic disadvantage 
associated with sexual minority identity – compounded by racial and ethnic minority identity; 
and, the lack of social scientific inquiry regarding the political implications of religiosity among 
sexual minorities. Furthermore, the intersection of religious belief, socio-economics, and 
geography, i.e., the rural/urban divide, among sexual minorities remain relatively unexplored in 
political science research. The data here indicate that each represent significant sources of 





Limitations of Identity Research 
 It should be noted that in adopting intersectional theory and methodology, I implicitly 
and explicitly accept the mutability of identity. The concept of identity mutability encompasses a 
temporal aspect. That is, identity can (and will) change over time (Bowleg 2008). One may 
identify as a lesbian, but days, months, or years later, one may instead identify as bisexual. 
Likewise, one may identify as ‘mixed race,’ but through the course of one’s life, one may 
become more strongly identified with specific aspects of one’s ethnicity (Omi and Winant 1994). 
So, intersectional attitudinal or behavioral research must come with a caveat that the identity 
presented at the time of interview or survey instrument administration may not be the same 
identity presented upon the next interview or survey. For this reason, longitudinal research 
designs may be better able to analyze how changes in identity affect political attitudes and 
behaviors over time (Diamond and Butterworth 2008; Diamond 2003a; Diamond 2003b). As 
recognized in previous footnotes, I adopt the assumption that identities are “coherent enough to 
be recognized, yet fluid enough to be interrogated” (Honeychurch 1996:345). That is, the survey 
responses collected by this study represent the identity of the respondent – and convey the 
behavior and attitudinal influences of that identity – at the time of the survey, although that 
identity may change over time. 
 It is also important to recognize that this research project uses statistical tools of analysis 
which assume survey data are collected from a probability sample. Because of the financial and 
physical limitations associated with LGBT-identity research, a probability sample is difficult to 
obtain. As Appendix A shows, however, the sample is representative of the LGBT population in 
the United States and closely mirrors – in demographic composition – other recent studies (Pew 
Research Center 2013).  
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Appendix A: Codebook 
 
S1: Political Attitudes 
The following questions will present you with a series of statements about various political 
issues or polices. Please tell us the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
 
Q1a. [ROG1]: The government should try to ensure that all Americans have such things as 
jobs, health care, and housing.  
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 28 2.3   
1 Strongly Disagree 66 5.5 5.6  
2 Disagree 45 3.7 3.8  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 82 6.9 6.9  
4 Agree 439 36.9 37  
5 Strongly Agree 556 46.8 46.8  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1188 28 1.00 5.00 4.15 1.07 
 
Q1b. [ROG2]: The main reason that government has gotten bigger over the years is 
because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 28 2.3   
1 Strongly Disagree 103 8.5 8.7  
2 Disagree 242 19.9 20.4  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 343 28.2 28.9  
4 Agree 320 26.3 26.9  
5 Strongly Agree 180 14.8 15.2  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1188 28 1.00 5.00 3.29 2.27 
 
Q1c. [ROG3]: The free market can handle today’s complex economic problems without 
government being involved.  
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 28 2.3   
1 Strongly Disagree 154 12.7 13.0  
2 Disagree 318 26.2 26.8  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 357 26.4 30.1  
4 Agree 263 21.6 22.1  
5 Strongly Agree 96 7.9 8.1  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1188 28 1.00 5.00 2.85 1.14 
 
Q2a. [PR1]: There should be a strictly enforced law requiring businesses to serve persons 
regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
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 Refused/Blank 28 2.3   
1 Strongly Disagree 40 3.3 3.4  
2 Disagree 54 4.4 4.5  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 96 7.9 8.1  
4 Agree 265 21.8 22.3  
5 Strongly Agree 733 60.3 61.7  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1188 28 1.00 5.00 4.34 1.03 
 
Q2b. [PR2]: Regardless of their own views, an employer should be required to hire workers 
without regard to sexual orientation. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 28 2.3   
1 Strongly Disagree 18 1.5 1.5  
2 Disagree 24 2.0 2.0  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 71 5.8 6.0  
4 Agree 238 19.6 20.0  
5 Strongly Agree 837 68.8 70.5  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1188 28 1.00 5.00 4.55 .818 
 
Q3a. [ES1]: More equality of income would avoid conflicts between people at different 
income levels. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 28 2.3   
1 Strongly Disagree 41 3.4 3.5  
2 Disagree 127 10.4 10.7  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 219 18.0 18.4  
4 Agree 453 37.3 38.1  
5 Strongly Agree 348 28.6 29.3  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1188 28 1.00 5.00 3.79 1.08 
 
Q3b. [ES2]: Incomes should not be more equal, because everybody’s contribution to society 
is not equally important. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 28 2.3   
1 Strongly Disagree 205 16.9 17.3  
2 Disagree 288 23.7 24.2  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 290 23.8 24.4  
4 Agree 284 23.4 23.9  
5 Strongly Agree 121 10.0 10.2  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 




Q3c. [ES3]: Incomes should be more equal, because every family’s needs for food, housing, 
and so on, are the same. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 28 2.3   
1 Strongly Disagree 68 5.6 5.7  
2 Disagree 187 15.4 15.7  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 225 18.5 18.9  
4 Agree 386 31.7 32.5  
5 Strongly Agree 322 26.5 27.1  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1188 28 1.00 5.00 3.59 1.20 
 
Q4a. [PS1]: Government should do more to protect the rights of gun owners in the United 
States. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 28 2.3   
1 Strongly Disagree 208 17.1 17.5  
2 Disagree 264 21.7 22.2  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 275 22.6 23.1  
4 Agree 268 22.1 22.6  
5 Strongly Agree 172 14.1 14.5  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1188 28 1.00 5.00 2.94 1.30 
 
Q4b. [PS2]: Immigrants to the United States burden the country because they take our 
jobs. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 28 2.3   
1 Strongly Disagree 373 30.7 31.4  
2 Disagree 312 25.7 26.3  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 200 16.4 16.8  
4 Agree 190 15.6 16.0  
5 Strongly Agree 113 9.3 9.5  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1188 28 1.00 5.00 2.45 1.32 
 
Q4c. [PS3]: There should be no restrictions on the ability of a woman to get an abortion. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 28 2.3   
1 Strongly Disagree 94 7.7 7.9  
2 Disagree 131 10.8 11.0  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 177 14.6 14.9  
4 Agree 278 22.9 23.4  
5 Strongly Agree 508 41.8 42.8  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
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1188 28 1.00 5.00 3.82 1.30 
 
 
S2: Political Behavior 
S2a. Please tell us whether you often, sometimes, rarely, or never take part in each of the 
following activities.  
 
Q5a. [PB1]: Vote for a presidential candidate in a primary or election caucus. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 38 3.1   
1 Never 117 9.6 9.9  
2 Rarely 97 8.0 8.2  
3 Sometimes 216 17.8 18.3  
4 Often 748 61.5 63.5  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St. Dev 
1178 38 1.00 4.00 3.35 .995 
 
Q5b. [PB2]: Vote for a presidential candidate in a general election. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 38 3.1   
1 Never 75 6.2 6.4  
2 Rarely 69 5.7 5.9  
3 Sometimes 188 15.5 16.0  
4 Often 846 69.6 71.8  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St. Dev 
1178 38 1.00 4.00 3.53 .865 
 
Q5c. [PB3]: Try to show people why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 38 3.1   
1 Never 147 12.1 12.5  
2 Rarely 247 20.3 21.0  
3 Sometimes 476 39.1 40.4  
4 Often 308 25.3 26.1  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St. Dev 
1178 38 1.00 4.00 2.80 .965 
 
Q5d. [PB4]: Attend political meetings or rallies. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 38 3.1   
1 Never 502 41.3 42.6  
2 Rarely 335 27.5 28.4  
3 Sometimes 240 19.7 20.4  
4 Often 101 8.3 8.6  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St. Dev 
257 
 
1178 38 1.00 4.00 1.94 .985 
 
Q5e. [PB5]: Contribute money to a political party, candidate, or other political cause. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 38 3.1   
1 Never 570 46.9 48.4  
2 Rarely 264 21.7 22.4  
3 Sometimes 249 20.5 21.1  
4 Often 95 7.8 8.1  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St. Dev 
1178 38 1.00 4.00 1.88 1.00 
 
Q5f. [PB6]: Volunteer with a political interest group. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 38 3.1   
1 Never 606 49.8 51.4  
2 Rarely 277 22.8 23.5  
3 Sometimes 204 16.8 17.3  
4 Often 91 7.5 7.7  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St. Dev 
1178 38 1.00 4.00 1.81 .981 
 
S2b. Please tell us to what extent you agree with the following statements.  
 
Q6a. [PA1]: Sometimes governmental and political affairs look so complex that I am 
unable to understand them. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 38 3.1   
1 Strongly Disagree 126 10.4 10.7  
2 Disagree 251 20.6 21.3  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 275 22.6 23.3  
4 Agree 413 34.0 35.1  
5 Strongly Agree 113 9.3 9.6  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1178 38 1.00 5.00 3.11 1.16 
 
Q6b. [PA2]: I think that other than voting there is no way whereby we can influence 
governmental decision-making. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 38 3.1   
1 Strongly Disagree 212 17.4 18.0  
2 Disagree 409 33.6 34.7  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 229 18.8 19.4  
4 Agree 228 18.8 19.4  
5 Strongly Agree 100 8.2 8.5  
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Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1178 38 1.00 5.00 1.48 .363 
 
Q6c. [PA3]: If government officials mistreat us we are unable to do anything against them. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 38 3.1   
1 Strongly Disagree 190 15.6 16.1  
2 Disagree 346 28.5 29.4  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 179 14.7 15.2  
4 Agree 310 25.5 26.3  
5 Strongly Agree 153 12.6 13.0  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1178 38 1.00 5.00 1.71 .088 
 
Q6d. [PA4]: The government does not care for people like me. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 38 3.1   
1 Strongly Disagree 45 3.7 3.8  
2 Disagree 186 15.3 15.8  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 321 26.4 27.2  
4 Agree 384 31.6 32.6  
5 Strongly Agree 242 19.9 20.5  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1178 38 1.00 5.00 3.50 1.09 
 
 
Section 3: Sexual Identity 
The following questions concern your feelings about different aspects of your sexual orientation. 
 
Q7: [SI]: Do you consider yourself as: 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 41 3.4   
1 Gay 357 29.4 30.4  
2 Lesbian 378 22.9 23.7  
3 Bisexual 521 42.8 44.3  
4 Not Listed [write-in] 19 1.6 1.6  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1175 41 1.00 4.00 3.50 1.09 
 
S3a: Sexual Identity Centrality 
[For each statement, insert value from Q7] 
Q8a. [SIC1]: Overall being, [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] has very little to do 
with how I feel about myself. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
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1 Strongly Disagree 100 8.2 8.6  
2 Disagree 235 19.3 20.8  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 162 13.3 13.9  
4 Agree 372 30.5 32.1  
5 Strongly Agree 290 23.8 25.0  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 3.44 1.29 
 
Q8b. [SIC2]: In general, being [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] is an important 
part of my self-image. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 68 5.5 5.8  
2 Disagree 203 16.6 17.5  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 294 24.1 25.3  
4 Agree 383 31.4 33.0  
5 Strongly Agree 211 17.3 18.2  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 3.40 1.14 
 
Q8c. [SIC3]: My destiny is tied to the destiny of other [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual 
Minority] people. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 225 8.2 8.6  
2 Disagree 308 19.3 20.8  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 267 13.3 13.9  
4 Agree 258 30.5 32.1  
5 Strongly Agree 101 23.8 25.0  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 2.74 1.24 
 
Q8d. [SIC4]: Being [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] is unimportant to my sense of 
what kind of person I am. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 116 9.5 10.0  
2 Disagree 228 18.7 19.6  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 192 15.7 16.5  
4 Agree 325 26.7 28.0  
5 Strongly Agree 298 24.5 25.7  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 




Q8e. [SIC5]: I have a strong sense of belonging to the [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual 
Minority] community. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 128 10.5 11.0  
2 Disagree 216 17.7 18.6  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 355 29.1 30.6  
4 Agree 302 24.8 26.0  
5 Strongly Agree 158 12.9 13.6  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 3.12 1.91 
 
Q8f. This is an attention filter. Please select ‘Strongly Disagree.’ 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 1159 95.3 100.0  
2 Disagree  0 0  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree  0 0  
4 Agree  0 0  
5 Strongly Agree  0 0  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 1.00 1 0 
 
Q8g. [SIC6]: I have a strong attachment to other [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] 
people. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 67 5.5 5.7  
2 Disagree 140 11.5 12.0  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 358 29.4 30.8  
4 Agree 424 34.8 36.5  
5 Strongly Agree 170 13.9 14.6  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 3.42 1.06 
 
Q8h. [SIC7]: Being [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] is an important reflection of 
who I am. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 84 6.9 7.2  
2 Disagree 179 14.7 15.4  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 286 23.5 24.6  
4 Agree 431 35.4 37.1  
5 Strongly Agree 179 14.7 15.4  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
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1159 57 1.00 5.00 3.38 1.13 
 
Q8i. [SIC8]: Being [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] is not a major factor in my 
social relationships.  
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 92 7.5 7.9  
2 Disagree 207 17.0 17.8  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 208 17.1 17.9  
4 Agree 402 33.0 34.6  
5 Strongly Agree 250 20.5 21.5  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 3.44 1.22 
 
S3b: Sexual Identity Private Regard 
Q9a. [SIPr1]: I feel good about being [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority]. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 12 .98 1.0  
2 Disagree 41 3.3 3.5  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 153 12.5 13.2  
4 Agree 441 36.2 38.0  
5 Strongly Agree 512 42.1 44.1  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 4.20 .875 
 
Q9b. [SIPr2]: I am happy that I am [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority]. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 12 .98 1.0  
2 Disagree 43 3.5 3.7  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 203 16.6 17.5  
4 Agree 414 34.0 35.7  
5 Strongly Agree 487 40.0 42.0  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 4.13 .904 
 
Q9c. [SIPr3]: I feel that [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] people have made major 
accomplishments and advancements. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 12 .98 1.0  
2 Disagree 26 2.1 2.2  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 212 17.4 18.2  
4 Agree 437 35.9 37.7  
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5 Strongly Agree 472 38.8 40.7  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 4.14 .867 
 
Q9d. [SIPr4]: I often regret that I am [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority]. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 559 45.9 48.2  
2 Disagree 328 26.9 28.3  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 135 11.1 11.6  
4 Agree 87 7.1 7.5  
5 Strongly Agree 50 4.1 4.3  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 1.91 1.13 
 
Q9e. [SIPr5]: I am proud to be [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority]. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 12 .98 1.0  
2 Disagree 52 3.3 4.4  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 236 12.5 20.3  
4 Agree 352 36.2 30.3  
5 Strongly Agree 507 42.1 43.7  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 4.11 .949 
 
Q9f. [SIPr6]: I feel that the [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] community has made 
valuable contributions to this society. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 20 1.6 1.7  
2 Disagree 31 2.5 2.6  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 225 18.5 19.4  
4 Agree 420 34.5 36.2  
5 Strongly Agree 463 38.0 39.9  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 4.10 .920 
 
S3c: Sexual Identity Public Regard 
Q10a. [SIPu1]: Overall [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] people are considered 
good by others. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 54 4.4 4.6  
2 Disagree 251 20.6 21.6  
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3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 353 29.0 30.4  
4 Agree 370 27.1 31.9  
5 Strongly Agree 131 10.7 11.3  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 3.23 1.05 
 
Q10b. [SIPu2]: In general, others respect [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] people. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 77 6.3 6.6  
2 Disagree 331 27.2 28.5  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 343 28.2 29.5  
4 Agree 313 25.7 27.0  
5 Strongly Agree 95 7.8 8.2  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 3.01 1.07 
 
Q10c. [SIPu3]: Most people, on average, consider [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] 
people to be more ineffective than other social groups. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 110 9.0 9.4  
2 Disagree 273 22.4 23.5  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 431 35.4 37.1  
4 Agree 262 21.5 22.6  
5 Strongly Agree 83 6.8 7.1  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 2.94 1.12 
 
Q10d. [SIPu4]: [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] people are not respected by the 
broader society. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 43 3.5 3.7  
2 Disagree 168 13.8 14.4  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 298 24.5 25.7  
4 Agree 498 40.9 42.9  
5 Strongly Agree 152 12.5 13.1  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 3.47 1.01 
 
Q10e. [SIPu5]: In general, other groups view [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] 
people in a positive manner. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
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1 Strongly Disagree 61 5.0 5.2  
2 Disagree 325 26.7 28.0  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 430 35.3 37.1  
4 Agree 276 22.6 23.8  
5 Strongly Agree 67 5.5 5.7  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 2.96 .960 
 
Q10f. [SIPu6]: Society views [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] people as an asset.  
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 57 4.6   
1 Strongly Disagree 115 9.4 9.9  
2 Disagree 356 29.2 30.7  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 453 37.2 39.0  
4 Agree 175 14.3 15.1  
5 Strongly Agree 60 4.9 5.1  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1159 57 1.00 5.00 2.74 .999 
 
S3d: Sexual Identity Stigma 
We would like to know how other people have treated you because of your sexual orientation. 
Please tell us how often, if at all, any of the following have happened to you because of your 
sexual orientation. 
 
Q11a. [SIS1]: Been threatened or physically attacked. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 61 5.0   
1 Never 611 50.2 52.9  
2 Rarely 287 23.6 24.8  
3 Sometimes 207 17.0 17.9  
4 Often 50 4.1 4.3  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1155 61 1.00 4.00 1.74 .902 
 
Q11b. [SIS2]: Been subject to any slurs or jokes. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 61 5.0   
1 Never 246 20.2 21.3  
2 Rarely 288 23.7 24.9  
3 Sometimes 446 36.7 38.6  
4 Often 175 14.4 15.2  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1155 61 1.00 4.00 2.48 .990 
 
Q11c. [SIS3]: Been treated unfairly by an employer. 
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Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 61 5.0   
1 Never 627 51.6 54.3  
2 Rarely 224 18.4 19.4  
3 Sometimes 221 18.2 19.1  
4 Often 83 6.8 7.2  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1155 61 1.00 4.00 1.79 .990 
 
Q11d. [SIS4]: Been made to feel uncomfortable in a public place such as a movie theater or 
restaurant. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 61 5.0   
1 Never 455 37.4 39.4  
2 Rarely 285 23.4 24.7  
3 Sometimes 296 24.3 25.6  
4 Often 119 9.8 10.3  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1155 61 1.00 4.00 2.07 1.02 
 
Q11e. [SIS5]: Been offended by a religious group or official. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 61 5.0   
1 Never 309 25.4 26.8  
2 Rarely 185 15.2 16.0  
3 Sometimes 348 28.6 30.1  
4 Often 313 25.7 27.1  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1155 61 1.00 4.00 2.58 1.15 
 
Q11f. [SIS6]: Been offended by a friend. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 61 5.0   
1 Never 425 35.0 36.8  
2 Rarely 361 29.7 31.3  
3 Sometimes 273 22.5 23.6  
4 Often 96 7.9 8.3  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1155 61 1.00 4.00 2.03 .968 
 
Q11g. [SIS7]: Been offended by a family member. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 61 5.0   
1 Never 355 29.2 30.7  
2 Rarely 286 23.5 24.8  
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3 Sometimes 321 26.4 27.8  
4 Often 193 15.9 16.7  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 




Section 4: Racial Identity 
 
Q12. [RI]: Which of the following best describes your race/ethnicity? 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 61 5.0   
1 Black, Not Latino/a 89 7.3 7.7  
2 Latino/a 108 8.9 9.4  
3 White, Not Latino/a 888 73.6 76.9  
4 Not Listed Here (write-in) 70 5.8 6.1  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1155 61 1.00 4.00 2.81 .654 
 
S4a: Racial Identity Centrality 
 
[For each statement, insert value from Q13] 
Q13a. [RIC1]: Overall being, [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] has very little to do 
with how I feel about myself. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 85 6.6 7.4  
2 Disagree 194 15.9 16.9  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 185 15.2 16.1  
4 Agree 401 32.9 34.9  
5 Strongly Agree 283 23.2 24.6  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 3.52 1.23 
 
Q13b. [RIC2]: In general, being [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] is an important 
part of my self-image. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 161 13.2 14.0  
2 Disagree 213 17.5 18.5  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 300 24.6 26.1  
4 Agree 306 25.1 36.6  
5 Strongly Agree 168 13.8 14.6  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 




Q13c. [RIC3]: My destiny is tied to the destiny of other [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial 
Minority] people. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 233 19.1 20.3  
2 Disagree 257 21.1 22.3  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 303 24.9 26.3  
4 Agree 252 20.7 21.9  
5 Strongly Agree 103 8.4 8.9  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 2.76 1.24 
 
Q13d. [RIC4]: Being [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] is unimportant to my sense 
of what kind of person I am. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 85 6.6 7.4  
2 Disagree 169 13.8 14.7  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 207 17.0 18.0  
4 Agree 369 30.3 32.1  
5 Strongly Agree 318 26.1 27.7  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 3.58 1.24 
 
Q13e. [RIC5]: I have a strong sense of belonging to the [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial 
Minority] community. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 121 9.9 10.5  
2 Disagree 241 19.8 20.9  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 367 30.1 31.9  
4 Agree 275 22.6 23.9  
5 Strongly Agree 144 11.8 12.5  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 3.06 1.17 
 
Q13f. This is an attention filter. Please select ‘Strongly Agree.’ 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 0 0 0  
2 Disagree 0 0 0  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 0 0 0  
4 Agree 0 0 0  
5 Strongly Agree 1148 94.4 100.0  
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Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 5.00 5.00 5 0 
 
Q13g. [RIC6]: I have a strong attachment to other [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial 
Minority] people. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 93 7.6 8.1  
2 Disagree 191 15.7 16.6  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 400 32.8 34.8  
4 Agree 328 26.9 28.5  
5 Strongly Agree 136 11.1 11.8  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 3.19 1.10 
 
Q14h. [RIC7]: Being [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] is an important reflection of 
who I am. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 177 14.5 15.4  
2 Disagree 232 19.0 20.2  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 314 25.8 27.3  
4 Agree 280 23.0 24.3  
5 Strongly Agree 145 11.9 12.6  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 2.98 1.25 
 
Q13i. [RIC8]: Being [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] is not a major factor in my 
social relationships.  
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 64 5.2 5.5  
2 Disagree 161 13.2 14.0  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 244 20.0 21.2  
4 Agree 389 31.9 33.8  
5 Strongly Agree 290 23.8 25.2  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 3.59 1.16 
 
S4b: Racial Identity Private Regard 
Q14a. [RIPr1]: I feel good about being [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority]. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 40 3.2 3.4  
2 Disagree 70 5.7 6.1  
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3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 367 30.1 31.9  
4 Agree 398 32.7 34.6  
5 Strongly Agree 273 22.4 23.7  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 3.69 1.01 
 
Q14b. [RIPr2]: I am happy that I am [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority]. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 20 1.6 1.7  
2 Disagree 38 3.1 3.3  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 391 32.1 34.0  
4 Agree 401 32.9 34.9  
5 Strongly Agree 298 24.5 25.9  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 3.80 .922 
 
Q14c. [RIPr3]: I feel that [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people have made 
major accomplishments and advancements. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 15 1.2 1.3  
2 Disagree 28 2.3 2.4  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 191 15.7 16.6  
4 Agree 521 42.8 45.3  
5 Strongly Agree 393 32.3 34.2  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 4.08 .846 
 
Q14d. [RIPr4]: I often regret that I am [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority]. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 448 36.8 39.0  
2 Disagree 289 23.7 25.1  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 232 19.0 20.2  
4 Agree 133 10.9 11.5  
5 Strongly Agree 46 3.7 4.0  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 2.16 1.17 
 
Q14e. [RIPr5]: I am proud to be [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority]. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 38 3.1 3.3  
2 Disagree 97 7.9 8.4  
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3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 369 30.3 32.1  
4 Agree 314 25.8 27.3  
5 Strongly Agree 330 27.1 28.7  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 3.69 1.07 
 
Q14f. [RIPr6]: I feel that the [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] community has 
made valuable contributions to this society. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 20 1.6 1.7  
2 Disagree 31 2.5 2.7  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 216 17.7 18.8  
4 Agree 480 39.4 41.8  
5 Strongly Agree 401 32.9 34.9  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 4.05 .894 
 
S4c: Sexual Identity Public Regard 
Q15a. [RIPu1]: Overall [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people are considered 
good by others. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 50 4.1 1.7  
2 Disagree 171 14.0 2.7  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 337 27.7 18.8  
4 Agree 412 33.8 41.8  
5 Strongly Agree 178 14.6 34.9  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 3.43 1.05 
 
Q15b. [RIPu2]: In general, others respect [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 42 3.4 3.6  
2 Disagree 135 11.1 11.7  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 313 25.7 27.2  
4 Agree 473 38.8 41.2  
5 Strongly Agree 185 15.2 16.1  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 3.54 1.01 
 
Q15c. [RIPu3]: Most people, on average, consider [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] 
people to be more ineffective than other social groups. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
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 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 186 15.2 16.2  
2 Disagree 340 27.9 29.6  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 362 29.7 31.5  
4 Agree 176 14.4 15.3  
5 Strongly Agree 84 6.9 7.3  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 2.67 1.13 
 
Q15d. [RIPu4]: [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people are not respected by the 
broader society. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 209 17.1 18.2  
2 Disagree 243 19.9 29.8  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 293 24.0 25.5  
4 Agree 212 17.4 18.4  
5 Strongly Agree 91 7.4 7.9  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 2.68 1.19 
 
Q15e. [RIPu5]: In general, other groups view [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] 
people in a positive manner. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 53 4.3 4.6  
2 Disagree 181 14.8 15.7  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 360 29.6 31.3  
4 Agree 397 32.6 34.5  
5 Strongly Agree 157 12.9 13.6  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 3.36 1.04 
 
Q15f. [RIPu6]: Society views [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people as an asset.  
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 68 5.5   
1 Strongly Disagree 41 3.3 3.5  
2 Disagree 100 8.2 8.7  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree 346 28.4 30.1  
4 Agree 460 37.8 40.0  
5 Strongly Agree 201 16.5 17.5  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1148 68 1.00 5.00 3.59 .981 
 
S4d: Racial Identity Stigma 
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We would like to know how other people have treated you because of your race or ethnicity. 
Please tell us how often, if at all, any of the following have happened to you because of your race 
or ethnicity. 
 
Q16a. [RIS1]: Been threatened or physically attacked. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 70 5.7   
1 Never 742 61.0 64.7  
2 Rarely 232 19.0 20.4  
3 Sometimes 124 10.1 10.8  
4 Often 48 3.9 4.1  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1146 70 1.00 4.00 1.54 .846 
 
Q16b. [RIS2]: Been subject to any slurs or jokes. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 70 5.7   
1 Never 468 38.4 40.8  
2 Rarely 330 27.1 28.8  
3 Sometimes 278 22.8 24.2  
4 Often 70 5.7 6.1  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1146 70 1.00 4.00 1.95 .945 
 
Q16c. [RIS3]: Been treated unfairly by an employer. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 70 5.7   
1 Never 800 65.7 69.8  
2 Rarely 155 12.7 13.5  
3 Sometimes 137 11.2 11.9  
4 Often 54 4.4 4.7  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1146 70 1.00 4.00 1.51 .878 
 
Q16d. [RIS4]: Been made to feel uncomfortable in a public place such as a movie theater or 
restaurant. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 70 5.7   
1 Never 726 59.7 63.3  
2 Rarely 223 18.3 19.4  
3 Sometimes 154 12.6 13.4  
4 Often 43 3.5 3.7  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 




Q16e. [RIS5]: Been offended by a religious group or official. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 70 5.7   
1 Never 782 64.3 68.2  
2 Rarely 141 11.5 12.3  
3 Sometimes 156 12.8 13.6  
4 Often 67 5.5 5.8  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1146 70 1.00 4.00 1.57 .932 
 
Q16f. [RIS6]: Been offended by a friend. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 70 5.7   
1 Never 755 62.0 65.8  
2 Rarely 206 16.9 17.9  
3 Sometimes 138 11.3 12.0  
4 Often 47 3.8 4.1  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1146 70 1.00 4.00 1.54 .857 
 
Q16g. [RIS7]: Been offended by a family member. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 70 5.7   
1 Never 882 72.5 76.9  
2 Rarely 119 9.7 10.3  
3 Sometimes 93 7.6 8.1  
4 Often 53 4.3 4.5  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1146 70 1.00 4.00 1.40 .821 
 
 
Section 5: Social Networks 
 
The following questions are about your close friends and how alike or different you are. On a 
scale from 0 to 6, where 0 means none and 6 means all, tell us how many of your close friends 
SHARE each of the following characteristics with you. 
 
Q17a. [SN1]: Your sexual orientation. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 90 7.4   
0 None 112 9.2 9.9  
1  132 10.9 11.7  
2  194 16.0 17.2  
3  240 19.7 21.3  
4  206 16.9 18.3  
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5  130 10.7 11.5  
6 All 112 9.2 9.9  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1126 90 0.00 7.00 4.01 1.75 
 
Q17b. [SN2]: Your gender. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 82 6.7   
0 None 30 2.5 2.6  
1  36 3.0 3.2  
2  87 7.2 7.7  
3  290 23.8 25.6  
4  285 23.4 25.1  
5  254 20.9 22.4  
6 All 152 12.5 13.4  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1134 82 0.00 7.00 4.88 1.42 
 
Q17c. [SN3]: Your race or ethnicity. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 82 6.6   
0 None 41 3.4 3.6  
1  50 4.1 4.4  
2  87 7.2 7.7  
3  208 17.1 18.3  
4  260 21.4 22.9  
5  294 24.2 25.9  
6 All 194 16.0 17.1  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1134 82 0.00 7.00 4.99 1.55 
 
Q17d. [SN4]: Your religion. 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 240 19.7   
0 None 118 9.7 12.1  
1  130 10.7 13.3  
2  150 12.3 15.4  
3  239 19.7 24.5  
4  127 10.4 13.0  
5  118 9.7 12.1  
6 All 94 7.7 9.6  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
976 240 0.00 7.00 3.88 1.80 
 
Q17e. [SN5]: Your political party. 
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Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 174 14.3   
0 None 67 5.5 6.4  
1  60 4.9 5.8  
2  88 7.2 8.4  
3  234 19.2 22.5  
4  179 14.7 17.2  
5  234 19.2 22.5  
6 All 180 14.8 17.3  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 




Section 6: Context 
 
Q18. [Gender]: Which of the following best describes you: 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 73 6.0   
1 Male 539 44.3 47.2  
2 Female 563 46.3 49.3  
3 Male-to-Female Transgender 16 1.3 1.4  
4 Female-to-Male Transgender 17 1.4 1.5  
5 Not Listed [write-in] 8 0.7 0.7  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1143 73 1.00 5.00 1.59 .666 
 
Q19. [Rel1]: Which of the following best describes your religious affiliation: 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 73 6.0   
1 Muslim 8 0.7 0.7  
2 Hindu 5 0.4 0.4  
3 Buddhist 26 2.1 2.3  
4 Christian 555 45.6 48.6  
5 Jewish 42 3.5 3.7  
6 Atheist 273 22.5 23.9  
7 Not Listed [write-in] 234 19.2 20.5  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1143 73 1.00 7.00 5.08 1.33 
 
[If Christian is selected from Q20.] 
Q20. [Rel2]: Which of the following best describes your religious denomination: 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 661 54.4   
1 Catholic 258 21.2 46.5  
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2 Mainline Protestant 93 7.6 16.8  
3 Evangelical Protestant 49 4.0 8.8  
4 African-American Protestant 19 1.6 3.4  
5 Mormon 7 .6 1.3  
6 Not Listed [write-in] 129 10.6 23.2  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
555 661 1.00 6.00 2.66 2.02 
 
Q21. [Aff]: Do you attend a church that is affirming of your sexuality? 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 75 6.2   
1 Yes 206 16.9 18.1  
2 No 821 67.5 72.0  
3 I don’t know 114 9.4 10.0  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1141 75 1.00 3.00 1.92 .524 
 
Q22. [Employ]: Which of the following best describes your current employment situation: 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 75 6.2   
1 Note Employed 295 24.3 25.9  
2 Retired 127 10.4 11.1  
3 Employed Part-time 196 16.1 17.2  
4 Employed Full-time 523 43.0 45.8  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1141 75 1.00 4.00 2.83 1.25 
 
Q23. [Urb]: Which of the following best describes where you currently live: 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 75 6.2   
1 Rural city 231 19.0 20.2  
2 Small city (> 50,000 people) 236 19.4 20.7  
3 Medium city (> 100,000 people) 323 26.6 28.3  
4 Large city (> 500,000 people) 351 28.9 30.8  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1144 75 1.00 4.00 2.70 1.11 
 
Q24. [Born]: Were you born in the United States, or in another country? 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 75 6.2   
1 Born in the United States, Puerto 
Rico, or other U.S. territory 
1090 89.6 95.5  
2 Born in a different country 51 4.2 4.5  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 




Q25. [Age]: What is your current age (in years)? 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 0    
18      
…      
…      
79      
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1216 0 18.00 79.00 54.0 366.9 
 
Q26. [Edu]: What is the highest grade you completed in school? 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 75 6.2   
1 Less than high school 21 1.7 1.8  
2 High school graduate 185 15.2 16.2  
3 Some college 320 26.3 28.0  
4 2-year degree 129 10.6 11.3  
5 4-year degree 292 24.9 25.6  
6 Professional degree 164 13.5 14.4  
7 Doctorate 30 2.5 2.6  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1141 75 1.00 7.00 3.96 1.47 
 
Q27. [Income]: Last year, that is in 2015, what was your total family income from all 
sources? 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 75 6.2   
1 Less than $20,000 160 13.2 14.0  
2 $20,000 to under $30,000 176 14.5 15.4  
3 $30,000 to under $40,000 140 11.5 12.3  
4 $40,000 to under $50,000 118 9.7 10.3  
5 $50,000 to under $75,000 221 18.2 19.4  
6 $75,000 to under $100,000 157 12.9 13.8  
7 $100,000 to under $150,000 110 9.0 9.6  
8 $150,000 or more 59 4.9 5.2  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1141 75 1.00 8.00 4.11 2.10 
 
Q28. [Ideo]: In general, how would you describe your political views? 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 75 6.2   
1 Very conservative 36 3.0 3.2  
2 Conservative 93 7.6 8.2  
3 Moderate 328 27.0 28.7  
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4 Liberal 314 25.8 27.5  
5 Very Liberal 301 24.8 26.4  
6 None of these 69 5.7 6.0  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1141 75 1.00 6.00 3.84 1.17 
 
Q29. [Party]: In politics today, do you consider yourself as a: 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 75 6.2   
1 Republican 167 13.7 14.6  
2 Democrat 611 50.2 53.5  
3 Independent 317 26.1 27.8  
4 Something else [write-in] 46 3.8 4.0  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 
1141 75 1.00 4.00 2.21 .735 
 
[If Independent or Something else is selected from Q30.] 
Q30. [Partyln]: As of today, do you lean more toward 
Value Label Frequency % Valid %  
 Refused/Blank 853 70.1   
1 The Republican Party 38 3.1 10.5  
2 The Democratic Party 135 11.1 37.2  
3 Neither party 190 15.6 52.3  
Valid Invalid Min Max Mean St.Dev 














Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables used in OLS regression estimation: 
Variable Minimum Mean Maximum St. 
Dev 

































2 8.90 10 1.66 1.84 6.53 .742 1188 
Egalitarianism 
Scale 
3 7.46 15 2.73 .318 2.73 .664 1188 
Political 
Behavior Scale 
























Immigration 1 2.45 5 1.32 .497 2.02 - 1188 














































































































































































Gender ID 0 .511 1 .500 -.044 1.00 - 1135 
Network 
Diversity Scale 
0 11.0 30 6.05 .095 3.15 .680 1216 
Income 1 4.11 8 2.10 .060 1.87 - 1141 
Education 1 3.96 7 1.47 .089 1.94 - 1141 
Unemployment 0 .258 1 .438 1.10 2.21 - 1141 
Age 18 37.5 83 14.8 .736 2.60 - 1212 
Religious 
Affiliation 
1 2.06 3 .689 -.087 2.10 - 1143 
Urbanity 0 .491 1 .491 -.368 1.13 - 1141 
Ideology 1 3.83 6 1.17 -.233 2.59 - 1141 




Appendix C: Correlation Matrix 
Variable                   
SI Centrality 1.0
0 










               
SI Stigma .37 .10 -.24 1.0
0 
              
RI Centrality .20 -.04 .09 .01 1.0
0 
             
RI Public 
Regard  
-.10 .17 .21 -.20 .47 1.0
0 
            
RI Private 
Regard 





           





          
Gender -.02 .03 -.06 .07 -.10 -.16 -.11 -.03 1.0
0 
         
Network 
Diversity 
-.24 -.08 -.13 -.11 -.17 -.03 -.09 -.13 .04 1.0
0 
        
Income .07 .01 .11 .02 .07 .05 .06 .11 -.13 -.10 1.0
0 
       
Education .11 -.02 .06 .03 .09 .01 .08 .06 -.16 -.11 .44 1.0
0 
      
Unemploymen
t 
-.07 -.03 -.11 -.05 .00
1 
-.04 -.10 -.04 .13 .12 -.29 -.33 1.0
0 





Age -.03 .10 .08 -.23 .02 .15 .24 -.19 -.34 -.05 .09 .25 -.21 1.0
0 




.01 -.02 -.02 -.04 -.05 -.05 -.04 -.01 .00
7 
-.01 -.03 -.01 -.10 1.0
0 
   
Urban .09 .03 .05 .06 .04 -
.00
1 
-.08 .07 -.07 -.04 .14 .14 -.07 .02 .03 1.0
0 
  
Party ID .02 .03 -.04 .00
2 
-.08 -.10 -.09 -.07 .06 .08 -.07 -.05 .01 -.05 .04 -.02 1.0
0 
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